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SCHUMPETERIAN PERSPECTIVES
SUMMARY
This is an attempt to apply Schumpeterian theory to the study of
"international economics". The first chapter gives a brief out-
line of the Schumpeterian perspective, considers how it may apply
<and has been applied) to the study of international economics
and presents some preliminary hypotheses, to be further developed
and tested in later chapters. Chapter 2 uses the Schumpeterian
model of innovation-diffusion as a f ramewo rk for the study of
"why growth rates differ" between countries, while chapter 3
extends the analysis to include international trade - or "compe-
titiveness" - as well. The main finding of chapters 2-3 is that
differences in the growth of national technological activities,
whether measured through R&D or patent statistics, contribute
significantly to differences in economic growth and export per-
formance across countries. Chapter 4, which focuses on the rela-
tion between innovation-diffusion, structural changes in world
trade and export performance, extends the analysis of the prece-
ding chapters to the multi-sector frame-work. The results show
that the structural changes in world trade in the Post-War period
were most favourable for countries with a high level of national
technological activity, an advanced export structure and a large
domestic market. However, the rapid growth in world trade in this
period did at the same time allow countries on a lower level of
economic and technological development to catch up through imita-
tion and exploitation of cost-advantages. The countries least
favourably affected were small countries with a high level of
income and costs, but a relatively low level of national tech-
nological activity. Chapter 5 considers the problems of small,
developed countries in more detail, using the Nordic countries as
illustrations, while chapter 6 uses the same empirical material
to discuss the implications of innovation-diffusion for changes
in specialization patterns/intra-industry trade. The final chap-
ter (7) contains summary and conclusions.
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1CHAPTER 1
SCBUMPETERIAN PERSPECTIVES ON GROWTHAND TRADE
1.1 INTRODUCTION
This study attempts to apply Schumpeterian theory to the study of
growth and trade. Why? One important reason, to be discussed
below, relates to the problems encountered by researchers brought
up in the neoclassical tradition when confronted with Post-War
empirical evidence on growth and trade. Another, to be set out
following sections of this chapter, rests in the authors belief
in the fruitfulness of Schumpeterian theory when coming to grasp
with these problems.
From a historical point of view, the period from the end of the
Second World War to the early seventies was characterized by
exceptionally high and stable economic growth. At the same time
there have been large differences across countries in the rates
of growth. countries like the United states and Great Britain,
for example, have experienced much lower growth than most other
countries, whereas for instance Japan has had a rate of growth
far above the average. According to the neoclassical theory of
growth, the growth of a country is a function of the growth of
the factors of production and the growth of free knowledge
(exogenously given). Hence, we should expect the differences in
growth between countries to be explained by differences in the
growth of the factors of production. But even the most thorough
2studies have not succeeded in explaining the differences in
growth between countries in this way. This fact is sometimes
referred to as "the growth paradox" (Andersen (1984».
During the last decades, many countries have found themselves in
a situation where balance of payments problems have put
restrictions on the growth of domestic demand and employment. In
many cases, unused capacity, rising unemployment and balance of
payments problems have coexisted for a considerable period of
time. These problems, which are generally referred to as
"competitiveness problems", cannot be easily approached by a
theory based on neoclassical equilibrium assumptions. Following
these assumptions, prices and quantities will always adjust, and
full capacity utilization, including labour, and balanced trade
will always be ensured. Thus, to be theoretically consistent,
students of competitiveness problems have always had to start by
assuming a certain amount of "imperfection" or disequilibrium in
the markets. The most popular story of this kind, accepted by
many macro-economic modelers, predicts that if the level of unit
labour cos~ in a country grows relative to other countries, this
will cause the market shares of the country, domestically as well
as abroad, to decline, with detrimental effects for the external
balance, economic growth and employment. However, though widely
accepted, these predictions are not necessarily supported by
empiri~al findings. On the contrary, as Kaldor (1978) has pointed
out, a reverse relation can be established for several countries
and time spans, i. e. that increasing relative labour cost
corresponds to increasing market shares and vice versa. This is
3
often referred to as "the Kaldor paradox".
The strong growth in the Post-War period has been accompanied by
an even stronger growth in international trade. At the same time,
trade has to an increasing degree been of an "intra-industry"
character (Grubel and Lloyd (1975». That means that a country,
instead of exporting on set of commodities and importing another,
ends up by exporting and importing products that belong to the
same commodity groups. As a consequence, the structures of
production and trade among the industrialized countries have
become increasingly similar, i.e. they have become less and less
specialized. This clearly contradicts what should be expected
from traditional neoclassical trade theory (the Heckscher-Ohlin
theory). According to this theory, the very advantage of taking
part in international trade is based upon the opportunity for
each country to specialize in the production of commodities that
make extensive use of factors of production with which the
country concerned is relatively well equipped. Thus, following
this theory, we should expect countries to be increasingly
specialized through trade. We may label this "the specialization
paradox".
The growth paradox, the Kaldor paradox and the specialization
paradox are three examples of problems which, in spite of
considerable research efforts, have not yet been solved through
developments based on neoclassical theory. This, of course, is no
proof that it cannot be done. Nevertheless, it may be taken as an
indication that it may prove fruitful to search in other
4directions for a theory of growth and trade that is consistent
with what we can observe empirically. Further indications of this
can be found in the research that, building on assumptions other
than those of neoclassical equilibrium theory, has tried to
explain the phenomena referred to above. In fact, it can be
shown1 that this research, to a much larger extent than
generally acknowledged, has found its theoretical basis in the
works of Schumpeter. This, we shall argue, is no coincidence.
1.2 SCHUMPETER'S PERSPECTIVE
What basically distinguishes Schumpeter from the neoclassicals is
the role he attributes to innovation. According to Schumpeter,
innovation is the source of economic growth (and growth in
capital and labour), not the other way around:
"What we, unscientifically, call economic progress
means essentially putting productive resources to uses
hitherto untried in practice, and withdrawing them from
the uses they have served so far. This is what we call
"innovation" (Schumpeter(1928), p. 378)
"•• the general expansion of the environment we observe
-increase of population included-is the result of it
" (ibid, p. 377)
His concept of innovation is wide and covers both the
introduction of a new product in a new context, the application
of a new method of production or raw material, and the
introduction of a new form of organization.2 The capitalist
1 See section 3 of this chapter.
2 See, for instance, Schumpeter (1928), p. 377-8 and
Schumpeter (1934), p. 66.
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system differs, according to Schumpeter, from other social
systems by the fact that technological progress (innovation) ha~
been endogenized and become a condition for the reproduction of
the system. Indeed, he points out, "the atmosphere of industrial
revolutions - of "progress" - is the only one in which capitalism
can survive" (Schumpeter (1939) p. 1033)·. It is this endogenous
revolution of production and consumption patterns that Schumpeter
labels "the process of creative destruction" (Schumpeter (1943)
p. 83) - a label which since has been widely used (and misused).
Technological competition
The process that, according to Schumpeter, secures that "the
process of creative destruction" goes on, is technological
competition between the firms, which he describes vividly as
follows:3
"Economists are at long last emerging from the stage in
which price competition was all they saw. As soon as quality
competition and sales effort are admitted into the sacred
precincts of theory, the price variable is ousted from its
dominant position. However, it is still competition within a
rigid pattern of invariant conditions, methods of production
and forms of industrial organization in particular, that
practically monopolizes attention. But in capitalist reality
as distinguished from its textbook picture, it is not that
kind of competition which counts, but the competition from
the new commodity, the new technology, the new source of
supply, the new type of organization (the largest-scale unit
of control for instance) - competition which commands a
decisive cost or quality advantage and which strikes not at
the margins of the profits and the outputs of the existing
firms, but at their foundations and their very lives" (ibid.
p. 84).
3 It should be noted that this model was outlined much
earlier by Marx. However, Marx was mainly concerned with process
innovation. Schumpeter extended the framework by taking into
account both product and process innovation.
6A firm that successfully carries through an innovation, may sell
its product·~t a higher price or produce at a lower cost than its
competitors, and obtains in this way higher rate of profits than
the average. "It is the premium put upon successful innovation in
capitalist society and is temporary by nature: it will vanish in
the subsequent process of competition and adaptation" (Schumpeter
(1939) p. 105). To remain more profitable than other firms, a
firm will have to be continuously more innovative than the
average.
Clustering
According to Schumpeter, innovations are not evenly distributed
across industries or through time:
" on the contrary they tend to cluster, to come about in
bunches, simply because first some, and then most, firms
follow in the wake of successful innovation; second, that
innovations are not at any time distributed over the whole
economic system at random, but tend to concentrate in
certain sectors and their surroundings" (ibid. p. 100 f).
Why? In Schumpeterian theory, an entrepreneur is not the same as
a risk taker. On the contrary, he points out, "risk bearing is no
part of the entrepreneurial function" (ibid. p. 104). An
entrepreneur is essentially a person who is much more creative
than the average. This is a talent for which Schumpeter assumes
limited supply. In addition, since it is much easier to follow in
the wake of an important innovation than to make one, he assumes
that most entrepreneurs will prefer the former. This is what
Schumpeter labels "swarming" and describes as follows:
"Then other entrepreneurs follow, after them still others in
increasing number, in the path of innovation, which becomes
progressively smoothed for successors by accumulating
experience and vanishing obstacles. We know the reasons why
this is likely to happen in the same field or in-
technologically, as well as economically - related fields:
although in some respects a successful innovation will make
other innovations easier to carry out in any field, it
primarily facilitates them in the lines in which it may be
directly copied as a whole or in part or for which it opens
up new opportunities. Consequences begin to make themselves
felt overall in the system in perfectly logical
concatenation" (ibid. p. 131).
The logic, then, is the following: Important innovations depend
on the supply of entrepreneurs and are relatively rare. However,
when an important innovation has occurred, this will induce other
(minor) innovations in the same and related industries or
sectors. The original and the induced innovations create a
cluster that for some time will be the source of strong economic
activity.
Business cycles and long waves
The fact that innovations do not take place evenly over time, but
gather in clusters, causes, according to Schumpeter, business
cycles of varying lengths. Long waves, of fifty years or so, are
the results of interactions between a large number of shorter
cycles. He mentions three long waves: The first from the end of
the eighteenth century until around 1840 (the industrial
revolution), the second from then until around 1900, related to
stearn and steel, and a third from the turn of the century
onwards related to electricity, chemical, large-scale industry
and the internal combustion engine.
8Figure 1. BUSINESS CYCLE
Economic activity
Prosperity Recession Depression Recovery
Time
9Figure 1 shows Schumpeter's division of a business cycle into
phases. During the prosperity phase, the expansive effects of the
cluster of innovation will spread through the economy and cause
strong growth. This will partly take place through the induced
demand for capital goods, and partly through increased demand for
consumption goods, caused by an overall increase in employment
and wages.4 As the expansive effects work their way through the
system, the economy proceeds to a new phase, recession:
"We may note, again, that recession besides being a time of
harvesting the result of preceding innovation, is also a
time of harvesting its indirect effects. The new methods are
being copied and improved, adaptation to them or to the
impact of the new commodities consists in part in "induced
inventions"; some industries expand into new investment
opportunities created by the achievements of entrepreneurs,
others respond by rationalization of their technological and
commercial processes under pressure, much dead wood
disappears" (Schumpeter (1939) p. 143).
In a sense, prosperity may be interpreted as a (positive)
divergence from a steady state growth path.5 Similarly, recession
4 " for the new demand, first of the entrepreneur and then
of those who extend operations (••• ) is, directly and indirectly,
chiefly demand for labor". (Schumpeter (1934), p. 248)
5 The use of the concept "steady state" is due to the
author, not to Schumpeter, and is used for pedagogical purpose
only. In Schumpeter's works, the concept of equilibrium plays the
role of a "reference solution", i.e. a description of what would
happen if no innovations occur. He explicitly denounced the use
of the concept of a "moving equilibrium" because in his view
"what really happens is destruction of equilibria in the received
meaning 'of the term" (Schumpeter(1928), p. 369). It must be
emphasized, therefore, that according to Schumpeterian logic, the
economy will never settle down on a steady state growth path. On
Schumpeter's use of the concept of equilibrium, see
Schumpeter(1928).
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may be interpreted as convergence towards a steady state.
However, at the same time, new factors develop that cause a new
(negative) divergence (depression). During the depression an
extensive restructuring of production will take place, and sooner
or later tendencies will occur that reverse the process and
brings the economy on a path towards a steady state again
(recovery, ibid. p. 149 ff). However, Schumpeter strongly
emphasized that there is no guaranty for a quick and painless
transition from depression to recovery, and that it is not at all
certain that the most innovative firms are those which will
survive the depression:
"in particular it often liquidates and weeds out firms
which do not command adequate financial support,
however sound their business may be, and it leaves
unliquidated concerns which do command such support,
although they may never be able to pay their way"
(ibid.).
Competitive versus trustified capitalism
It may be objected that Schumpeter's writings on business cycles,
especially long waves, to some extent remind more of a
description of history than of a theory of self-repeating cycles
of specific lengths. In fact, Schumpeter himself strongly
emphasized that these theories were tied to a historically given
institutional setting:
"•• it should be emphasized once more that our model and its
working is, of course, strongly institutional in character.
It presupposes the presence, not only of the general
features of capitalist society, but also of several others
which we, no doubt, hold to be actually verified, but which
11
are not logically implied in the concepts either of economic
action or of capitalism. Our argument rests on (abstractions
from) historical facts which may turn out to belong to ari
epoch tnat is rapidly passing. In this sense the analysiS
presented has, in fact, itself been called historical"
(ibid. p. 144).
The historical facts to which Schumpeter refers are the existence
of capitalist institutions and attitudes and a system of
relations between firms which he labels "competitive capitalism".
By this Schumpeter means a system where the firms are led by
entrepreneurs, and where the relationships between the firms are
regulated through technological competition. As opposed to this
he puts "trustified capitalism", where the innovation process has
been institutionalized within large enterprises, and where
neither technological competition between firms, nor the
entrepreneurs, matter any longer. In the latter case, the
tendency to mechanization of progress has been brought to the
extreme, and "any technological improvement which is becoming
"objectively possible" tends to be carried into effect"
(Schumpeter (1939) p. 108 f). The innovation process, according
to Schumpeter, should in this case be expected to be far more
continuous, and the tendency to clustering as well as business
cycles far weaker, than in competitive capitalism
Schumpeter(1934), p. 230).
Schumpeter recognized that there was a clear tendency in the
directidn of "trustification", but emphasized that this
development at the time of writing had not gone far enough as to
require changes in theory. He also expressed belief that this
would not happen for a long time to come (he suggests 50 - 100
12
years (Schumpeter (1943) p. 163». The essential, according to
Schumpeter,-:is not whether the firms on average become larger6,
but whether the system of technological competition between firms
still works or not:
"Even in the world of giant firms, new ones rise and others
fall into the background. Innovation still emerge primarily
with the "young" ones, and the "old" ones display as a rule
symptoms of what is euphemistically called conservatism"
(Schumpeter (1939) p. 97).
The emphasis on technological competition (innovation and
diffusion) as the driving force of capitalist development is
probably the most basic element in Schumpeter's economic thinking
and constitutes in our view his main contribution to economic
theory. His analysis on long waves, though incorporating
important insights on the systemic character of the process of
innovation and diffusion, are more descriptive in character and
depend to a larger extent on specific historic circumstances.
However, this does not imply that they are not useful. In recent
years, there has been a revival of interest for his theory of
long waves, and several researchers have attempted to develop
6 Contrary to this, many interpretations of Schumpeter(see,
for instance, Kamien and Schwartz (1982» emphasize that
Schumpeter believed large firms to be more innovative than small
firms (and monopolistic firms more innovative than firms working
in perfectly competitive markets). However, these interpretations
make too much out of a few polemic remarks in his Capitalism,
Socialism and Democracy (1943) on contemporary anti-trust policy
in the US. As is apparent from above, if a distinction between
firms with respect to innovative ability is to be made,
Schumpeter was more concerned with the differences between new
and old firms, than between large and small firms. Regarding the
distinction between imperfect and perfect competition,
Schumpeter's point is not that the former is more conducive to
innovation than the latter, but that the latter represents an
empty set (see the quotation on p. 5).
13
these parts of his theory further. We will return to this in the
fourth section of this chapter.
1.3 THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
Schumpeter himself did not, to our best knowledge, extend his
analysis to include international trade, even if the level of
analysis in Business-Cycles (1939) was the three largest
capitalist countries of that time: the united States, Germany and
Great Britain. However, when Leontief in 1953 established that
the pattern of specialization in us foreign trade seemed to be
the contrary of what the Hecksher-Ohlin theory predicted (the
United states was shown to export labour-intensive products and
import capital- intensive ones), a need for an explanation arose,
and several researchers began to search in new directions. Many
of these came to adopt Schumpeterian perspectives on the working
of the economy, especially the idea of technological competition
as the driving force of capitalist development.
The availability theory
One of the first attempts to use technological competition as a
framework for analysis of international trade was made by Kravis
(1956). In a paper inspired by Leontief's findings, Kravis
presented the hypothesis that the us industry, because it was
more knowledge intensive-and innovative than the industries of
other countries, would be a main producer of products from
knowledge- (or skill-) intensive industries and firms. As a
14
consequence, the United States would at any time produce a large
number of new knowledge-intensive products that, because of lags
in the transfer of production technology, would only be available
in the United States. Thus, prospective buyers of these products
in other countries would, for a period of time, be left with no
other choice than to import these produ~ts from the us. Kravis
held this to be a reasonable explanation of the finding that us
exports seemed to be more labour intensive (or skilled-labour
intensive) than us imports.
The technology-gap theory
This model, which was only quite roughly outlined in Kravis's
paper, and without reference to sohumjct.e r, was later further
developed by Posner (1961). Posner, who was clearly inspired by
Schumpeter, introduced two new concepts to explain the diffusion
process: demand lag and imitation lag. Demand lag is the time it
takes from a product is introduced in the innovating country
until it is demanded in the imitatmg country. Imitation lag is
accordingly the time from the product is introduced in the
innovating country until it is produced in the imitating'country.
The difference between the two lags - the net lag as Posner
labels it - indicates the length of the period in which the
innovating country will export the product to the imitatmg
country without facing any competition from domestic producers
there.
Even though a general tendency towards diffusion may be traced,
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this does not, however, imply that diffusion necessarily will
take place. Posner discusses to some degree factors that
contribute to a large net lag or block diffusion entirely. He
mentions, among other things, the organization of the markets
(the degree of monopoly) and technological barriers ( static and
dynamic economies of scale, especially the effect of continuous
learning and induced innovation processes in the innovating
country). He also considers the case where one country succeeds
in being permanently more innovative, or "dynamic", than another.
According to Posner, this may create a situation where the
"dynamic" country continuously improves its terms of trade
relative to the "less dynamic" country, with unfavourable
consequences for the external balance and growth of the latter.
During the 1960's several sector studies based on technology-gap
assumptions appeared, as, for instance, Freeman (1963, 1965 and
1968) and Hufbauer (1966). The method was to study the
development of important innovations in one sector, and then
examine how the diffusion process developed with regard to
production and trade. These studies, concentrating mainly on the
chemical and electronic industries, confirmed by and large the
underlying hypotheses. However, the length of the lags varied
considerably between products, industries and countries. Walker
(1979) comments this as follows:
"As is apparent from above, the technology-gap theory's main
shortcoming was a rather naive view of the mechanisms behind
the transfer of production from one country to another;
imitation was overemphasized, capital mobility (and monopoly
powers) underemphasized. As a consequence, the theory lacks
precision in its predictions of the timing and direction (to
which countries) of production transfers"
16
(Walker,1979,p.18.)
On a macro level, technology-gap assumptions were used by Gomulka
(1971), Cornwall (1976, 1977) and others to explain differences
in growth between countries ("the growth paradox"). The method
was to regress growth, or productivity growth, on a proxy for the
scope of imitation (based on GDP per capita) and other variables
assumed to influence growth. Even though these models turned out
to explain a large part of the actual differences in growth
between countries, they were - as pointed out by Pavitt (1979-
1980) - essentially convergence models. Differences in innovative
performance across countries were excluded from the empirical
analysis. As a consequence of this and other omissions, some of
the differences in growth between countries continued to be
unaccounted for (for example, the industrial growth of United
Kingdom has been significantly below what Cornwall's model
predicts).
The product-cycle theory
A related theory that seeks to give a more precise prediction of
the process of innovation and diffusion was developed by Vernon
(1966). Vernon's theory is based on three elements; a theory of
technological competition (A la Schumpeter), a theory of the
relation between the different stages of diffusion and the
technological requirements (that most of all resembles Marx7),
7 What Vernon and Marx have in common is that they both
assume technolQgical competition to lead to the introduction of
capital-intensive techniques. In the case of Marx, this led to
the formulation of the famous law of the falling rate of profit.
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and Linder's (1961) theory on the importance of the domestic
market for innovation and diffusion.
According to Vernon, new products are generally unstandardized
and produced by skill-intensive production methods. In this
early phase, prices will be high and growing, because production
costs are high and demand generally grows faster than supply.
However, in the course of time, products and technologies will
gradually standardize, and this makes it easier for new suppliers
to start production. But as new competitors arrive, price
competition becomes gradually more important. Increasing
standardization of products and processes, together with greater
emphasis on price competition, increases the scope for
introducing capital-intensive forms of production based on the
exploitation of static economies of scale. Thus, in the late
stages of the product-life cycle, production methods are likely
to be capital intensive.
Like Kravis, Vernon assumes that new products originate in the
United states. The reason for this, Vernon sees, in approval of
Linder (1961), in the high income level and the advanced demand
structure in the United states. This is assumed to give us
producers incentives and possibilities to develop new, advanced
products that initially are demanded in the us only, but
subsequently will be demanded in other countries as well,
depending on their levels 'of income. As the product matures and
price competition hardens, costs of transportation and changes in
the composition of demand in the markets make it profitable to
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start production in other countries as well. For very
standardized products, where price competition is severe and the
exploitation of static economies of scale through capital-
intensive methods of production very important, a transfer of
production to a low-cost country will be of interest. Thus, a
story may be constructed where the. United states exports
(skilled) labour-intensive goods and imports mature, but capital-
intensive goods, from less-developed, low-cost countries.
It is easy to see that Vernon's theory gives a possible solution
to the so-called Leontief paradox. But to what extent is this
perspective confirmed by empirical research? Wells (1972) reviews
some of the research that has originated from Vernon's theory.
According to Wells, the Linder part of the theory - that
countries specialize in products where domestic demand is
important, i.e. that a complementarity exists between the export
structure, the level of income and the structure of consumption,
has been confirmed by several studies. Also the hypothesis that,
in late stages of the product cycle, the production of products
will have a tendency to be transferred to low-cost countries
(developing), has, according to Wells, proven to be fruitful-
although the number of studies at the time of the review was
fairly modest.
A more critical evaluation of the product cycle theory and the
empirical evidence may be found in Walker (1979). His main
objection is that the two most important hypotheses of the
theory, that products will gradually standardize, and that
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production will be gradually more capital intensive and based on
the exploitation of static economies of scale, have never been
thoroughly tested. He discusses this in relation to three
selected sectors: textile machinery, chemicals and consumer
electronics. In the case of textile machinery, Walker found no
tendency to either standardization of the products or a change
towards more capital-intensive methods of production. Within
chemicals there was a tendency toward standardization of the
products, but continuous process innovation prevented a
standardization of the production process and, in combination
with an oligopolistic market structure, slowed down or blocked
the transfer of production to other countries, especially the
developing ones. For consumer electronics one could also trace a
tendency to standardization of the products without a
corresponding standardization of the process of production.
Another characteristic feature of consumer electronics was that
continuous process innovation contributed to the maintenance of
the labour-intensive character of the production process. Walker,
therefore, concludes that even in cases where the tendency toward
standardization of products is quite manifest, technological
competition through process innovations will prevent the type of
standardization of production technology - and the associated
relocation of production - that the product-cycle theory
predicts.
Another shortcoming, poi.nt.edout by a so, Vernon himself (Vernon,
(1979), Caves(1982) and Mansfield(1982», is that the theory does
not take the increasing importance of multinationals with world-
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wide activities (MNE's) sufficiently into account. If the
innovator is a MNE, this may according to these writers
significantly shorten (or abolish altogether) the period where
the innovating country exports the product in question, since the
MNE is free to locate production in other countries than the
innovating one. Thus, MNE's should to some extent be expected to
speed up the process of diffusion and counteract the tendencies
towards delayed or blocked diffusion emphasized by Walker.
However, as pointed out by Vernon (1979), this is probably more
relevant for large countries than for small countries.
However, in spite of these shortcomings, the product-cycle theory
often remains a fruitful framework (or starting point) for
applied work. Even if the concept of maturity is a difficult one,
it is hard to deny that products (and often also industries)
mature and that transfer of production takes place, though at
different paces and to different degrees. Rosenberg(1982), for
instance, points out that in a historical perspective
"•• the transfer of industrial technology to less developed
countries is inevitable. (••) the central questions are not
whether industrial technologies will be transferred, but
rather when it will happen, where it will happen, which
technologies will be transferred, how they will be modified
in the process, and how rapidly this process will occur."
Rosenberg(1982, p.270)
Walker has, however, satisfactorily shown that the product-cycle
theory is not valid as a general theory of diffusion or transfer
of production (from high- ,tomiddle- and low-income countries).
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Innovative efforts
The starting point for Kravis, Posner, Vernon and others was an
attempt to explain the specialization pattern of us trade from a
model where new products originate in the United states and
subsequently, at a varying pace, diffuse to other countries.
However, by the end of the sixties it was not longer evident that
the United states was the technological leader in all areas. As a
consequence, the perspective of world trade as a medium for
"catch-up" processes (through imitation), with other countries
converging to, but not surpassing, the United states as a
technological leader, became partly obsolete. To analyse the
development on the technological frontier, the framework had to
be broadened to include both innovation and diffusion processes.
In the last part of the sixties, Vernon and his associates at
Harvard started to model and test the us lead in new technologies
and products as the result of innovative efforts. In a paper from
1967, they ranked American industry according to R&D intensity
(expenditures on research and development as a share of gross
production value), and showed that the United states had over-
average market shares in R&D-intensive industries. They
concluded, therefore, that "All roads lead to a link between
export performance and R&D" (Gruber, Metha and Vernon (1967». In
a later paper (Gruber and Vernon (1970» they examined the
relation between export specialization and industry structure for
a larger group of countries, where the export and the industry
structures were classified in terms of "research intensive",
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"capital intensive" and "work intensive (unskilled)". However,
the test, which used a classification of industries based on us
data, gave significant results for a few countries only.
The method of using the research intensity of American industry
as a basis for international comparison~ has been criticized by
several authors. The industries that are the most research-
intensive in the United States, it is argued, need not be the
most research-intensive in other countries as well. An
alternative method would be to start from national research
statistics and calculate the research intensity for different
industries or products for each country. This was done by Walker
(1979), who found a significant and positive relation between
export growth/growth of the market share, and research
effort/research intensity for aircraft, "chemicals, rubber and
plastics", drugs, ferrous metals and instruments for the period
1963-1973. However, for electrical as well as mechanical
machinery, no significant correlation between exports and
research efforts was found, even not for the most research-
intensive industries/parts. One possible explanation of the poor
results for these industries may be that several of the factors
that influence the process of innovation in these industries are
not included in the term "research and development expenditures"
(R&D).
On this background Soete has proposed to substitute R&D (a
"technology-input measure") by patents (a "technology-output
measure") as a measure of innovativeness. Because national patent
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statistics are of quite varying quality, Soete chose to use
foreign patents in the United states as basis for the analysis
(this provides comparable figures for all countries except the
United States). In a series of studies, soete and others (Soete
(1978, 1981, 1987), Pavitt and Soete (1980), Dosi and Soete
(1985» tested the correlation between export performance on the
one hand, and patent activity, supplemented by other variables
assumed to affect exports, on the other, for a number of OECD
countries. These studies demonstrated a significant and positive
correlation between the ranking according to exports per capita
and patent activity per capita for a large number of industries,
including, for instance, the machinery sector (except consumer
durables) and a large part of the chemical sector.
In summary, this section has shown the fruitfulness of applying a
Schumpeterian perspective to the study of international trade. In
particular, applications of his model of technological
competition to Post-War experience have increased our
understanding of specialization patterns8 and diffusion processes
(on a micro as well on a macro level). Still, it is fair to say
that the contributions discussed so far have been rather limited
both in scope an methods. In most cases, they have either used
convergence assumptions, overemphasizing diffusion and
underemphasizing innovation aspects, or limited themselves to
static (cross-sectional) analysis of specialization patterns.
Thus, the fundamental dynamic character of Schumpeterian thinking
has not yet been adequately reflected in most applied research.
8 On this, see also Hufbauer(1970).
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1.4 NEO-SCHUMPETERIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LONG RUN ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT
Schumpeterian-oriented research on growth and trade has so far
concentrated on applications of the theory on technological
competition to the relation between countries. As shown in the
preceding section, this has been a fruitful trajectory to follow.
But at the same time, important parts of Schumpeter's perspective
have been left out, especially his emphasis on the relation
between innovation-diffusion, structural changes and long-run
economic growth. Part of the reason for this is probably that
these parts of Schumpeter's theory - especially his theory on
long waves - have been considered with great skepticism by most
economists. However, in the wake of the economic set-back in the
industrial world after OPEC I, there has been a revival of
interest for these parts of Schumpeter's work, and a considerable
amount of new research has been initiated. Among the most
important contributions from recent years are Mensch (1979),
Clark, Freeman and Soete (1982), Freeman (1983) and Van Ouijn
(1983). In the following we shall have a closer look at some of
these (neo-Schumpeterian) contributions in order to see to what
extent they may be linked to the study of growth and trade.
A major point in neo-Schumpeterian theory is that the innovation
process has certain laws of its own. For an innovation to occur,
a set of needs (to which the innovation responds) and a set of
selected, technological principles (by which the innovation is
carried out) must exist. Oosi (1983) has coined the concept
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"technological paradigm" for the specific combination of needs
and selected, technological principles which characterize a
specific innovation. A technological paradigm is to a large
extent assumed to define the possibilities for further
developments (or "natural trajectories" as Nelson and Winter
(1977, 1982) label them), such as the. scope for improvements,
applications of the innovation in new contexts, development of
methods to reduce the costs attached to the exploitation of the
innovation, etc.
Clark, Freeman and Soete (1982) have introduced the concept
"technological system" to cover the dynamics of an interrelated
set of technological paradigms, innovations and natural
trajectories • A technological system will, according to this
view, during its life span go through certain phases. The growth
will - as outlined by Schumpeter - follow a S-curve with an
introductory phase, a prosperity phase, a recession phase and a
depression phase. Through this lifespan a change of emphasis will
take place from product innovation to process innovation (cost-
reducing innovation). The length of the different phases may,
however, vary strongly between different technological systems,
and the course of development may also be interrupted by new
innovations (Van Duijn (1983».
A long wave may originate because of a new technological system,
if this is of great importance, or because of a complex of
technological systems that reinforce one another, if their
introductory phases coincide (Clark, Freeman and Soete (1982».
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It has been shown (Mensch (1979), Clark, Freeman and Soete
(1982» that fundamental innovations have had a tendency to
cluster in certain periods of time (for example in the thirties).
There are several possible causes for such coincidences that are
discussed in the neo-Schumpeterian literature, from long-run
cycles of investments in the production of raw materials (Rostow
(1983» or economic infra-structure (Van Duijn (1983», to social
and institutional barriers for innovativeness that are built up
during the long wave and broken down in the crisis (Mensch
(1979», or, more general, interactions between technological and
institutional systems with different dynamic properties
(Perez(1983». A more agnostic view can be found in Clark,
Freeman and Soete (1982). According to these writers, long-run
cycles in economic activity and innovativeness may be the outcome
of several factors, of which some may be of a historically
specific nature.
Most researchers on long waves - including those who are
skeptical to the theory - agree that long-run periods of economic
growth or stagnation may be defined. Even though there are
different views on the periodization, most of them are no more
than relatively small variations or updates of Schumpeter's
initial proposal. It should be noted, also, that several
researchers (see, for instance, Kleinknecht (1984» in recent
years have found evidence that Post-War growth could be described
as a "Schumpeter-boom", characterized by a strong correlation
between growth and innovation across industries. Thus, even if
considerable disagreements remain on the timing and causation of
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long waves, there seems to be plenty of support for the (weaker)
proposition that capitalist development is characterized by
alternating long-run periods of growth and stagnation, where each
growth period is linked to the diffusion of a specific set of
technologies or technological systems.
1.5 SOME PRELIMINARY HYPOTHESES ON POST-WAR GROWTH
To what extent may the approach presented in the previous
sections be applied to the problems outlined in the introduction
to this chapter? This is the question to which we now turn.
A long wave, in the (weak) sense outlined above, may be seen as a
disequilibrium process along two connected dimensions. The first
dimension relates to disequilibria between industries: Some
industries, related to new technological systems, grow much
faster than the average. Examples from the Post-War period are
electronics, chemicals and consumer durables.9 The second
dimension relates to disequilibria between countries and regions:
Not only does growth depend more on some technological systems
than others, but these growth-inducing technological systems are
also more strongly related to certain countries or regions than
to others. Thus, there is a coupling between economics and
geography10 that we may label a "centre-periphery" dimension
9 See chapter 4.2 for a more thoroughgoing treatment of this
question.
10 It should be noted that this coupling between economical
and spatial factors has for long been in the focus of interest of
regional economics, see especially the contribution by
Perroux(1955).
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within the long wave. In the Post-War period, the United states,
though increasingly contested by Japan and some European
countries, has played the role of "centre country" in the above
sense.
The countries in the centre, the "technological frontier"
countries, are characterized by a developed technological
infrastructure and a high level of institutionalized innovative
activity. They specialize in innovative, skill-intensive goods
with a high unit-value. Because of this, they have to, and can
afford, to pay high wages compared to most other countries. Since
the demand for these goods generally grows faster than average,
the changing commodity composition of international trade should
be expected to be favourable for these countries.
Countries in the periphery, on the other hand, are at the outset
in a less favourable position. They produce goods for which
demand generally tends to grow more slowly than the average, and
are in this sense unfavourably affected by the structural changes
in international trade. To some extent, they can compensate for
this by winning market shares in declining markets. However, if
the purpose is to increase the level of income in the country,
this is no viable strategy in the long run, because of the
increasing price competition that characterizes the drive towards
maturity. What they have to do, therefore, is to transform their
industrial structure by imitating the countries in the centre and
increasing their own innovative efforts. If successful in this
process, they may in the long run be able to approach the
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economic and technological level of the leader countries, and,
eventually, surpass them. Thus, countries that succeed in
increasing their innovative activities and other efforts related
to the economic exploitation of innovation and diffusion faster
than other countries, should also be expected to grow faster than
other countries on a comparable level of development.
The extent to which a country manages to take part in the
international process of innovation and diffusion should also be
expected to have crucial effects for its export performance. A
country that does not succeed in this, runs the risk of losing
market shares both domestically and abroad. Firstly, because the
industrial structure of the country will be gradually less
adapted to the structure of demand both domestically and abroad.
Secondly, these problems are likely to be accentuated further
because price competition usually hardens as industries mature.
In the long run this is likely to cause chronic balance-of-
payments problems, often combined with repeated devaluations, and
slower growth than in other countries. This will in turn provide
less room for increased growth in factor rewards. Thus, we should
not necessarily be surprised to find that a country that loses
out in the international process of innovation and diffusion, may
experience both declining market shares and declining relative
unit labour costs, and vice versa. This is consistent with the
findings of Kaldor (1978) mentioned earlier (the so called
"Kaldor paradox").
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To what extent a country in the periphery succeeds in taking part
in the international process of diffusion will also have
important implications for its pattern of specialization in
international trade. In the early phases of the diffusion
process, successful "catching up" through imitation will show up
in reduced import dependency. If successful, then, on the
domestic market, firms are likely to exploit the accumulated
experiences to engage in exports, first to regional markets,
then to other markets. Empirically, this will show up declining
export specialization and increasing intra-industry trade. As
pointed out earlier, this is consistent with what is actually
observed in the Post-War period( the "specialization paradox").
Thus, following a Schumpeterian perspective, what seems
paradoxical from the viewpoint of established neoclassical
orthodoxy, is not necessarily so paradoxical after all. What
remains to be seen, of course, is to what extent the preliminary
hypotheses outlined here can be developed into testable models
and to what degree these can be shown to be supported by
empirical evidence. This is what we attempt to find out in the
chapters that follow.
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CHAPTER 2
'WHY GROWTH RATES DIFFER'
2.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter focuses on the importance of creation and diffusion
of technology for differences in economic growth across
countries.
The question of how technology and growth relate is not a new
one. Already the classical economists discussed this question
extensively. But attempts to study this relation empirically are
of much more recent date. In fact, with one exception
(Tinbergen(1942)), the first attempts were made in the mid/late
1960s (Domar et al.(1964), Denison(1967)). The next section
discusses how this question is treated in some influential Post-
War studies on "why growth rates differ" between countries.
Generally, these studies either ignore technological differences
between countries or treat them as accidental and transitory.
Diffusion is assumed to take place relatively automatically,
either as free knowledg~ or through the addition of new vintages
of capital to the capital stock The role of innovation is
normally ignored, except in the case of the technological leader
country, and then treated in a very superficial way. Thus, the
models underlying these studies can generally be characterized as
"convergence-to-equilibrium models". No surprise, then, that
these studies have difficulties in explaining phenomena such as
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"changes in- technological leadership" or the existence of
"laggards.
This chapter develops a simple model of "why growth rates differ"
in which economic growth is assumed to depend on three factors:
diffusion of technology from abroad, growth in the country's own
technological activities and growth in the country's capacity to
the exploit the possibilities offered by available technology,
whether domestically created or diffused to the country from the
international economic environment. In contrast to many other
approaches to the subject, this model does in principle allow for
both convergence and divergence between ~ountries. In the final
part of the chapter, the model is tested on a sample containing
data for 27 developed and semi-industrialized countries between
1973 and 1983.
2.2 LESSONS FROM PREVIOUS RESEARCH
Studies of why growth rates differ between countries may roughly
be divided in three groups: (a) "catch-up" analysis, (b) "growth
accounting" and (c) "production-function" studies. Let us
consider these approaches' one at a time1•
1 The purpose of the following is to discuss some main
characteristics of post-war research in this field, not to give a
complete survey. For survey articles covering the whole or parts
of this field, the reader is referred to Chenery(1986),
Choi(1983), Kendrick(1981a), Maddison(1987), and Nel~on(1981).
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(a) "Catch-up" analysis
The idea that differences in economic growth between countries
are related to differences in the scope for imitation is normally
attributed to Veblen(1915). Since then, several economic
historians have analysed problems related to industrialization
and growth from this perspective2•
More recently, Abramovitz(1979, 1986) and Maddison (1979, 1982,
1984, 1987) have applied this perspective to the differing growth
performance of a large sample of Ln dust rLa Li.z ed countries.
According to these writers, large d i.f f crencea in productivity
levels between countries (technological gaps) tend to occur from
time to time, mainly for historical reasons (wars etc). When a
technological gap is established, this opens the possibility for
countries on a lower level of economic and technological
development to "catch up" by imitating the more productive
technologies of the leader country. Since these writers hold
technological progress to be partly capital embodied, they point
to investment as a critical factor for successful "catch up".
They also stress the role of demand factors, since demand is
assumed to interact in various ways with investment and the pace
of structural change in the economy. For instance, the
deceleration of productivity growth in the last decade is partly
explained in this way. They mention the importance of
2 See, for instance, the works by Gerschenkron(1962) and
Landes(1969).
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institutions7- but do not discuss this in detail, because of the
methodological difficulties that are involved.
The works by Abramovitz and Maddison are to a large degree
descriptive, and as such they are very useful. They convincingly
support their arguments by comparing data for productivity levels
and economic growth/productivity growth across countries, and
these comparisons are sometimes supplemented by descriptive
statistics/simple statistical tests. Other scholars working in
this tradition have extended these tests in various ways and
reached similar results (Singer and Reynolds(1975),
Cornwall(1976,1977». However, they all concentrate on diffusion
processes and ignore innovation aspects. As pointed out already
by Ames and Rosenberg(1963), writers in t~is tradition have great
difficulties in analysing phenomena such as developments in
leader countries3, changes of leadership4 and the existence of
"laggards".
(b) "Growth accounting"
For many years, Kuznets and his colleagues devoted much effort to
the construction of historical time series for GOP and its major
components (national accounts). Post-War "Growth accounting"
studies grew to some extent naturally out of this work. While
3 "••the forces animating growth in the lead countries are
more mysterious and autonomous than in the follower countries, ••"
(Maddison(1982), p.29)
4 See, however, Abramovitz' instructive, but inconclusive
discussion of possible factors influencing change of leadership
in Abramovitz(1986),p.396-405.
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national a c'c ou nt.a presented decompositions of GOP, growth
accounts attempted to decompose the growth of GOP. The first
Post-War analysis of this type was carried out by
Abramovitz(1956) in a historical study of the US. What he did was
to sum up the growth of inputs (capital and labour), using
"prices" or factor shares as weights, and compare the result with
the growth of output as conventionally measured. The result, that
about one half of actual growth5 could not be explained in this
way, and had to be classified as unexplained total factor
productivity growth, surprised many, including Abramovitz
himself:
"This result is surprising ••• Sinc2 we know little about
the causes of productivity increase, the indicated
importance of this element may be taken to be some sort of
measure of our ignorance about the causes of economic
growth." (Abramovitz(1956),p.11)
Abramovitz discussed briefly possible explanatory factors behind
this large residual, emphasizing research, education, learning by
doing and economies of scale. From this, researchers have
followed different paths in "squeezing down the residual", as
Nelson(1981) puts it. One has been to embody as much as possible
of technological progress into the factors themselves, as
suggested by Jorgensen and Griliches(1967)6. Another, following
5 According to the numbers presented by Abramovitz, US NNP-
growth over the period 1869/78 to 1944/53 equaled 3.5 %, of which
1.8% could be attributed to growth of inputs, and 1.7% was left
dS unexplained. Similar, if not identical, results were reported
by Solow(1957), Kendrick(1961) and Oenison(1962).
6 Jorgensen and Griliches originally claimed that the
residual could be eliminated altogether, but later retreated from
this position. See the debate between them and
Oenison(Oenison(1969), Jorgensen and Griliches(1972» on this
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Abramovitz '0g- suggestions, has been to add other explanatory
variables, thereby reducing the unexplained part of the residual,
which, following Solow(1957), is normally attributed to technical
change.
Denison was the first to apply this latter methodology to the
study of why growth rates differ between countries(Denison(1967),
Denison and Chung(1976»7. Regarding technology, Denison's works
rest on a view very similar to the one which characterizes most
"catch-up" analysis. For instance, differences in innovation
between countries are completely ignored8• But his interpretation
of the sources of Post-War growth differs to some extent from
Abramowitz and Maddison. Some of Denison's main results are
summarized in table 1 below.
subject.
7 The study by Damar
earlier{1964), did not take
growth in capital and labor.
8 Cf. for instance the following programmatic remark by
Denison: "Because know Iedge is an inte rnational commodity, I
should expect the contribution of knowledge - as distinct from
the change in the lag - to be of about the same size in all the
countries examined in this study." (Denison(1967),p.282)
et al., publ ished a few years
into account other factors than
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TABLE 1. "WHY GROWTH RATES DIFFER" (DENISON)
1950 - 1962 1953-1961
US Western Italy Japan
Europe(l)
Growth(2) 3.4 4.7 6.0 8.1
Of which:
Labour 1.1 0.8 1.0 1.9
Capital 0.8 0.9 0.7 1.6
Residual(TFP) 1.4 3.0 4.3 4.6
of which:
Technology 0.8 1.3 1.7 1.4
Resource
allocation 0.3 0.7 1.4 1.1
Scale factors 0.4 0.9 1.1 2.0
For comparison:
National income per
person employed(3) 100 59 40 55
(1) Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Netherlands, Norway and
United Kingdom.
(2) The columns do not always add up because of rounding errors
and other minor adjustments not reported here.
(3) In 1960 US prices (except Japan 1970)
Sources: Denison(1967), ch. 21, and Denison and Chung(1976), ch.
4 and 11.
As is apparent from table 1, the results indicate a close
connection between the .ize of the residual and the level of
development. This could of course be interpreted in support of
the catch-up approach. But Denison attributes about 2/3 of the
differences in residuals between the United states and the rest
of the countries covered by his investigation to other factors
(improvements in resource allocation and the exploitation of
economies of scale). In fact, when these factors are adjusted
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for, only France and Germany among the Western European countries
seem to catch up in terms of technology. In his 1967 study, he
therefore concludes9:
"On the surface, to reduce the gap greatly would not seem
very difficult if the businessmen, workers and governments
of a country really wished and were determined to do so.( ••)
In contrast to this a priori impression of possibilities,
the historical record up to the early 1960's, at least,
suggests that either the desire is lacking or imitation is a
very difficult thing; most countries seem to have made
little progress." (Denison(1967), p. 340)
However, when Denison discusses the contribution from increased
exploitation of economies of scale, what he mainly refers to is
increased aggregate productivity caused bv increased productivity
in the production of durable consumer goods. But where does the
technology used to produce consumer dur~bles come from, if not
from the United States? In fact, the 1950s and 1960s are exactly
the periods when the production of consumer durables spreads from
the United states to Europe and Japan. A similar argument can be
made for structural changes. without the growth of new industries
based on imported technology, such as, for instance, consumer
durables, would these changes have taken place to the same
extent? Thus we will argue that Denison's conclusions rest on
rather shaky assumption~, and that it is quite probable that he
9 However, 1n his 1976 study of Japan, he acknowledges that
in this case, "There was, in other words, a major element of
"catching up" ••"(Denison and Chung(1976),p.49)
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seriously understates the importance of diffusion of technology
from the United states to Europe and Japan in this period10.
On a more general level, the preceding discussion illustrates a
major weakness in growth-accounting analysis. As pointed out by
Nelson(1973,1981), most of the variables which the growth
accountants take into account are interdependent, and without a
theory of how these variables interact, decompositions cannot
claim to be more than mere illustrations of the growth process11•
To explain differences in growth between countries, it would be
necessary to distinguish between "active factors" ("engines of
growth"), and more "passive factors", which, though permissive to
growth, cannot themselves be regarded as causal, explanatory
factors, and the relations between the various factors would have
to be worked out. Furthermore, the contribution of innovation to
economic growth, not only in the US, but everywhere, would have
to be included in the analysis12•
10 More recently, Kendrick(1981b) has published a study of
the growth of nine OECD countries between 1960 and 1979. This
study is based on Denison's methodology, but contrary to
Denison's analysis, it attributes a large part of the final
residual to "catching up", especially in the period 1960-1973.
11 "••some of the recent studies seem
the growth accounts really explain growth.
can. lr. growth accounting is not a
growth."(Nelson(1973), p.466)
12 It should be noted that Kendrick(1981b) in a growth-
accounting study of nine OECD countries between 1960 and 1979,
made an attempt to quantify the contribution to growth in each
country from cumulative national R&D outlays, but according his
calculations, this contribution was negligible.
to imply that somehow
I do not see how they
tested theory of
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(c) "Production-function" studies
As noted, the growth accounting exercises relate the growth of
output to various input factors. Solow(1957) was the first to
provide a formal theoretical framework for this type of
analysis13• Following standard neoclassical equilibrium
assumptions (perfect competition, full capacity utilization, full
employment, no economies of scale etc), he assumed that
production (Q) could be related to technology (A) and the factors
of production (capital(K) and labour(L» in the following way:
(1) Q(t) = A(t) F(K(t),L(t»
Let small case letters denote rates of growth. By
differentiating, dividing through with Q, and substituting the
partial elasticities of output with respect to capital and
labour, EIQK and EIQL' into the equation, we arrive at:
Since under neoclassical assumptions the partial elasticity of
output with respect to labour, EIQL' equals the workers' share
13 The purpose of what follows is only to discuss some
problems related to applications of neoclassical production
functions to cross country samples. I do not in any way attempt
to survey the development of neoclassical growth theory or the
theoretical controversies that followed. For a good (but old)
survey of growth theory, see Hahn and Matthews(1964).
Pasinetti(1974) provides an exciting introduction to both to the
development of the neoclassical growththeory and the subsequent
controversy from a post-Keynesian point of view.
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(sL), and tKe partial elasticity of output with respect to
capital, ElQK' the capitalists' share (sK) of net output, the
rate of growth can now be written as the sum of the rate of
growth in the capital stock, weighted by the capitalists' share
in net output, the rate of growth in the labour force, weighted
by labour's share in net output, and the rate of growth of
"technology" (or "total factor productivity growth"):
Equation (3) obviously provides a theoretical justification for
growth accounting, even if the underlying assumptions are much
stronger than those which underlie most applied work in this
area. But Solow's work did also represent the starting point for
econometric studies of "why growth rates differ" between
countries. Chenery(1986) provides a summary of some of the main
results from econometric applications of production functions on
cross-country samples consisting of less developed, semi-
industrialized or developed countries. One result is that Solow-
type production-function models explain very little of the
observed differences in growth between semi-industrialized or
less-developed countries~ According to Chenery, the main reason
for this is that the equilibrium conditions which underlie the
neoclassical approach do not hold for these countries. He
concludes that
"In particular, disequilibrium phenomena are shown to be
more significant for the former<semi-industrialized) than
for the latter(developed). Thus, although neoclassical
theory is a useful starting point for the study of growth,
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it mu st." be modified substantially if it is to explain the
essential features of economies in the process of
transformation"(Chenery(1986),p.13-14)
Following this line of argument, several attempts have been made
to extend the production function approach by adding other
explanatory variables, reflecting various types of disequilibria
which exist within countries14• The main arguments in favour of
this may be summarized as follows. Many countries, especially
developing countries, are often assumed to have a "dual" economy,
consisting of a high-productivity modern sector and a low-
productivity traditional sector. In this case, it is argued, a
mere transfer of resources from the traditional sector to the
modern sector should raise growth. A similir perspective is often
applied to the relation between the export sector and the rest of
the economy, because the export sector is often assumed to be
more productive than other sectors.
A recent application of this methodology to a sample of semi-
industrialized countries may be found in Feder(1986). He
estimates a neoclassical production function, with variables
reflecting the development of exports and manufacturing
production added, on a cross-country data set for the period
1964-1973. When compared with Denison's estimates for countries
on a comparable level of development (Italy and Japan in the
fifties), some important differences emerge. First, the combined
contribution of capital and labour explains about 2/3 of actual
growth, compared to between 1/3 and 1/2 in Denison's
14 For reviews of this literature, as well as empirical
evidence, see Choi(1983), ch.S-6 and Chenery(1986).
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ca Lou La t i.ons'; Second, the contribution of capital is relatively
more important in Feder than in Denison. Third, Feder does not
distinguish between economies of scale and other factors related
to reallocation of resources. Fourth, Feder totally ignores the
contribution of innovation and diffusion. The latter is of course
the most striking. Following this approach, the question of "why
growth rates differ" between countries can be answered without
any references to technology.
TABLE 2. SOURCES OF GROWTH IN SEMI-INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES 1964-
1973(FEDER)
Regression contribution to
coefficient growth
Growth 6.4
of which
Labour 0.766 1.8
(3.73 )
Investment 0.135 2.7
(2.96)
"Residual" 1.9
of which
Exports 0.246 0.5
(2.96)
Manufacturing 0.809 1.5
(3.68)
"Constant" -0.002 -0.2
(0.132)
R2(adjusted) = 0.75
N = 29-
The contributions do not add up because of rounding errors.
The numbers in brackets are t-values.
Source: Feder(1986), tables 9.9-9.10, Model VI.
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However, there are important methodological problems here. To
what extent can the introduction of disequilibrium conditions be
defended within a framework which assumes equilibrium from the
start? The pure neoclassical growth model, as set out by solow
and others, pretends to explain economic growth from factor
growth and technological progress. But the explanatory power of
the model rests solely on the underlying equilibrium assumptions.
If these assumptions do not hold, it is not at all clear how an
estimated neoclassical growth model should be interpreted. For
instance, in a situation when unemployment prevails, it is not
obvious that growth in the labour force should be assumed to add
anything to economic growth15• Furthermore, to what extent can
structural changes, though facilitated by the existence of large
low-productivity sectors, populated by "surplus labour", be
counted as independent, explanatory factors of growth in the same
sense as capital accumulation or innovative efforts? Why is it
not the other way around, that structural changes are caused by
capital accumulation, innovative efforts and growth? Thus,
neoclassical students of why growth rates differ seem to be faced
15 Of course, the labour force variable may still turn up
with the expected sign significantly different from zero at the
chosen level of significance. But this may simply reflect that
the growth of labour force is correlated with other
variables that affect growth positively, as, for instance, the
level of development.
"The correlation between growth in labour supply(POP) and
GOP per capita measured in PPPs(T), a much-used proxy for the
potential for technology transfer, for the 27 countries included
in our sample(see the next sections) was(the numbers in brackets
are t-statistics, one star denotes significance of test at the 1%
level):
POP = 3.16 - O.23T, R2=O.56(O.55)
(9.54) (-5.70)
* *
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with the following dilemma: Either stick to the traditional
neoclassical assumptions. This produces a logically coherent
explanation that predicts poorly. Or add additional variables
that destroy the original equilibrium assumptions. Then
predictions become much better, but the model ceases to explain
anything.
Chenery and others should be credited for having shown that the
equilibrium conditions on which the production function approach
is built, cannot be defended in studies of why growth rates
differ. However, they miss their point when they mix together a
model built on equilibrium assumptions and factors reflecting
disequilibrium conditions, without showing explicitly how the
various factors interact and what the fundamental causal factors
are. It is disappointing, also, that they generally ignore
aspects related to differences in the scope for imitation and
innovative performance across countries16• In our view, what
needs to be done is to study "why growth rates differ" from a
theoretical framework which assumes disequilibrium conditions
right from the start.
16 I should be mentioned here that there are a few examples
of researchers who have estimated neoclassical growth models with
some kind of "development-level" variable included (Chenery,
Elkington and Sims(1970), Parvin«1975».
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2.3 A TECHNOLOGY GAP THEORY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH
Essentially, the technology-gap theory of economic growth is an
application of Schumpeter's dynamic theory of capitalist
development, which was developed for a closed economy, to· a
world economy characterized by competing capitalist nation-
states. Following Schumpeter, the technology gap theorists17
analyse economic development as a disequilibrium process
characterized by the interplay of two conflicting forces:
Innovation, which tends to increase economic and technological
differences between countries, and imitation or diffusion which
tends to reduce them. Thus, whether a country behind the world
innovation frontier succeeds in reducing the productivity gap
vis-a-vis the frontier countries, does not only depend on its
imitative efforts, but also on its innovative performance, and on
the innovative performance of the frontier countries.
Furthermore, even if a country behind the world innovation
frontier may succeed in reducing the productivity gap through
mainly imitating activities, it cannot surpass the frontier
countries in productivity without passing them in innovative
activity as well. In general, the outcome of the international
process of innovation and diffusion - with regard to the
development levels of different countries - 1S uncertain. The
17 The major contributors to this development were
Gomulka(1971) and Cornwall(1976,1977), but the main arguments
were outlined much earlier by Posner(1961), even if Posner's main
concern was specialization, not growth. For a more thorough
treatment of Posner's work, see chapter 1. More recently
Krugman(1979) has constructed a formal model of north-south trade
based on similar arguments.
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process may generate a pattern where countries follow diverging
trends, as well as a pattern where countries converge towards a
common mean.
Assume that the level of production in a country (Y) is a
multiplicative function of the level of knowledge18 diffused to
the country from abroad (Q), the level of knowledge created in
the country (T), the country's capacity for exploiting the
benefits of knowledge (C), whether internationally or nationally
created, and a constant (z):
(4) Y = Z QaTbce , where Z is a constant.
By differentiating and dividing through with Y:
(5) dY = a~ + bdT + edC
Y Q T C
Assume further, as customary in the diffusion literature, that
the diffusion of internationally available knowledge follows a
logistic curve. This implies that the contribution of diffusion
of internationally available knowledge to economic growth is an
increasing function of the distance between the total level of
knowledge appropriated in the country and that of the country on
the technological frontier( for the frontier country, this
18 In the present context, knowledge means "technological
know-how" (knowledge and skills on how to produce goods and
services).
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contr ibut Lon" will be zero). Let the total amount of knowledge,
adjusted for differences in size, in the frontier country and the
country under consideration be Qf and Q*, respectively:
(6) dQ/Q = h - h(Q*/Qf)
By substituting (6) into (5) we finally arrive at:
(7) dY = ah - ah~ + bdT + edC
Y Qf T C
Thus, following this approach, economic yrowth depends on three
factors:
- The diffusion of technology from abroad. The contribution of
this factor increases with the distance from the world innovation
frontier.
- The growth in nationally produced knowledge
- The growth in the country's capacity for exploiting the
benefits offered by available technology, whether created within
the country or elsewhere.
The model developed above does of course present a very
simplified picture of reality. To do full justice to the
Schumpeterian theory outlined above, the world economy should be
modelled both from the technology side, characterized by
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creation, dYffusion and contraction of competing technological
systems, and from the side of competing nation-states,
characterized by different technological levels and trends,
institutional settings, and internal structural disequilibria.
However, the model differs from the one which until now has
dominated most empirical work on technological gaps and economic
growth in at least one respect, it incorporates the effects of
national innovative performance. As pointed out by
Pavitt(1979/1980) and Pavitt and Soete(1982), the omission of the
innovation variable in most applied work makes it difficult to
explain diverging trends, whether represented by laggards, or
related to the question of changes in technological leadership.
However, the reasons for this neglect are probably not only
rooted in the deep influence of equilibrium or convergence
assumptions on current economic thinking, but also on problems
related to the measurement of innovation and diffusion of
technology across countries. The latter problem will now be
considered more closely.
2.4 PRODUCTIVITY, PATERNTS AND R&D
In the preceding section, we defined two concepts related to a
country's level of economic and technological development, the
total level of knowledge appropriated in the country(Q*), and the
level of knowledge created within the country(T).
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The first co~cept (Q*) refers to the total set of techniques in
use in the country, whether invented within the country, or
diffused to the country from the international economic
environment. Q* cannot be measured directly. What can be
measured, is the resources associated with the use of these
techniques ("technology-input-measures") or the output of the
process in which these techniques are used("technology-output-
measures"). Of the former type, expenditures on education,
research and development(R&D) and employment of scientists and
engineers may be mentioned. But these data are often of low
quality, especially for non-OECD countries. Among the latter,
data on patents and productivity may be mentioned. However, since
patents primarily reflect innovative (or inventive) activity, not
imitation, patent-based measures should be expected to give
biased estimates of the level of technological development for
countries which rely mainly on imitation as, for instance, semi-
industrialized countries. We have, therefore, chosen to use Real
GOP per capita as a proxy for Q*. Since, current prices and
exchange-rates are known to produce downward biased estimates of
Real GOP per capita for countries with productivity levels well
below the world productivity frontier, we adjusted the data on
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GOP per capft.a accordingly on the basis of results obtained by
the "United Nations International Comparison Project"19.
The second concept(T) refers to the amount of technology created
within the country, or its domestic "technology base" as opposed
to its use of "imported technology". We will label this "national
technological activity". This cannot be measured directly either.
The most obvious proxies are R&D and patents. R&D reflects to
some degree both innovation and imitation, since a certain
scientific base is a precondition for successful imitation in
most areas(Freeman(1982), Mansfield(1982», while patents as
noted primarily reflect innovation, not imitation. Since patent
data also are of a better quality then R&D data for the countries
covered by the investigation, patents will in general be
preferred. To make the data comparable across countries, we used
19 The UN study (Kravis et al.(1982» provides estimates
for Rea 1 GOP (Nominal GOP adjusted for differences in the
purchasing power of currencies) and Nominal GDP for 34
developing, semi-industrialized and developed countries for the
year 1975. Since many of the countries included in our sample are
not covered by the UN study, we used one of the short-cut methods
developed there to estimate a relation between Real and Nominal
GOP per capita(r and n) for a sample of countries comparable to
ours, and then used t~is estimated relation to predict Real GOP
per capita for the countries of our sample. The estimated
relation was (with a dummy for Jamaica (an extreme deviant)
included) :
In r = 1.14 + 1.229 In n - 0.042 (In n)2 - 0.372 JAMAICA
(1.52) (5.70) (-2.82) (-3.49)
:It :It :It
N=27
R2 = 0.99(0.98)
(The numbers in brackets under the estimates are t-statistics,
one star denotes significance at the 1% level)
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a method devoe-lopedby Soete(198U20, which implies that we limit
the analysis to patenting activities of different countries in
one common (foreign) market. Contrary to Soete who used patenting
in the US as indicator, this study uses patenting on the world
market21, which has the advantage that it gives data for the US.
It may be noted that while both Q and T are defined in term of
levels of activity (or "stocks"), the chosen proxies are both
measures of the output of these activities (or "flows"). The
implicit assumption, then, is that the (unmeasurable) stocks are
reflected in the (measureable) flows so that, for any pair of
countries, a higher stock value means a higher flow value. This
is consistent with the view that "stocks" of means of production
should be measured in terms of their capacity to produce output
(Pasinetti(1973».
Let us take a closer look at the relation between the proxies.
what we should expect, following the technology-gap argument, is
that the technologically most advanced countries, in terms of
high levels of national technological activity, also are the
economically most advanced, in terms of GDP per capita. Since the
relation between own and foreign-produced technology should be
expected to increase rapidly as the country moves towards the
world 'innovation frontier, the relation between ·GDP per capita
20 Soete's works are discussed in more detail in chapter
1.3.
21 That is: Total patent applications of residents in
country x in all countries which report patent applications to
WIPO(World Intellectual Property Organization) less patent
applications by residents of x in country x.
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and measured-Eechnological activity should be expected to be 109-
linear rather than linear, and steeper for patent-based than for
R&D-based indices, since the latter to a large degree reflects
both imitation and innovation processes.
These hypotheses are tested on cross-sectional data (yearly
averages) from the 1973-1983 period. The sample consists of 27
developed and semi-industrialized countries for which data are
available (24 for R&D). The following variables are used:
PROD = GOP per capita in constant 1980 US dollar (adjusted for
differences in purchasing power of currencies)
RD = Civil R&D as 0/00 of GOP
EPA = External patent applications per billion of exports
(constant 1980 dollars)
For the sake of comparison with other variables, we have to
deflate the total numbers of patent applications filed in other
countries (external patent applications) by some measure of size.
Soete(1981) used population as deflator, but since the number of
patent applications filed in other countries is likely to depend
on the" importance of the export sector relative to the economy as
a whole, this may bias the index (as a measure of national
technological activity) upwards for countries where the share of
exports in GOP is high, and downward for countries where the
share of exports in GOP is low(as for instance the US and India).
54
Thus, if population is to be used as deflator, such differences
in export orientation should be adjusted for. This is the
approach adopted in Fagerberg(1987) and chapters 3-4 of this
study. However, since this adjustment may produce an arteficial
correlation between GDP per capita and the adjusted patent
measure, we have in this section chosen to deflate external
patent applications by exports.
The results are given in table 3. First, whatever the form of the
independent variable, a positive relation between productivity
and technological activity exists, significantly different from
zero at a 1% level. Second, as expected, the best results are
obtained for log-linear models (log for R&D and double-log for
patents, which implies a steeper curve in the latter case).
Third, the correlation between productivity and patenting is much
closer than between productivity and R&D. Note also that in the
data matrix, the observations for the countries enter in
descending order of GDP per capita (as it was in the early
sixties, though). This implies that the Durbin-watson statistics
can be given a special interpretation: It shows whether countries
on approximately the game level of GDP per capita tend to have
correlated residuals. As is evident from table 3, this is indeed
the case for R&D, but not for patents.
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Table 3. THE RELATION BETWEEN PRODUCTIVITY AND TECHNOLOGICAL
ACTIVITY
(1) PROD = 5.72 + 0.02EPA,
(9.80) (4.49)
* *
R2=0.45(0.42), SER=2.14, DW=0.72
(2) PROD = -1.44 + 2.14 lnEPA, R2=0.72(0.71), SER=1.52, DW=1.58
(-1.25) (8.06)
*
(3) PROD = -4.28 + 8.45 lnlnEPA, R2=0.75(0.74),SER=1.44,
(-3.07) (8.69) DW=1.79
* *
(4) PROD = 4.16 + 0.32RD,
(4.84) (4.98)
R2=0.53(0.51), SER=1.89, DW=1.27
(5) PROD = 0.49 + 3.21 lnRD, R2=0.55(0.53), SER=1.85, DW=1.21
(0.33) (5.18)
*
(6) PROD = 3.65 + 5.41 lnlnRD, R2=0.45(0.43),SER=2.04,DW=1.03
(3.33) (4.27)
* *
N(1-3)=27, N(4-6)=24
* = Significance at the 1% level at a two-tailed test
SER = Standard error of regression
OW = Durbin-Watson statistics
The numbers in brackets under the estimates are t-statistics.
The numbers in brackets after R2 are R2 adjusted for degrees of
freedom.--------------------------------------------------------------
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Graph 1 plots the actual and estimated number of patents per
billion of exports against GDP per capita (model 3 above). As can
be seen from the graph, with some exceptions, the countries of
our sample fit the regression line quite well. The main source of
variance is Japan and a group of small, developed countries
headed by Norway. Graph 2, which plots actual and estimated R&D
against GDP per capita (model 5 above), shows that the variance
in this case is larger. In addition to Japan and the group of
small, developed countries referred to above, the variance comes
from the semi-industrialized countries, which in most cases show
much higher levels of R&D than should be expected, given their
levels of GDP per capita. This latter phenomenon is in accordance
with the fact that a certain level of R&D is a necessary
condition for imitation.
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GRAPH II R&D AND GDP PER CAPITA
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2.5 PATTERNS-OF DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH
The general picture which emerges from graph 1 and 2 suggests
that the countries of our sample may be divided in three or four
"groups" depending on the relation b~tween productivity and
technological activity:
Group A consists of four countries with high levels of
productivity and high levels of technological activity:
Switzerland, the United States, Germany and Sweden. These
countries are the typical "technological frontier" countries of
our sample.
Group B consists of seven countries with medium levels of
productivity and medium levels of technological activity: France,
UK, the Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Italy and New Zealand.
This group of countries is less homogeneous than the other
groups. In terms of R&D some of them (France, United Kingdom and
the Netherlands) are close to the leader countries, but they
patent less, while others have more in common with the semi-
industrialized countries or the countries in group C below •
Group C consists of five countries that have high levels of
productivity, but relatively low levels of technological
activity: Norway, Belgium, Canada, Australia and Denmark (Belgium
is close to group B in terms of R&D, but not in terms of
patenting). What the majority of these countries have in common,
in addition to high productivity and low technological activity,
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is small si~e and an industrial structure where production based
on natural resources plays an important role.
Group D consists of the semi-industrialized countries of the
sample(except India): Spain, Ireland, Greece, Hong Kong,
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Taiwan and Korea. They have low levels
of productivity and patenting, but their R&D efforts vary
considerably.
Finally, Japan and India are in a sense "freak cases". In terms
of level of technological activity, Japan joins the frontier
countries in group A, but GDP per capita is much lower than
should be expected. India fits the characteristics of group 0 in
terms of technological activity, but in this case too the level
of productivity is much lower than should be expected.
Table 4 gives some further evidence on the patterns of growth of
these countries in the last decade. This evidence confirms the
type of interpretation of history that normally comes out of
applied work on technological gaps and "catch-up" processes. The
frontier countries in group A show on average the weakest
performance in nearly ~very respect: Group A countries have lower
economic growth, lower level of investments, lower growth in the
labour force and less structural change than other countries. The
medium-technology countries in group B, and the small, natural-
resource based economies of group e, come second and third worst,
respectively, in most respects: Economic growth, investments and
growth of labour force. (But group B countries compete favourably
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with group c-- in two respects, growth of patenting activity and
structural change.) However, all developed countries become
"laggards" compared to the semi-industrialized countries of group
D. On average, group D countries have rates of growth of GOP,
patenting activity and labour force between two and three times
that of the developed countries, and they also have much higher
levels of investments and faster structural change.
It is important to note, however, that there are large
differences in growth patterns within group 0: The Asian NICs
show a much better performance in all respects than Latin
American and European NICs, even if the latter countries still
have better performance than the developed countries in most
areas (though not patent growth). But the distance is not all
that large, especially not to group C countries.
The growth pattern of Japan is an interesting mix of the patterns
discussed so far. In terms of level of technological activity
(and growth of labour supply too), Japan belongs to group A, but
in terms of productivity and structural change to group B.
However, when it comes to GOP growth, patent growth and
investment behavior, J.apanshares many of the characteristics of
group 0 countries. In fact, the share of investments in GOP is
even -higher than that of the Asian NICs.
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2.6 TESTING THE TECHNOLOGY-GAP MODEL
In the following we are going to use the data just presented to
test the technology gap theory of economic growth. As most other
studies on "why growth rates differ" between countries, we will
do this in the form of a cross-country regression, using ordinary
least squares (OLS).
One possible objection to the test is that there may be left-out
variables that should have been taken into account. The most
obvious candidates, to be considered below, are growth in labour
supply (the neoclassical candidate) and changes in the sectoral
composition of output and employment(the structural candidate).
The neoclassical candidate has already been discussed in some
length. Our argument was that the existence of excess labour, or
growth of labour supply, though permissive to growth, cannot be
regarded as a causal factor in the same sense as the technology-
gap variables, especially not as long as unemployment prevails22•
By the same token, it may be questioned whether there is a real
need for additional factors reflecting structural changes in the
model, even if one ac~epts the "dual-economy argument" of large
and persistent differences in productivity between sectors. As
poin~ed out earlier on, these changes cannot be analysed
independently of the process of technology transfer from abroad
22 This is not to deny that limitations in labor supply may
restrict the growth of certain countries in certain periods, but
this is not considered relevant in the period under consideration
here (1973-1983). Cornwall(1977), however, argues that it was not
relevant in the pre-1973 period either.
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(diffusion);-~nd the amount of national efforts mobilized in the
economic exploitation of technology (investments). Rather than
causal factors, such changes should in general be regarded as
outcomes of the growth process, much in the same way as growth of
GOP itself. However, it may be argued that if institutional
obstacles for transfer of resources from one sector to another
exist, this may restrain growth. Thus, what we will do is to test
the basic technology-gap model with and without variables
reflecting structural changes, in order to decide to what degree
these variables add something to the explanatory power of the
model. However, since it is difficult to test for causation in
cross-sectional analyses, these results should be interpreted
with care.
The discussion in the preceding paragraph relates the problem of
interdependence between variables. For instance, as pointed out
by Michaely(1977), growth of gdp and growth of exports (or
agricultural production for that sake) should be expected to be
correlated, simply because exports (or agricultural production)
are included in gdp. But other forms of interdependence are also
possible. For example, economic growth may feed back on
investments (the accel~rator mechanism). Even if this may be true
to some extent, and should be taken into account when
interpreting the results, available evidence indicates that this
feedback mechanism is not sufficient to explain the large and
persistent differences in investment ratios across countries.23
23 See chapter 3 for an empirical verification of this on a
somewhat smaller sample of countries.
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Another possible, though not necessarily probable, form of
interdependence runs from the other variables to growth in
national technological activity. This, it may be noted, would not
be consistent with the Schumpeterian emphasis on innovation as
the source of growth (see chapter 1). Furthermore, the observed
differences in growth of national technological activities within
and between different groups of countries (see section 2.5 and
appendix) seem to indicate that growth in national technological
activity cannot be reduced to a mere reflection of the growth
process itself and the other factors that take part in it. Thus
we will continue to regard growth in national technological
activity as exogenous with regard to the other variables of the
model.
Following the discussion of the previous subsections, we use
growth in external patent applications(PAT) as a proxy for growth
in domestically created knowledge or "national technological
activity", and GDP per capita adjusted for differences in
purchasing power of currencies (PROD), as a proxy for the total
level of knowledge appropriated in a country. To test for the
sensitivity of shift in technology proxies, we have included an
additional test with the level and growth of R&D (RD and RDG) as
technology proxies. The result, however, should be interpreted
with care, since we have fewer observations for R&D than for
patents, and R&D data in many cases are of low quality. As in
most other studies, the investment share(INV) was chosen as an
indicator of the growth of the capacity to exploit the benefits
of technology, whether domestically created or diffused to the
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country from abroad. To avoid spurious correlation, we -
following Michaely (1977) chose the change in the shares of
agriculture and exports in GDP (instead of growth of agriculture
and exports) as proxies for structural changes.
The following variables were used:
GDP = Average annual growth of GDP at constant prices,
PROD = GDP per capita at constant 1980 prices (dollars) adjusted
for differences in the purchasing power of currencies,
PAT = Average annual growth in external patent applications
(abroad),
INV = Investments as a share of GDP at constant prices,
RD = Civil R&D expenses as a percentage of GDP
RDG = Annual average growth in Civil R&D expenses (inflation
adjusted)
AGR(EXP) = Annual average change in the share of
agriculture(exports) in GDP(%o).
The results of the test follow in table 5 below.
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TABLE 5. THE MODEL TESTED (27 countries, 1973-1983)
1. Basic model
* * *
R2=0.83(0.81)
SER=0.85
DW=2.12
N=27
GDP = 0.38 - 0.24PROD + 0.12PAT + 0.20INV
(0.25) (-3.74) (4.02) (3.47)
2. Basic model with dummy for Japan
* * *
- 1.22JAP R2=0.84(0.81)
(-1.24) SER=0.84
DW=2.24
N=27
GDP = - 0.60 - 0.22PROD + O.llPAT + 0.23INV
(-0.35) (-3.40) (3.84) (3.67)
3. Test for effects of changes in agriculture as a share of GDP
* * *
+ 0.005AGR R2=0.83(0.80)
(0.10) SER=0.87
DW=2.10
N=27
GDP = 0.47 - 0.25PROD + 0.12PAT + 0.20INV
(0.26) (-2.88) (3.68) (3.35)
4. Test for effects of changes in exports as a share of GDP
* *
- 0.07EXP R2=0.85(0.82)
(-1.74) SER=0.82
** Dw=1.85
N = 27
GDP = 0.81 - 0.24PROD + 0.14PAT + 0.20INV
(0.53) (-3.85) (4.54) (3.65)
*
5. Test for shift of technology Eroxies
"'~
GDP = 0.45 - 0.18PROD + O.llPAT + 0.17INV
(0.30) (-2.75) (3.21) (3.09)
'* * *
GDP = -1.98 - 0.62 RD + 0.20RDG + 0.17INV
(-1.55) (-2.14) (3.55) (3.08)
** * *
R2=0.76(0.82)
SER=0.78
DW=1.43
N=22
R2=0.73(0.69)
SER=0.83
DW=1.75
N=22
~'.
* = Significant at a 1% level(two-tailed test)
** = Significant at a 10% level(two-tailed test)
R2 in brackets = R2 adjusted for degrees of freedom
SER = Standard error of regression
DW = Durbin-Watson statistics
N = Number of observations included in the test-----------------------------------------------------------------
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Generally, the results give strong support to the basic
technology-gap model as a model of "why growth rates differ"
between countries. The degree of explanation is very high, above
80%, and all variables turn up with the expected signs,
significantly different from zero at the 1% level. Since Japan is
often regarded as a special case, we also estimated the model
with a dummy for Japan, but this did not influence the results.
In the case of structural changes, both variables turned up with
signs opposite of what should be expected, in the case of exports
significantly different from zero at the 10 % level. One possible
interpretation of this result is that the slow growth in world
demand during this period more than outweighed the the economic
benefits from increased export orientation.
Table 6 decomposes the differences in growth between the frontier
countries (Group A) and the others (model 1). The following
picture emerges:
(1) Differences in growth between the frontier countries and the
other groups of developed countries were rather small in the
period under consideration, about 1% as a maximum (group C-
group A), when Japan is excluded. It is difficult to attribute
these differences to specific factors.
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( 2 ) When Japan
(actuaT)
is included, the differences were larger, about
or 3.6% (estimated). The model attributes the2.4%
higher growth of Japan compared to other western countries mainly
to Japan's high growth in national technological activity and the
high share of resources devoted to investments.
(3) Within the group of semi-industrialized countries, t-wo
distinctly different growth patterns may be observed. The
European and Latin-American NICs grow on average 1.5-2%
faster than the frontier countries, primarily because of
diffusion of technology, but partly also because of a higher
share of resources devoted to investments. The Asian NICs,
however, grow on average about 6% faster than the frontier
countries, and 3-4% faster than the other NICs. The model
attributes this latter difference to the rapid growth of the
Asian NICs' own technological activities, in combination with
high levels of investments.
2.7 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Most studies of "why growth rates differ" between countries have
in common that they 'ignore innovation-aspects and lack a
systematic theory of what causes growth to differ. Thus, while
useful -as descriptions, they do not really explain differences in
growth performance across countries.
This chapter has developed a simple, testable, model of economic
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growth based on Schumpeterian logic. Both this logic, and the
subsequent -t~st, point strongly in the direction of a close
relation between economic growth and growth of national
technological activities. Thus, to catch up with the developed
countries, the results obtained here suggest that semi-
industrialized countries cannot rely only on a combination of
technology import and investments, but have to increase their own
technological activities as well.
However, the limitations should also be stressed. For instance,
the result that change in export orientation does not add much to
the explanation of differences in e~onomic growth across
countries in the period under consideration, cannot be
interpreted in support of the view that autarky is a viable
strategy. What it shows, probably, is that the factors that
influence economic growth also influence the growth of exports,
or "competitiveness". However, to study the interaction between
economic growth, competitiveness and factors influencing the
growth process, a more elaborated framework is needed. This is
the question to be considered in the next chapter.
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APPENDIX
Methods
Growth rates are calculated as geometric averages for the period
1973-1983, or the nearest period for which data exist. Levels and
shares are calculated as arithmetic averages for the period 1973-
1983, or the nearest period for which data exist. Changes in
shares are calculated as total change in the share between 1983
and 1973, divided by the number of years(normally ten)
«s(t1)-s(tO»/n). .
Sources
A.
Real GOP per capita, 1980 market prices in US $,
Growth of gross domestic product at constant prices,
Agriculture, Exports and Gross fixed capital formation as a share
of GOP:
OECD countries: OECD Historical Statistics 1960-1983
Taiwan: Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China 1984
Other countries: IMF Supplement on Output statistics and UN
Monthly Bulletin of Statistics
For Switzerland and New Zealand, data for Agriculture as a share
of GOP were not available, so the data for these countries are
estimates(based on employment).
B.
External patent applications:
OECD countries: OECD/STIIU DATA BANK
Other countries: world International Property Organization(WIPO):
Industrial Property Statistics, various editions and
unpublished data
The OECD data are adjusted WIPO data. Data for the non-OECD
countries are compiled from published WIPO statistics except for
Hong Kong, Korea and Ta±wan 1975-1983 where data are compiled by
WIPO from unpublished sources.
C.
R&D
The R&D data are estimates based on the following sources:
OECD countries: OECD Science and Technology Indicators, Basic
Statistical Series (vol B(1982) and Recent Results(1984».
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Other countries: UNESCO Statistical Yearbook(various editions)
and varlbus UNESCO surveys on resources devoted to R&D.
Military R&D expenditures were, following the OECD, assumed to be
negligible in all countries except the US, France, Germany,
Sweden and the UK. The R&D data for these countries were adjusted
downward according to OECD estimates. The estimates were taken
from OECD, Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry: The
problems of estimating defence and civil GERD in selected OECD
member countries(unpublished). For other countries, civil and
total R&D as a percentage of GOP were assumed to be identical.
D.
Growth of labour force (Population between 15 and 64):
OECD Historical Statistics 1960-1983, OECD National
Accounts(various editions), UN Monthly Bulletin of
Statistics(various editions) and Statistical Yearbook of the
Republic of China 1984.
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Table Al DATA USED IN REGRESSIONS (Cha2ter 2)
~
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CHAPTER 3
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS
3.1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter focuses on the interaction between technology,
economic growth and international competitiveness.
Measures of the international competitiveness of a country
relative to other countries are frequently used, especially in
mass media, governmental reports and discussions of economic
policy. But, in spite of this, it is rather rare to see the
concept of international competitiveness of a country defined.
However, few would probably disagree with the view that it refers
to the ability of a country to realize central economic policy
goals, especially growth in income and employment, without
running into balance-of-payments difficulties. Following t.hi.s;:
what a theory of international competitiveness must do is to
establish the links between the growth and balance-of-payments
position of an open economy and factors influencing this process.
Even if there exist many measures of the international
competitiveness of a country1, by far the most popular and
1 These measures range from indicators of economic
performance(market shares (Chesnais(1981), profitability
(Eliasson(1972»), single-factor indicators based on price or
cost development, to complex composite indexes reflecting
economic, structural and institutional factors(EMF 1984).
76
influential is "growth in relative unit labour costs"(RULC2,.
In the small open economies of Western Europe this measure seems
to be as important for policy-making as certain monetary
aggregates have been in the United States and the united Kingdom
in recent years. If unit labour costs grow more than in other
countries, it is argued, this will reduce market shares at home
and abroad, hamper economic growth and increase unemployment.
However, available empirical evidence shows that the fastest
growing countries in terms of exports and GDP in the post-war
period have at the same time experienced much faster growth in
relative unit labour costs than other countries, and vice versa3•
This fact, sometimes referred to as the "Kaldor paradox" after
Kaldor(1978), indicates that the popular view of growth in unit
labour costs determining international co~petitiveness is at best
too simplified. But why?
The following section discusses the main theoretical arguments in
favour of a detrimental effect of "growth in relative unit labour
costs" on market shares and growth. It also considers an
alternative, although closely related, approach advocated by
2 Unit labour costs(ULC) in manufacturing are wages and
social costs for workers at current prices divided by gross
product at constant prices. Relative unit labour costs(RULC) are
ULC converted to an international currency and divided by the
average ULC for the country's trading partners. RULC may grow (1)
because wages and social costs for workers in national currency
are rising faster than in other countries, (2) because the
exchange rate is improving relative to other countries, or (3)
becaus~ productivity growth is lower than in other countries.
3 Several studies, including Fetherston et al. (1977),
Kaldor(1978) and Kellman (1983) have shown that the effects of
growing relative costs or prices on exports or market shares seem
to be rather weak and sometimes "perverse".
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Thirlwall(1979), which focuses on differences between countries
in "income elasticities of demand" as a possible source of
international growth rate differentials. The common shortcoming
of these approaches, we shall argue, is that they fail to take
factors other than price competition and demand explicitly into
account. Sections 3 and 4, then, develop a model of international
competitiveness which relates growth in market shares to three
sets of factors: the ability to compete in technology, the
ability to compete in price, and the ability to compete in
delivery(capacity). The remaining part of this chapter presents a
test of the model on pooled cross-sectional and time-series data
from 15 OECD countries between 1961-1983. The results indicate
that factors related to technology and capacity are indeed very
important for medium and long run differences across countries in
growth of market shares and GOP, while cost-competitiveness plays
a more limited role than commonly assumed. These results are
shown to provide a reasonable explanation for the seemingly
paradoxical findings by Kaldor and others.
3.2. TRADITIONAL WISDOM QUESTIONED
The most popular approach to international competitiveness is
that which focuses on the detrimental effects of growth in
relative unit labour costs(RULC) on market shares and growth.
What are the theoretical arguments in favour of this view?
Firstly, it may be noted that this approach is incompatible with
neoclassical equilibrium theory. In perfect competition, prices
and quantities will always adjust, resources (including labour)
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be fully utilized and balance-of-payments equilibrium ensured.
Thus, economists defending the hypothesis of the detrimental
effects of growing relative unit labour costs, have always had to
assume some degree of imperfect competition or disequilibrium.
For instance, let us assume that each country produces one good
which is an imperfect substitute for the goods produced by the
other countries. As a consequence, each country faces a downward
sloping demand curve both at horne and abroad. To bring unit
labour costs into the picture, assume that prices are determined
by unit labour costs with a mark-up(other cost factors than
labour costs ignored), and that unit labour costs are determined
outside the model. The model is closed by assuming balanced
trade.
The following symbols will be used:
y = GDP(volume),
X = Exports(volume),
M = Imports(volume),
W = World demand(volume),
P = Price per nationally produced product (dollar),
Pw= world market price(dollar),
U = Unit labour costs at home(dollar) and
Uw = Unit labour costs abroad(dollar).
The coefficients a and b are the price elasticities of demand on
the world market and the national market respectively, while c
and h are the corresponding income elasticities.
79
(1) X = A (Pw/p)a WC where A,a and c are constants
(2) M = B (P/pw)b yh where B,b and h are constants
(3 ) XP = MPw (The balance-of-trade restriction)
( 4 ) p. = Ui(1+t) , where t is a constant (i=home, world)1
This way of modelling export and import growth (equation 1-2) has
a long tradition in applied international economics, and examples
may be found in many national and international macroeconomic
models, including, for instance, the OEeD INTERLINK model
(Samuelson(1973». In its present version (equation 1-3), it was
first presented by Thirlwall(1979). The main lesson to be learned
from the model is set out in equations (5)-(6) below.
( 5 ) dY = 1-(a+b) (dP - dPw) + c dWY h P Pw h W
By substituting 4 into 5 we get:
(6 ) dY = 1-(a+b) (dU dUw) + c dWY h U Uw h W
Thus, on these assumptions, economic growth may be written as a
function of growth in relative unit labour costs and world
demand. However, this model has given rise to rival
interpretations. The most common is no doubt that higher growth
in relative unit labour costs than in other countries decreases
exports, increases imports and slows down economic growth. As is
evident from equation (6) above, a necessary condition for this
is that the Marshall-Lerner condition is strictly satis-
fied(a+b>1). This is often taken for granted, but, as noted in
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the introduction, several studies indicate that the effects of
growing relative unit labour costs on exports or imports are
rather wea~:- For instance, a report from the British Treasury
points out:
"Recent experience suggests
have a significantly less
influence on export volumes
ago"(Treasury(1983), p. 4)
that cost-competitiveness may
important or more delayed
than was thought a few years
According to this report, the long-term elasticities of growth in
relative unit labour costs in the Treasury model were as a result
adjusted downwards to 0.5 for exports and 0.3 for imports.
Consider, also, the following regression of growth in relative
unit labour costs(RULC) and growth in OECD imports(W) on GOP
growth(GDP) on a pooled cross-country time-series data.set4 for
the period 1961-1983 (95% confidence intervals in brackets):
GOP = 0.64 +
(-0.08/1.36)
0.06RULC
(-0.07/0.20)
+ 0.49W,
(0.3810.60)
R2=0.60(0.58)
SER=I.36
DW(g)=1.23
N=60
Where R2 in brackets is R2 adjusted for the degree of freedom,
SER is standard error of regression, DW(g) is the Durbin-Watson
4 The data cover the 15 industrial countries for which data
on unit labour costs exist. Average values of the variables
covering whole business cycles were calculated, using the "peak"
years 1968, 1973, 1979 and 1983(final year) to separate one cycle
from the next. For further information on data and methods, see
section 5 and appendix.
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statistics adjusted for gaps5 and N is the number of observations
included in the test.
For the Marshall-Lerner condition to be strictly satisfied, the
estimate of RULC should be negative and significantly different
from zero at the chosen level of significance. The test suggests
that this hypothesis should be rejected. Since serial correlation
in the residuals of the cross-sectional units cannot be ruled
out, an additional test was carried out including one dummy
variable for each country. To test for the sensitivity of lags, a
three year distributive lag of the RULC variable was introduced
(because of lack of data, only 12 countries were included in the
regression). However, neither of these additional tests changed
the result.6
5 This test, which is designed for first order serial
correlation in the residuals within the cross sectional units,
was suggested to me by Professor Ron Smith of Birkbeck College,
London. For a more thoroughgoing discussion of serial correlation
in regressions with pooled data sets, see section IV. The
difference between this test and the one commonly used in time-
series analysis, is that the differences between the residuals of
different cross sectional units, and the corresponding residuals,
are left out from both the numerator and the denominator of the
Durbin-Watson statistics. This reduces the number of observations
in the test by one per country.
6 The results were:
GDP = 0.63
(-0.19/1.45)
0.06LAGRULC
(-0.25/0.05)
+ 0.51W,
(0.39/0.63)
R2=0.84(0.78)
SER=0.98
DW(g)=2.78
N=60
R2=0.60(0.59)
SER=0.60
DW(g)=1.02
N=48
R2=0.86(0.80)
SER=0.95
DW(g)=2.53
N=48
GDP = 0.06RULC
(-0.04/0.16)
+ 0.49W + DUMMIES
(0.41/0.57>
GDP = -0.008lLAGRULC
(-0.13/0.11>
+ 0.51W + DUMMIES
(0.42/0.60)
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The second interpretation (Thirlwall(1979» starts off with the
assumption that relative prices in the long run will be roughly
constant7, so the first term can be neglected. On this
assumption, equation 6 reduces to:
(7) dY = c dWY h W
or, alternatively
(8 ) dY = 1 dxY h X
In this case differences in economic growth between countries
will be determined exclusively by differences in income
elasticities of exports and imports(7), or, in the case of
exogenously given export growth, by differences in income
elasticities of imports alone(8). Using estimates of income
elasticities from Houthakker and Magee(1969), Thirlwall
(1979) showed that equation (8) gave fairly good predictions of
the differences in growth rates between countries. However, his
interpretation of these results, that they support the assumption
of constant relative prices and balance of payments constrained
growth, has been subject to some controversy8. Firstly, it is
pointed out that the test carried out by Thirlwall, a
nonparametric one, is rather weak, and that more appropriate
methods of testing raise doubts about the correctness of his own
7 This is a strong assumption which may be difficult to
justify (and deserves to be tested). For a discussion of this
point, see McGregor and Swales(1985,1986) and Thirlwall(1986).
8 See McCombie(1981), Thirlwall(1981, 1986) and McGregor and
Swales(1985,1986).
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interpretation of his results.9 Secondly, it is argued that open
economy models based on very different theoretical assumptions
could lead to a reduced form equation such as (8), so that not
much could be said from a test of this equation alone.
Another fundamental problem, which relates to the model as such
and not only Thirlwall's interpretation, is what meaning should
be attached to the "income elasticities of demand" in equation
(1)-(2). Why, for instance, is the estimated income elasticity
for imports to the United Kingdom so much higher, and the
estimated income elasticity for exports from the United Kingdom
so much lower, than for other countries on approximately the same
level of income per capita? One possible answer to this question
is, as indicated by Thirlwall(Thirlwall(1979, pp. 52-53), that UK
producers did not manage to compete successfully on non-price
factors during the period for which the estimation was carried
out, and that the estimates of c and h capture the effects of
this. Thus, rather than estimates of "income elasticities of
demand", the estimates of c and h should be regarded as
estimates of differences between countries with regard to non-
price competitiveness As pointed out by Kaldor(1981), this
implies that these elasticities should be regarded as endogenous
9 McGregor and Swales estimated the equation
log(dY/Y)=const+k1109(h)+k2109(dX/dX) on two different data sets
and got a point estimate of k1 of -0.50/-0.58, significantly less
than the expected value (-1) at a 5%level. Thus, the income
elasti~ity of import was found to be an important explanatory
factor of international growth rate differences, as postulated by
Thirlwall, but less so than should be expected given Thirlwalls
assumptions. The explanation is probably that one or more of
these assumptions, as for instance the assumption of no changes
in relative prices, does not hold 100%.
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variables rather than given constants. According to his view, the
income elasticities of this model reflect "the innovative ability
and adaptive capacity" of the producers in different
countries(Kaldor(198l, p. 603»
At this point it becomes increasingly clear what the major
weakness of the model is. It is probably not the assumption of
balanced trade, which would be found in most medium- or long-run
models of an open economy, regardless of theoretical
underpinnings. The major weakness of the model, we will argue, is
the exclusion of non-price factors of competitiveness from the
equations for exports and imports.lO The crucial question is what
to do about it. This is the theme for the next section.
3.3 TECHNOLOGY, COSTS AND CAPACITY
Economic historians, lecturers in business schools and managers
have long been aware of a fact often forgotten by economists,
that competition is not only price competition, but also
technological competition. The reason for this is probably that
the main focus in economics until recently has been on perfect
competition, an abstraction which is now widely recognized to be
a poor description of how international markets function.
However, this is now rapidly changing, especially in the field of
international economics. A logical conclusion from this would be
to include both technological competitiveness and price
10 On this, see also Fagerberg(1985) and McGregor and
Swales(1986).
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competitiveness in the exports and imports functions. The main
reason why this is not normally done is, apart from the reasons
referred to above, probably lack of reliable indicators. We will
postpone the discussion of the latter to section 5 of this
chapter.
However, even if a country is very competitive in terms of
technology and prices, it is not always able to meet the demand
for its products because of a capacity constraint. Similarly,
lack of competitiveness in terms of technology or prices may
sometimes be compensated by a high ability to meet demand, if
some other country faces a capacity constraint. Thus, the growth
in market shares for a country at home and abroad does not only
depend on technology and prices, but also on its ability to
deliver. We will assume that the rest of the world's ability to
deliver is unlimited, i.e. that there is always some country
which is able to deliver if the national producers face a
capacity constraint.
Let the technological competitiveness of a country be T/Tw, price
competitiveness P/Pw' capacity C and the market share for exports
be S(X) = X/We In the usual multiplicative form, S(X) may be
written:
(9) S(X) = ACV(T/Tw)e(p/pw)-a,
where A,v,e and a are positive constants
By differentiating with respect to time this may be written:
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dS(X)
(10) S(X) de dT dTw dP dPw= v e + e(~ - T ) - a(-P --p )w w
We will assume that growth in the ability to deliver depends on
three factors: (a) the growth in technological capability and
know-how that is made possible by diffusion of technology from
the countries on the world innovation frontier to the rest of the
world (dQ/Q), (b) the growth in physical production equipment,
buildings, transport equipment and infrastructure (dK/K) and (c)
the rate of growth of demand (dW/W). Demand enters the function
because capacity at any given point of time is given, while
demand may vary11. If demand outstrips the given level of
capacity, exports will remain constant, but the market share for
exports will decrease, because other countries will increase
their exports. If we assume a multiplicative form as above, the
growth in the ability to meet demand may be written:
(11) dee = ~Z Q dK dw+ r K - l"W
where z,r,l are positive constants.
As is customary in the literature on diffusion, we will assume
that growth in free knowledge follows a logistic curve:
(12) ~Q =
11 Since these constraints (or critical levels of demand)
vary across the different export sectors, the relation between
S(X) and W is likely to be continuous, as in equation (11) below.
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where h is a positive constant, and Q*/ Qf is the ratio between
the country's own level of technological development and that of
the countries on the world innovation frontier. This contribution
will be zero for the frontier countries. By substituting (11)-
(12) into (10) we finally arrive at the following:
dS(X)
(13) S(X) = vzh -
For the sake of exposition, this exercise was carried out for the
market share for exports only. But exactly the same logic applies
to the import share, or the "rest of the world"'s market share in
a specific country's home market, with the exception that the
demand variable in this case is GDP(Y). However, all effects now
enter the equation with the opposite signs of those in (13). For
instance, growth in relative prices decreases the export share,
but increases the import share etc. Carrying out the same
exercise for the import share S(M), using bars to distinguish the
coefficients in the two equations, leaves us with the following
equation:
(14) dS(M)S(M) = -vzh + vzh ~ dKQf - vr K + vI dY - dT dTw - dP dPY - e(~ - T ) + a(-p - Pw
Thus, equations (13)-(14) state that growth in the market shares
for exports and imports depends on technological factors (scope
for imitation, growth in technological competitiveness), growth
in physical production capacity, growth in relative prices and
growth of demand.
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3.4. COMPETITIVENESS AND GROWTH
This section focuses on the relation between market shares for
exports and imports and economic growth. Firstly, how do changes
in market shares affect economic growth? Secondly, how does
economic growth feed back on market shares?
The first question relates to the assumption of balanced trade
made in section 2 of this chapter:
(3) XP = MPw
Following the previous section, define the export share as
S(X) = X/Wand the import share as S(M) = M/Y. By substituting
these expressions into (3), differentiating with respect to time
and rearranging, (3) may be written:
(15) dY/Y = dS(X)/S(X) - dS(M)/S(M) + (dP/P - dPw/Pw) +dW/W
Basically, what is assumed is that countries do not wish, or are
not able, to continually increase debts or claims to the rest of
the world, so that the balance-of-payments, with the exception of
short run fluctuations,' will have to balance through its current
account12• This implies that, in the medium and long run, actual
12 It should be noted, though, that the United
special position because of the demand for
international monetary transactions.
States is in a
dollars for
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growth has to adjust to balance-of-payments equilibrium growth
rate, or the growth rate "warranted" by the current account, to
use a Harrodian term. We will assume that the government plays an
important role in this process by adjusting fiscal and monetary
policies towards this end.
The second question refers to the possible feedbacks of economic
growth on factors influencing the growth of market shares for
exports and imports. For instance, higher economic growth is
likely to lead to higher growth in both wages and productivity.
However, with respect to unit labour cost, these effects tend to
counteract each other. The net effect will crucially depend on
the institutions and the working of the national system of income
distribution, which we in the present context have chosen to
regard as exogenously determined.
Furthermore, economic growth may influence technological
competitiveness through demand-induced innovation
(Schmookler(1966». The importance of demand-induced relative to
supply-induced innovation has been subject to much debate in
recent years. The available evidence shows that there is no easy
link between changes in demand conditions and innovative
activity. Clusters of innovations have appeared in booms as well
as in slumps, and on the whole innovative activity seems to
depend more on technological opportunity and the quality and
quantity of the resources devoted to innovation than on demand
conditions( Clark et al.(1982».
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Finally, economic growth may affect the ability to compete in
delivery. An increase in domestic demand may lead to a situation
where demand outstrips capacity in certain sectors, and as a
consequence domestic suppliers may lose market shares to foreign
suppliers, and vice versa. This has already been taken into
account in the import share function (14). But the effect of
increased demand on capacity utilization may also have a
secondary effect on the ability to deliver, by stimulating
investments in new productive capacity. This effect is supported
by economic theory and should be taken into account in the model.
For instance, the effect of growth in demand on investment may be
represented by a simple accelerator mechanism:
(16) dK/K = dY/Y
However, viewed as an explanation of differences between
countries in investment behaviour, this model will not suffice,
because investment behaviour is also influenced by other factors.
According to the approach of this study, investment in physical
production capacity should be analysed as a complementary asset
to other factors necessary for generating technological
capability, such as the number of scientists and engineers, R&D
facilities, advanced electronic equipment etc. Some of these are
scarce, and to the extent that the government succeeds in
attracting these at the expense of the market sectors of the
economy, this may hamper investment in physical production
capacity too. As pointed out by Kaldor et al.(1986), the
probability for this to happen is much larger for the military
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than for other types of governmental activities, since the former
to a much larger extent than the latter competes with the private
sector in attracting scientists and engineers and other resources
necessary for generating technological capability. Thus,
following Smith(1977) and Cappelen, Gleditsch and
Bjerkholt(1984), we have chosen to include the shares of output
devoted to military and non-military governmental expenditures
("welfare state expenditures") in the accelerator-based
investment function. What we should expect, then, is that
military expenditures have a significantly more negative effect
on investment behaviour than welfare-state expenditures.
Let us take a brief look at the model as developed so far. It
consists of five equations:
(15) dY/Y = dS(X)/S(X) - dS(M)/S(M) + (dP/P - dPw/pw) +dW/W
(13 )
dS(X)
S(X) = vzh - ~ dKvzh Qf + vr K dwvlW dT dTw+ e(T - T )w
dP dl
a(p -
(14) dS (M)
S (M) = ~-vzh + vzh Qf - vr
dK
K + vI
dY - dT dTw - dP dPw
Y - e(T - T ) + alp --p )w w
( 17> dK/K = g MIL - f WELF + dY/Y,
where ~IL and WELF are the shares of military and non-military
governmental expenditures in total output, respectively.
92
From (4) we have:
(18) (i=home, world)
The working of the model is as follows.
Growth in relative prices is determined by growth in relative
unit labour costs(18). Together with technological factors,
growth in physical production and demand, growth in relative
prices determine the growth in market shares for exports and
imports(13-14). Growth in market shares, growth in relative
prices and growth of world demand determine jointly the balance-
of-payments equilibrium growth rate, to which the actual growth
rate is assumed to adjust(15). The actual growth rate then feeds
back on the import share(14) and the growth of physical
production equipment etc(17).
The actual outcome of the adjustment process depends on the
relative strength of the two feedback effects, since they
counteract each other. For example, let us assume that the
balance-of-payments equilibrium growth rate, Yb, is below the
actual growth rate, Ya' and that the government seeks to adjust
the actual growth rate to the balance-of-payments equilibrium
growth rate by successive incremental changes in demand of given
size until a new equilibrium (Ya=Yb=y*) is reached13. The new
13 The condition for a stable solution is:
1> ~(vr+vr)-vl)
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equilibrium y* will be between the initial values of Ya and Yb
provided that the positive effect on the balance-of-payments of
reduced imports outweighs the negative effect of reduced
capacity, or formally:
(19) O>«vr+vr)-vI)
If on the contrary the negative effect of reduced capacity
outweighs the positive effect of reduced imports, we will have a
"vicious" circle, with the new equilibrium below the initial
value of Yb, or formally:
(20) l>«vr+vr)-vI»o
3.5 TESTING THE MODEL
a) Data
The model was tested on pooled cross-country and time-series data
for the period 1960-1983 covering the 15 ind~strial countries for
which data on unit labour costs exist. Average values of the
variables covering whole business cycles were calculated, using
the "peak" years 1968, 1973, 1979 and 1983(final year) to
separate one cycle from the next.
The following variables were used:
GDPi = Growth in gross domestic product in country i at constant
prices
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MEi = Growth in export market share (volume) for country i on
the world market
M1i = Growth in import share(volume) in country i
TERMSi= Growth in terms of trade for country i
RULCi = Growth in relative unit labour costs in common currency
for country i
W = Growth of world trade at constant prices
TLi = Technological level of country i relative to the most
advanced country of the sample(=l)
TGi = Growth in country i's technological competitiveness
relative to other countries
WELFi= Non-military governmental consumption as percentage of
GOP in country i
1NVi = Gross fixed investment in country i as percentage of GOP
in country i
M1Li ='Military expenditure as a percentage of GOP in country i.
95
Most of these variables, with an exception for the technology
variables, are self-explanatory(the reader is referred to the
appendix for details on sources and methods). Chapter 2, as many
other studies, used GDP per capita as a proxy for the level of
technological development. While defendable when comparing coun-
tries on very different levels of development, this practice
becomes more questionable for a sample of developed countries
only. In contrast to less developed countries, most developed
countries also regularly publish data on technological activities
which can be used to construct a proxy for the level of tech-
nological development.
The advantages and problems of different types of data on tech-
nological activities are discussed in more detail in the previous
chapter and will not be repeated here. As pointed out there, the
most obvious proxies are R&D and patents. However, both R&D and
patent statistics are imperfect measures in the sense that they
neglect important aspects of technological activity. For instan-
ce, some sectors of the economy do a lot of R&D, but do not
patent, while others patent a lot without being especially R&D-
intensive. At the national level, however, cross-country studies
show a close correlation between levels of R&D and levels of
patenting activity (Soete(1981), Fagerberg(1987». If both vari-
ables were to be included in the same model, a high degree of
multicollinearity should be expected. These considerations seem
to suggest that the best measure of technological activity would
be a weighted average of R&D-based and patent-based measures.
This is the approach adopted in this chapter. In principle we
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would have given the two variables an equal weight, but since the
variances of the two variables differ substantially, we used
weights that adjusted for these differences. For details on how
this was done, the reader is referred to the appendix to this
chapter.
Thus, the proxy for technological development, TL, is a weighted
average of (a) civil R&D as a percentage of GOP, and (b) exter-
nal patent applications per capita adjusted for differences in
the openness of the economy14. Following the discussion in sec-
tion 3 of this chapter, both variables were divided by the hig-
hest value found in the sample in each period. The index, then,
varies between 1 (the country on the world innovation frontier)
and 0 (a hypothetical country with no technological activity). In
a similar way, a proxy for growth in technological competitive-
ness relative to other countries, TG, can be constructed as a
weighted average of (a) annual percentage growth in Civil R&D15
14 To arrive at a patent based index of technological
development, we adjusted for the size and openness of the economy
(the number of patent applications filed abroad reflect both the
size of the country and the importance of foreign markets
relative to the domestic market. For a more thoroughgoing
treatment, see chapter 3 and Fagerberg(1987). For details, see
the appendix to this chapter.
15 Annual data for R&D were available for a few countries
only, so we had to use a proxy for growth in civil R&D. In
general, R&D efforts (as a percentage of GOP) and income per
capita tend to be closely correlated (Soete(1981),
Fagerberg(1987». If the R&D efforts of a country are much above
what 'should be expected from the level of income in the country,
this may be interpreted as an effort by the country to upgrade
its technological level, and vice versa. Following this, the
proxy chosen is the difference between actual R&D (as a
percentage of GDP)and what should be expected assuming a linear
relation between R&D and income per capita. See the appendix to
this chapter for further details,
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for country i, less the average growth for the countries in the
sample, and (b) annual percentage growth in external patent
applications for country i, less the average growth for the
countries in the sample. This index, then, has a zero average in
each period.
Regarding the growth of "physical production equipment, transport
equipment and infrastructure", we would have preferred a proxy
based on some measure of physical capital, but unfortunately no
such measure was available for all the countries concerned and
for sufficiently long time spans. As a number of other studies,
therefore, we chose to use gross investment as a percentage of
GOP as a proxy.
b) The empirical model
The model tested is the one set out in the previous section
subject to a few modifications.
First, in order to test the assumption of a one-to-one correla-
tion between actual growth and the balance-of-payments equili-
brium growth rate (BAL), we introduced a separate equation for
this (in addition to the balance-of-payments equilibrium growth
rate identity). Second, in actual practice growth in relative
prices (terms of trade) is influenced by a number of factors,
many of them country specific, that do not relate to the price-
or cost-competitiveness of firms. Since we believe growth in
relative unit labour costs to be a better measure of price-
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and cost-competitiveness of firms than growth in terms of trade,
we have substituted growth of relative unit labour costs into
the two equations for growth in market shares, and introduced a
separate equation where growth in terms of trade is set out to be
a function of growth in relative unit labour costs, country
dummies(see later) and a POST-73 dummy. The POST-73 dummy is
supposed to catch the effect of the loss in terms trade that most
of these countries experienced because of the oil price shocks.
The empirical model, then, is the following:
(21> GDP = alO + allSAL, where we expect alO=O, all=l
(22 ) SAL = ME - MI + TERMS + W
(23) TERMS = a31RULC - a32POST73 + DUMMIES
(24) ME = a40 a41TL + a42INV a43W + a_i4TG a4sRULC
(25) MI = aSO + aS1TL - aS2INV + aS3GDP - aS4TG + a5SRULC
(26) INV = a60 - a61M1L - a62WELF + a63GDP
Since all coefficients are defined as positive, the expected
signs are the ones above. Note, however, that since we use a
proxy for growth in physical production capacity, we cannot any
longer make inferences from the theoretical model about the
expected signs of the constant terms in (24)-(26).
c) Estimation
To avciid simultaneous equation bias, the two st~ge least squares
method (2SLS) was adopted. To test for first-order serial
correlation within the cross-sectional units, we used the Durbin-
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watson statistics adjusted for gaps, to test for hetero-
scedasticity, we applied a Glejser test. Furthermore, to test for
the possibility of structural change, a Chow test was used.
There is a special problem involved in estimation on pooled
cross-country time-series data. For instance, assume that there
is one time-invariant omitted variable for each country,
representing country-specific factors such as differences in
culture, institutions, composition of output etc. In this case we
would expect least-squares methods to produce results where the
residuals of each country are serially correlated. If this type
of serial correlation is a serious one, more efficient estimates
may be obtained by methods that adjust for the part of the total
variance which can be attributed to country-specific factors.
Several methods are available. The most widely used is to
introduce country dummies (the LSDV method)~ This method
automatically leaves out the part of the total variance which
refers to differences in country-variable means, and is therefore
not applicable in cases where these differences are considered to
be relevant. Another class of methods treats the country specific
effects as random variables16 (random effects method). The
16 In the case of a linear relation between a dependent and
an independent variable, let the dependent variable be denoted b~
Yjt (country j, period t), the independent variable by Xjt, the
"adjustment-factor" by c (l>c>O) and let "bar" denote w1thin-
country mean of a variable. It is suggested, then, that
estimates obtained by estimating the equation
(Yjt - c Yj) = b (Xjt - c Xj)
will give more efficient estimates than estimates obtained by
ordinary least ~quares. Let the disturbance term be
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problem in this case is that the "true" variances are not known
and have to estimated.
The choice of estimation method depends crucially on the nature
of the hypothesis under test. Consider, for instance, the
relation between growth in terms of trade and growth in relative
unit labour cost(23). Ordinary least squares implies a test of
the hypothesis that growth in terms of trade is determined by
growth in relative unit labour costs (and the POST-73 dummy)
only. To apply the LSDV method implies a test of the hypothesis
that growth in terms of trade is determined by country-specific
trends, reflecting differences in specialization patterns and
other time-invariant factors, but that deviations from these
trends are determined by growth in relative unit labour costs
(and the POST-73 dummy). Since we, as pointed out in the previous
u(j,t) = b(j) + w(j,t), where b(j) is the country-specific
"random effect", and let the expected variance of the country-
specific effects and the rest of the disturbance term be V(b) and
V(w), respectively. The adjustment factor may then be written:
c = l-[V(w)/(V(w)+T V(b»]O.s,
where T is the number of time periods(Maddala(l971, 1977),
Johnston(1984». The limiting cases c=l and c=0 correspond to
LSDV and ordinary least squares, respectively(Johnston(1984».The
problem is that the true variances are not known and have to be
estimated. Several methods are suggested in the literature, but
Monte Carlo studies show that the differences between the
estimates obtained by the various methods are
small(Nerlove(1971), Maddala(1973». The estimates of V(b) and
V(w) used in this paper are based on the 2SLS residuals, with
V(b) = (Sum(j) u(j)2) / (n-1) and
V(w) = [Sum(j,t)(u(j,t)-u(j»2] / [n(T-l)],
where n is the number of countries and u(j) within-country means
of the observed residuals u(j,t).
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subsection, hold the latter to be the most likely, the LSDV
method is the most appropriate method in this case.
Similar arguments may be put forward for the relation between
actual growth and the balance-of-payments equilibrium growth rate
(21). To use 2SLS without dummy variables implies a test of the
hypothesis that the balance-of-payments equilibrium growth rate
and the actual growth rate are identical. This is a strong
hypothesis, that may be contested. For instance, the United
States is in a special position, because of the demand for
dollars for international monetary transactions. Furthermore,
large, unexpected changes in the balance-of-payments position may
lead to very long adjustment processes, as the experiences of
many oil-producing countries suggest. The use of two-stage LSDV,
then, allows for the existence of stable, country-specific
deviations from the balance-of-payments equilibrium growth rate.
This implies a test of the weaker hypothesis that a change in the
balance-of-payments equilibrium growth rate will be accompanied
by an equal change in the actual growth rate. Since both
hypotheses are interesting, we report both estimates.
In the case of the equations for growth in market shares for
exports and imports (24-25), the hypotheses under test suggest a
different procedure. For instance, would we consider a large
scope for imitation, or a high investment share, compared to
other 'countries throughout the period to be irrelevant to the
growth in market shares? Certainly not. To apply the LSDV method
in this case would mean wrongly attributing a large part of the
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effects of these variables to unknown country-specific factors. A
similar argument may be put forward in the case of the investment
equation (26). In these cases, if serial correlation in the
residuals within the cross-sectional units is considered to be
important, it is better to re-estimate the equation by the random
effects model discussed above.
d) Results
Table 1 reports results from the test. For the sake of space, we
do not report the estimates of the country dummies.
The test suggests that even though the balance-of-payments
equilibrium growth rate and the actual srowth rate are strongly
correlated, the assumption of strict equality between the two
does not hold. However, the introduction of two dummies, one for
the United states and one for Norway, the "Kuwait" of the North,
is enough to change this (95% confidence intervals in brackets>:
GOP = 0.21 +
(-0.97/1.39)
0.87 BAL + 2.00 us
(0.59/1.15>
- 1.96NORWAY (2SLS>
Furthermore, the test suggests that we can accept the weaker
hypothesis of a one-to-one correlation between changes, or
deviations, in the balance-of-payments equilibrium growth rate
and changes, or deviations, in the actual growth rate.
In the case of the equations for growth in the market shares for
exports and imports, all coefficients turned up with the expected
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signs, most of them significantly different from zero at the
1%level17• Furthermore, the estimates of the coefficients in the
two equations did not differ significantly, except for the demand
variables. The latter result is in accordance with the fact that
world trade in the post war period has grown more than twice as
fast as GDP. In the case of the equation for growth in the export
market share, the Glejser test indi~ated violation of the
assumption of homoscedasticity. To check the implications for the
estimates, we re-estimated the equation with weighted least
squares, but this did not change the result significantly. For
the equation for growth in the import share, the test for serial
correlation was inconclusive, so we re-estimated the equation
with the random effects method to check whether this would affect
the estimates (it did not).18
For investment, 2SLS produced serial correlation between the
residuals within each cross-sectional unit. The random effects
method gave a lower estimate of the feedback of economic growth
on investment. In both cases military expenditures had a
significantly larger negative effect on investments than welfare
state expenditures.
17 Except for the constant terms, for which no assumptions
could "be made, due to the introduction of proxies~
18 Note that since these additional tests imply a
transformation of the whole data set, the estimate of the
constant term cannot be compared to 2SLS.
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TABLE 1. THE MODEL TESTED(N=60)
(21) 2SLS
GDP = 0.96 + 0.67BAL
(2.13) (6.43)
R2=0.31(0.30)
SER=1.76
DW(g)=1.62
DF=S8
(21) 2SLS-LSDV
GDP = 1.16BAL + DUMMIES
(4.01)
R2=0.41<0.19)
SER=2.66
DW(g)=2.47
DF=44
(22) 2SLS-LSDV
TERMS = 0.23RULC - 0.92POST73 + DUMMIES
(3.02) (-2.4S)
R2=0.SO(0.30)
SER=1. 4S
DW(g)=2.03
DF=43
(24) 2SLS
ME = -2.03 - 2.70TL + 0.24INV - 0.3Sw + O.27TG - 0.29RULC
(-1.16) (-2.31) (3.S6) (-4.S6) (~.49) (-3.14)
R2=0.55(0.S1)
SER=1.81
DW (g)=2.09
DF=54
(24) 2SLS-WLS
ME = -3.25 - 2.64TL + 0.30INV - 0.36W + 0.25TG - 0.34RULC
(-2.2S) (-2.98) (S.Ol) (-S.42) (4.68) (-4.S9)
R2=0.67(O.63)
SER=1.10
DW(g)=1.97
DF=54
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(25) 2SLS
MI = 2.65 + .1!47TL - 0.27INV + 1.22GDP - 0.17TG + 0.23RULC
(1.47) (2.75) (-3.39) (7.20) (-2.55) (2.45)
R2=0.47(0.42)
SER=1.85
DW(g)=1.58
DF=54
(25) 2SLS-RANDOM EFFECTS METHOD
MI = 0.88 + 3.46TL - 0.23INV + 1.25GDP - 0.21TG + 0.21RULC
(0.62) (1.84) (-2.00) (7.72) (-2.34) (2.38)
R2=0.54(0.49)
SER=1.59
DW(g)=2.33
DF=54
(26) 2SLS
INV = 28.52 -1.48MIL -0.23WELF + 0.75GDP
(13.01) (-6.95) (-2.34) (3.60)
R2=0.65(0.64)
SER=2.48
DW(g)=0.75
DF=56
(26) 2SLS-RANDOM EFFECTS MODEL
INV = 9.21 -1.32MIL -0.29WELF + 0.50GDP
(12.47) (-4.33) (-2.78) (3.09)
R2=0.55(0.52)
SER=1.45
DW(g)=1.89
DF=56
R2 in brackets = R2 adjusted for degrees of freedom
SER = Standard error of regression
DW(g) = Durbin-Watson statistics adjusted for gaps
N = Number of observations included in the test
DF= Degrees of freedom
The numbers in brackets below the estimates are t-statistics.
Finally, to test for the possibility of structural change, we
tested the assumption that the 15 post-1979 observations are not
generated by the same model as the entire data set, using a chow
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test. Table 2 reports the results of the test for the regressions
in table 1 above (except the additional WLS and random-effects
tests). The test suggests that in all cases, the assumption of
structural change can be rejected at the 1% level of
significance.
Table 2. CHOW TEST OF STRUCTURAL CHANGE(F-statistics)
GOP GDP(lsdv) Terms(lsdv) ME MI INV
1.73 2.48
( * ) ( * )
2.01
( * )
0.74 1.80 0.47
( * ) ( * ) ( * )
* denotes rejection of the assumption of structural change at the
1% level of significance
----------------------------------------------------------------
3.6. "THE KALDOR PARADOX" ONCE MORE
We will now return to the seemingly paradoxical findings by
Kaldor and others. What Kaldor(1978) did was to compare growth
in relative unit labour costs and growth in market shares for
exports, when measured in value, for 12 countries over the period
1963-1975. He found that for some of these countries, the
relation between growth in relative unit labour costs and growth
in market shares seemed to be positive, or the opposite of what
is commonly assumed ("perverse"). Table 3 reproduces Kaldor's
findin~s for three countries19 for which he found a strong
19 Kaldor found four examples of a strong "perverse"
relationship, Japan, Italy, the UK and the US. Our model does
predict this for all but one (Italy). A closer look at the export
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"perverse" relationship, Japan, the UK and the US, and compares
these findings with the same relationship as predicted by the
model20.
TABLE 3. THE KALDOR PARADOX
COUNTRY
Kaldor 1963-1975 Our 1961-1973
Growth in market Growth in market
RULC share for exports RULC share for exports
(value) (value(predicted»
JAPAN 27.1 72.0 31.0 103.3
UK -21. 4 -37.9 -25.7 -16.2
USA -43.7 -17.8 -33.9 -29.8
Thus, in these cases, the model actua lly predicts a strong
"perverse" relationship between growth in relative unit labour
costs and market shares for exports (value). To see how this may
be explained, consider table 4 below. The decomposition suggests
that Japan's large gains in market share during this period
should be explained by a combination of (a) a rapid increase in
technological competitiveness, (b) a large scope for imitation,
performance of Italy shows a very erratic development (an export
boom in the sixties followed by a weak performance in the late
sixties and early seventies) which our model fails to replicate.
20 The predicted growth in the market share for exports
measured in value was obtained as the sum of the predicted growth
in the market share measured in volume and the predicted growth
in the terms of trade(country-dummies not included). The
coefficients were taken from the 2SLS-estimates given in table 1.
Note that the predictions are for total exports, while Kaldor
reported data for manufacturing only. For these and other
reasons, predicted and actual export performance(as reported by
Kaldor) should only be expected to show a similar pattern, not
coincide.
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and (c) a high level of investment. Note, also, that since the
estimated (negative) effect of growth in relative unit labour
costs on the market share for exports measured in volume, is not
significantly different from the estimated (positive) effect of
growth in relative unit labour costs on relative prices(terms of
trade), the net effect of growth in relative unit labour costs on
the growth of market shares for exports· measured in value turns
out be negligible.
In the case of the united States, it may be argued that a certain
loss in market share would have been difficult to avoid, given
the cost of being close to the world innovation frontier in a
number of areas. This is also partly confirmed. However, for
both the us and the UK, the main factor behind the losses in
market shares during this period seems to have been slow growth
in productive capacity caused by the unusually low shares of
national resources devoted to investments. The model (equation
(26» suggests that the main factor behind the low investment
shares in these two countries is the high share of national
resources used for military purposes.
3.7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The most commonly held 'approach to international competitiveness
focuses on differences in the growth of relative unit labour
costs(RULC) as the major factor affecting differences in
competitiveness and growth across countries. However, as several
studies have pointed out, this view is at best too simplified.
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According to the results obtained in this chapter, the main
factors influencing differences in international competitiveness
and growth across countries are technological competitiveness and
the ability to compete on delivery. Regarding the latter, this
chapter especially points out the crucial role played by
investments, and factors influencing investments, in creating new
production capacity and exploiting the potentials given by
diffusion processes and growth in national technological
performance.
One implication of these results is that polices aimed at curbing
growth in wages and prices are not sufficient to strengthen
international competitiveness and increase economic growth in the
medium or long run. To achieve these goals, policies should aim
at increasing national technological competitiveness and the
amount of efforts devoted to the economic exploitation of
diffusion and innovation.
long run nature.
By necessity, such policies are of a
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APPENDIX
1. Definitions and methods
Growth rate~-are calculated as geometric averages for the periods
1960-1968, 1968-1973, 1973-1979 and 1979-1983, while levels and
shares are calculated as arithmetic averages for the periods
1960-67, 1968-1973, 1974-1979 and 1980-1983, or the nearest
period for which data exist.
The growth of the export market share of a country is defined as
the growth of exports less the growth of world trade(OECD
imports), both in constant prices.
The growth of the import share of a country
growth of imports less the growth of GDP,
prices.
is defined as the
both in constant
The technological level of a country i (TLi) is defined as the
weighted average of a patent-based index(Pi) and a R&D-based
index (Ri), using the standard deviations as weights:
TLi=(std(R)/(std(P)+std(R»)Pi+(std(P)/(std(P)+std(R»)Ri
The patent-based index(P) is defined as the number of external
patents application(PAT), divided by the number of inhabitants in
the country(POP) and the degree of the openness of the economy,
measured through exports as a percentage of GDP(XSH),
Pi=PATi/(POPi*XSHi). The R&D-based index (R) is defined as civil
research and development expenditures as ~ percentage of GDP.
Each index is normalized to the range 0,1 by dividing all
observations from period t with that observation from period t
which has the highest value.
The growth in country i's technological competitiveness relative
to other countries(TGi) is defined as the weighted average of a
patent-based index (PGi) and a R&D based index (RGi), using the
standard deviations as weights:
TGi=(std(RG)/(std(PG)+std(RG»)PGi+(std(PG)/(std(PG)+std(RG»)RGi
The patent-based index(PG) is defined as growth in external
patent applications for country i, less the average growth rate
for all countries. The R&D based index (RG) is defined as the
ratio between civil R&D expenditures as a percentage of GDP (RD)
and GDP per capita (T) for country i, less the average ratio for
all countries in each, period. Let "bar" denote within-period
mean. Then
The TG index, then, has a zero average in each period.
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2. Sources
Growth in r~l~tive unit labour costs in common currency:
IMF International Financial Statistics and OEeD(Finland).
External patent applications:
OEeD/STIIU DATA BANK and World International Property
Organization(WIPO):Industrial Property Statistics
The R&D data are estimates based on the following sources:
OEeD Science and Technology Indicators, Basic Statistical Series
(vol. B(1982) and Recent Results(1984».
Military R&D expenditures were, following the OEeD, assumed to be
negligible in all countries except the US, France, Germany,
Sweden and the UK. The R&D data for these countries were adjusted
downward according to OEeD estimates. The estimates were taken
from OEeD, Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry: The
problems of estimating defence and civil GERD in selected OEeD
member countries(unpublished). For other countries, civil and
total R&D as a percentage of GDP were assumed to be identical.
Military expenditure as percentage of GDP:
SIPRI Yearbook
Non-military governmental consumption as percentage of GDP:
SIPRI Yearbook and OEeD Historical Statistics
other variables:
OEeD Historical Statistics and OEeD National Accounts
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3• Supplementary tables
•TABLE Al. DATA USED IN REGRESSIONS (CHAPTER 3)
COUNTRY GDP W ME MI INV MIL WELF RULC TERMS BAL TL TG LAGRULC
USA 1 4.5 8.1 -2.3 4.1 18.0 8.7 9.1 -1.3 0.7 2.4 0.78 0.5 -1.3
USA 2 3.3 9.4 -0.7 3.0 18.3 7.6 11.1 -6.2 -1.7 4.0 0.79 -0.9 -1.5
USA 3 2.6 4.0 1.2 1.2 18.3 5.6 12.7 -2.6 -3.6 0.4 0.66 -0.6 -4.8
USA 4 0.7 1.3 -2.8 3.1 17.4 6.0 12.5 7.2 0.4 -4.2 0.76 0.5 3.5
JAPAN 1 10.5 8.1 6.6 3.3 31.3 0.9 .7.0 0.9 -1.0 10.4 0.42 15.8 -1.5
JAPAN 2 8.8 9.4 3.6 5.6 34.7 0.8 7.0 4.0 1.3 8.7 0.51 12.8 1.1
JAPAN 3 3.6 4.0 6.1 0.7 32.0 0.9 8.9 -1.5 -6.1 3.3 0.55 8.9 2.1
AJAPAN 4 3.9 1.3 8.9 -5.4 30.4 1.0 9.1 -2.8 -4.0 11.6 0.73 13.4 -7.5
GERMANY 1 4.2 8.1 -0.4 3.5 25.2 4.3 10.6 -0.1 0.9 5.1 0.55 0.8 0.5
GERMANY 2 4.9 9.4 -1.7 5.4 24.4 3.4 13.0 5.5 1.8 4.1 0.65 3.4 2.7
GERMANY 3 2.4 4.0 0.6 3.0 20.9 3.4 16.4 0.4 -1.4 0.2 0.67 2.6 2.2
GERMANY 4 0.5 1.3 2.8 0.9 21.5 3.4 17.0 -2.1 -2.0 1.2 0.75 3.8 0.7
FRANCE 1 5.4 8.1 -1.2 4.1 22.3 5.5 7.7 0.3 0.9 3.7 0.50 3.1 -2.2
FRANCE 2 5.9 9.4 4.1 7.2 23.3 4.2 9.1 -2.5 0.3 6.6 0.47 1.3 -2.0
FRANCE 3 3.1 4.0 2.9 3.0 22.7 3.8 10.7 0.8 -1.2 2.7 0.44 -0.3 1.2
FRANCE 4 1.1 1.3 1.0 2.1 20.9 4.1 11.6 -2.8 -1.8 -1.6 0.50 0.2 1.2
~U. K. 1 3.1 8.1 -3.7 1.0 17.8 6.0 10.9 -3.0 0.6 4.0 0.51 1.7 0.0
U.K. 2 3.2 9.4 -2.9 3.5 19.2 5.1 12.7 -1.2 -3.8 -0.8 0.50 2.9 -1.3
U.K. 3 1.4 4.0 0.0 0.6 19.4 4.8 15.7 3.6 0.9 4.3 0.45 1.0 0.7
U.K. 4 0.4 1.3 -1.4 -0.1 16.9 5.1 16.7 1.5 0.7 0.7 0.54 7.4 7.4
ITALY 1 5.7 8.1 3.7 4.0 21.7 3.2 10.7 2.2 -1.1 6.7 0.22 0.3 -0.1
ITALY 2 4.6 9.4 -1.7 7.1 20.6 2.9 12.0 -0.5 -1.2 -0.6 0.25 0.7 1.6
ITALY 3 2.6 4.0 4.8 1.7 20.0 2.5 12.9 0.1 -2.4 4.7 0.23 1.9 -0.2
ITALY 4 0.6 1.3 -0.1 0.8 19.2 2.5 15.2 2.4 -1.5 -1.1 0.28 -1.6 1.1
CANADA 1 5.6 8.1 1.2 1.8 22.1 3.5 11.6 -1.0 0.0 7.5 0.33 -0.8 -3.0
..t"ICANADA 2 5.6 9.4 -1.5 3.5 21.6 2.3 16.2 -0.7 1.4 5.8 0.31 -1.9 -1.3
CANADA 3 3.4 4.0 -0.4 0.9 22.9 1.9 17.8 -1.7 0.2 2.9 0.28 -3.5 -3.3
CANADA 4 0.8 1.3 0.8 -2.2 21.8 1.9 18.2 5.1 -0.8 3.5 0.34 -3.0 3.1
AUSTRIA 1 4.2 8.1 -1.0 3.4 26.4 1.2 12.1 0.8 -0.8 2.9 0.16 -4.8 na
AUSTRIA 2 5.9 9.4 2.2 5.3 27.2 1.1 13.7 0.7 0.9 7.2 0.20 -4.4 na
AUSTRIA 3 2.9 4.0 2.5 3.0 26.4 1.2 16.2 0.5 -0.6 2.9 0.27 -2.4 na
AUSTRIA 4 1.5 1.3 3.7 1.8 24.0 1.2 17.1 -1.4 -1.1 2.1 0.34 -3.0 na
BELGIUM 1 4.5 8.1 0.3- 3.3 21.6 3.3 9.4 0.7 0.0 5.1 0.31 0.3 6.7
BELGIUM 2 5.6 9.4 1.6 5.2 21.7 2.9 11.1 -1.6 0.4 6.2 0.35 -1.8 0.1
BELGIUM 3 2.2 4.0 -0.6 1.8 21.9 3.1 13.5 0.2 -1.0 0.6 0.34 -1.8 2.2
BELGIUM 4 0.9 1.3 1.3 -1.4 18.3 3.4 14.9 -8.5 -2.4 1.6 0.34 -1.4 -2.5
A
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DENMARK 1 4.6 8.1 -1.5 2.5 23.4 2.8 12.8 0.3 0.0 4.1 0.20 -3.4 0.5
DENMARK 2 4.0 9.4 -3.3 3.0 24.4 2.4 17.8 -1.0 1.1 4.2 0.29 -6.5 1.0
• DENMARK 3 1.9 4.0 -0.8 -0.1 22.1 2.3 21.9 -0.2 -2.2 1.1 0.30 -4.4 1.8
DENMARK 4 0.9 1.3 3.5 -2.2 16.7 2.4 25.0 -4.0 -2.1 4.9 0.32 -4.9 -2.1
NETHERL 1 4.8 8.1 -0.9 3.9 25.0 4.1 10.3 2.6 0.5 3.8 0.53 2.2 1.6
NETHERL 2 5.3 9.4 2.9 4.8 25.0 3.5 12.1 0.8 -1.5 6.0 0.57 4.5 1.6
NETHERL 3 2.5 4.0 -1.0 0.8 20.9 3.2 14.2 0.7 -1.1 1.1 0.52 3.4 2.4
NETHERL 4-0.3 1.3 0.6 0.0 19.2 3.2 14.6 -3.6 -0.1 1.8 0.51 1.0 -1.5
NORWAY 1 4.4 8.1 -1.0 3.0 29.0 3.5 10.9 1.8 0.4 4.5 0.21 -5.4 1.1
NORWAY 2 4.1 9.4 -3.7 2.8 27.4 3.4 14.0 1.3 0.1 3.0 0.30 -1.0 2.0
NORWAY 3 4.9 4.0 0.9 -3.0 32.9 3.1 16.5 2.1 1.3 9.2 0.34 -2.7 4.4
NORWAY 4 2.3 1.3 1.3 -0.4 25.8 3.0 16.1 2.3 6.3 9.3 0.33 -6.4 1.3
,aO SWEDEN 1 4.4 8.1 -1.1 1.6 23.9 4.0 13.4 0.8 -0.1 5.3 0.40 -3.9 0.4
, SWEDEN 2 3.7 9.4 -0.5 2.3 22.6 3.7 18.4 -1.3 0.1 6.7 0.47 -4.3 0.2
SWEDEN 3 1.8 4.0 -1.5 0.9 20.6 3.3 22.6 0.7 -1.0 0.6 0.56 -1.3 1.9
SWEDEN 4 1.2 1.3 2.5 -1.9 19.2 3.3 25.8 -6.6 -1.2 4.5 0.67 -1.0 -1.3
SWITZER 1 4.4 8.1 -1.6 2.9 28.0 2.7 7.4 1.2 1.9 5.5 1.00 0.8 na
SWITZER 2 4.5 9.4 -1.8 4.8 27.9 2.2 8.5 0.3 -0.4 2.4 1.00 -0.3 na
SWITZER 3-0.4 4.0 -0.9 3.9 22.7 2.1 10.6 2.8 0.8 0.0 1.00 -0.2 na
SWITZER 4 1.4 1.3 0.6 0.5 23.6 2.1 10.8 -0.4 0.7 2.1 1.00 -2.2 na
FINLAND 1 3.9 8.1 -2.1 0.7 26.6 1.8 11.6 -1.5 0.1 5.4 0.12 -3.2 na
FINLAND 2 6.7 9.4 -0.4 4.8 26.2 1.5 13.7 0.8 0.2 4.4 0.24 -0.9 na
e FINLAND 3 2.4 4.0 0.8 0.4 27.2 1.4 16.5 0.2 -0.8 3.6 0.29 1.3 na
FINLAND 4 3.3 1.3 2.9 -0.7 24.9 1.6 17.7 0.6 -0.9 4.0 0.39 0.9 na
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TABLE A2 GROWTH IN EXTERNAL PATENT APPLICATIONS
1960-68 1968-73 1973-79 1979-83
USA 6.7 -1.7 -6.1 -4.3
JAPAN 22.8 10.9 0.9 1.0
GERMANY 5.2 0.7 -6.7 -8.7
FRANCE 6.3 0.5 -6.1 -4.8
UK 3.1 -2.4 -9.5 -2.2
ITALY 5.9 0.6 -0.3 -8.7
CANADA 5.7 2.9 -5.7 -3.2
AUSTRIA 4.5 3.0 -5.0 -6.5
BELGIUM 5.9 -5.8 -8.7 -4.4
DENMARK 8.6 -3.0 -5.8 -2.9
NETHERLANDS 2.2 -1.4 -4.6 -9.2
NORWAY 1.2 5.9 -6.2 -7.3
SWEDEN 5.3 0 -4.5 -7.9
SWITZERLAND 5.2 0.6 -7.3 -9.1
FINLAND 10.0 8.1 4.0 4.2
TABLE A3 EXTERNAL PATENT APPLICATIONS PER CAPITA(INDEX)
1960-1967 1968-1973 1974-1979 1980-1983
USA 3.19 2.96 2.15 2.18
JAPAN 0.32 0.70 0.92 1.32
GERMANY 1.60 1.58 1.63 1.43
FRANCE 0.96 0.92 0.86 0.82
UK 0.91 0.77 0.63 0.70
ITALY 0.33 0.32 0.31 0.38
CANADA 0.34 0.31 0.35 0.36
AUSTRIA 0.48 0.48 0.54 0.52
BELGIUM 0.30 0.24 0.23 0.45
DENMARK 0.46 0.54 0.67 0.54
NETHERLANDS 0.65 0.60 0.61 0.55
NORWAY 0.19 0.21 0.30 0.25
SWEDEN 1.57 1.40 1.58 1.43
SWITZERLAND 3.50 3.67 3.72 3.31
FINLAND 0.20 0.32 0.50 0.76
1) Adjusted for differences in the openness of the economy,
mean = 1 in each period.
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TABLE A4 CIVIL R&D EXPENDITURES AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP
1963-1967 1968-1973 1974-1979 1980-1982
USA 1.67 1.77 1.74 1.94
JAPAN 1.50 1.79 1.95 2.36
GERMANY 1.45 1.91 2.08 2.40
FRANCE 1.55 1.52 1.50 1.67
UK 1.60 1.71 1.65 1.93
ITALY 0.71 0.88 0.87 0.97
CANADA 1.15 1.14 1.07 1.26
AUSTRIA 0.40 0.61 0.92 1.16
BELGIUM 1.10 1.37 1.37 1.17
DENMARK 0.60 0.95 0.97 1.07
NETHERLANDS 1.80 2.09 2.00 1.88
NORWAY 0.75 1.17 1.35 1.28
SWEDEN 0.89 1.25 1.62 2.03
SWITZERLAND 2.38 2.30 2.38 2.29
FINLAND 0.38 0.84 1.01 1.22
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CHAPTER 4
INNOVATION-DIFFUSION, STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
AND EXPORT PERFORMANCE
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The two preceding chapters have focused on how differences in the
scope for imitation, growth of national technological activities
and efforts to exploit technology in production affect
differences in competitiveness and economic growth across
countries. However, the discussion has essentially been carried
out within the framework of one-sector growth-models. Even though
the analyses of these chapters have incorporated many important
Schumpeterian insights, it is one major aspect which necessarily
gets lost at this level of aggregation: the relation between
innovation-diffusion and structural changes in production and
trade.
The implications of Schumpeter's analyses of innovation-diffusion
and structural ch~nges for the analysis of international trade
have already been discussed at some length in the introductory
chapter. According to,the Schumpeterian perspective presented
there, capitalist development tend to be characterized by
altern~ting long-run periods off growth and stagnation. Each
growth period, then, can be shown to be related to the diffusion
of a specific set of technologies or "technological systems" from
the countries on the world innovation frontier ("centre
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countries") to the rest of the world. Because world demand for
products and technologies belonging to these technological
systems tend to grow faster than the average, while production,
in the initial phase at least, tends to be concentrated in a few
countries only, trade in these products and technologies will
grow much faster than the average. This will cause radical
changes in the commodity composition of world trade, changes
that will affect countries quite differently depending on their
specialization patterns. For instance, a country that produces
products belonging to the expanding technological systems, should
be expected to be favourably affected, while these changes should
be expected to be less favourable for a country that mainly
produces mature1 products (for which demand is assumed to grow
slower than the average). Thus, the relation between the
composition of a country's exports and that of world demand
enters as an important determinant of export performance.
To analyse this issue further, however, a shift in the level of
analysis, from a one-sector to a multi-sector framework, is
needed. This is what we attempt to do in this chapter. The next
section analyses the structural changes in OECD trade between
1961 and 1983 from the perspective outlined above. The data are
then used to decompo~e the export performance of 18 OECD
countries on the OECD market into effects of structural changes
in OECD trade, the ability to adapt the export structure to these
changes, and the ability to compete for market shares within
1 By mature products we mean products where both product
characteristics and production technology are fairly
standardized.
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individual commodity groups. Finally, various economic,
institutional and technological factors influencing these
different aspects of export performance are discussed and tested.
4.2 STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN OECD TRADE 1961-1983
According to the Schumpeterian perspective outlined in chapter
1, new products and technologies, originating in R&D-intensive
industries and firms, tend grow faster than average, causing the
structure of production and trade to change in a systematic way.
Following this we should expect the fastest-growing commodities
in OECD trade in the post-war period to be relatively "new"
compared to other commodities and to originate in science-based,
R&D-intensive industries or sectors of the economy. To analyse
the structural changes in OECD trade in this period, and the
consequences of these changes for different types of countries,
we have constructed a database on OECD trade for selected years
1961-1983, consisting of all OECD countries for which data were
available2• Great care was taken to ensure that research- and
development-intensive products and products based on important,
commercially successful innovations in the not too distant past
were specified as separate products. More mature products, on
the other hand, like raw materials, semi-finished products and a
2 Jhe database used in the study was constructed jointly by
Bent Dalum, University of Aalborg, and the author from the OECD-
trade series C. It consists of data on exports and imports
(value)for all OECD-countries less Australia and New Zealand for
selected years 1961-1983. For Finland and Japan, which had not
joined OECD(OEEC) in 1961, we had to supplement the data for 1961
from national sources.
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number of rather unsophisticated manufactures, were treated in a
more aggregative way.
The construction of the data base was complicated by the fact
that many countries, mainly for industrial security reasons, do
not report a complete country and commodity breakdown of their
exports and imports, and that the international trade
classification (SITe) changed during the period of observation.
For instance, we found that a country like Sweden for industrial
security reasons does not report a complete country and commodity
breakdown of its exports of pharmaceuticals on any level of
aggregation below the three-digit level of the SITe. Thus, if a
more disaggregated level had been used in the analysis, Swedish
exports of pharmaceuticals would have disappeared from the
analysis. Similar problems arise for other countries, the most
prominent example being the US, and these problems are further
complicated by changes in the classification system during the
period. Thus, in order to get reliable results, these problems
must be taken explicitly into account when making a decision on
which level of aggregation to use. Needless to say, this put
limits on the choice of aggregation.
Like most trade studies, this study uses value data (OEeD Trade
Series C), which is the only type of data available on a
suffici~ntly disaggregated level. It is often suggested that it
would be preferable to use volume data instead of value data, but
this is, as pointed out by Rotchild(198S), not always the case.
There are two reasons for this. First, value data reflect better
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than volume data the effects of changes in export performance on
the balance-of trade. Second, volume data are problematic in
cases where substantial technological changes occur and become,
for the very same reason, less reliable when the time span under
consideration grows.
The data (table 1) are organized on two levels, sector and
product(or commodity) level. The sectors are Products based on
natural resources, oil and gas, Chemicals, Machinery and
Traditional manufacturing products. Each sector, then, (except
oil and gas) is further divided into a number of specified
products and a residual category3. The residual categories
contain a number of products that were not considered important
enough to be specified as separate commodities according to the
purpose of the investigation. As a guiding principle, we tried to
classify products according to industry, where an industry is
defined by either use of a specific raw material, a specific
technology, market- or product- characteristics or combinations
of these factors. In general, products based on natural
resources (and oil-gas) are mainly classified according to raw
material, chemicals according to technology and product
characteristics, and other manufacturing products according to
technology, product and market characteristics.
3 The most important of these groups were "other products
based on natural resources" and "other industrial products not
elsewhere classified". Within chemicals and machinery these
groups turned out to be negligible.
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TABLE .1
CLASSIFICATION OF PRODUCTS
101 PR( UCTS BASED ON NATURAL RESOURCES
1 Ani ~ls, meat and meat preparations
2 DaiLY products and eggs
3 Fish and fish preparations
4 Cereals and cereal preparations
5 Feeding-stuff for animals
6 Skins and leather manufactures
7 Woof and wood manufactures
8 Pulp and paper
9 Textiles
10 Iron ore
11 Iron, steel and ferro-alloys
12 Aluminum
13 Other products based on natural resources
102 OIL AND GAS
14 Oil and gas
103 CHEMICALS
15
16H
17
18H
19
20H
21
Organic chemicals
Inorganic chemicals
Dyestuffs, coloring
Pharmaceuticals
Fertilizers
Plastics
Other chemicals
materials
104 ENGINEERING, ELECTRONICS AND TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT
22H Power generating machinery
23 Machinery for special industries or processes
24 Heating and cooling equipment
25 Pumps and centrifuges
26H Typewriters and office machines
27H Computers and peripherals
28H Semiconductors
29H Telecommunications
30H Machinery for production and distribution of electricity
31H Consumer electronics
32 Domestic electrical equipment
33H Scientific instruments, photographic supplies, watches and clock!
34H Road motor vehicles '
35H Aircraft
36 Ships and boats (incl. oil rigs)
37 Other engineering products
105 TRADITIONAL MANUFACTURING PRODUCTS
38 Manufactures of metal
39 Furniture
40 Clothing
41 Industrial products n.e.c.--------------------------------------------------------------------
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The classification of products according to research and
development intensity (expenditures on research and development
as a share in output or sales) was based on other studies,
especially Kelly(1977), Aho and Rosen (1980) and GEeD(198S).
While the two earlier studies were based on US data only, the
last one uses data for a group of GEeD countries. However, with a
few exceptions, these studies end up with rather similar rankings
according to R&D intensity4. It should be noted, though, that a
few products that were classified as research and development
intensive in the two earlier studies, do not fulfill the
requirements according to the last study. Even if this cannot be
established with absolute certainty, it is probable that this
difference refers as much to the difference in time span as to
the difference in methodology between the two earlier and the
last study. In our classification, the relevant products are
typewriters and other(non-electronic) office machines, consumer
electronics and road motor vehicles. We have chosen to regard
these products as R&D intensive prior to 1973, but not later.
In table 1, products with high R&D-intensity are marked with "H".
4 Pavitt(1982) has developed an entirely different approach
to ranking according to technology intensity. Instead of ranking
commodities according to R&D intensity, he proposes to rank
commodities according to the importance of technological
competition, measured through the statistical significance of the
correlation between per capita exports and per capita US patents
for different countries within the same commodity group. This
method has the disadvantage that it does not allow for the
inclusion of the us in the investigation. However, the results
are not very different from the GEeD study, with the exception
that Pavitt includes a larger part of the engineering sector (and
excludes aircraft) from the list of technology-intensive
products(the "upper third" in Pavitt's ranking).
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Table 2 and 3 rank growth of total DECD imports by commodity
(intra-DECO-trade included) in the periods 1961-1973 and 1973-
1983, respectively, from highest growth to lowest growth. The
fastest-growing commodities in DECD trade between 1961 and 1973
may be roughly divided into three groups. First, a group of R&D-
intensive commodities related to relatively recent innovations in
electronics (semiconductors, computers, telecommunications,
consumer electronics and scientific instruments). Second, some
R&D-intensive chemicals related to innovations in the interwar
and post-war periods (plastics(synthetic fibers) and
pharmaceuticals). Third, commodities related to the diffusion of
the lifestyle and pattern of consumption that developed ln the US
in the first half of this century ("the_.American way of life")
and to the rapid growth in private consumption in this period
(cars, electrical household equipment, consumer electronics
(already mentioned), clothing and furniture). A common
characteristic of the two latter commodities in this period is
the introduction of new materials in the process of
production(synthetic fibers and light metals).
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TABLE 2. GROWTH OF OECD IMPORTS 1961-1973.
(Value, yearly average value, percentage)
Rank R&D
inten-
sity
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
1l.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
Commodity
Furniture (39)
Consumer electronics (31)
Semiconductors (2B)
Road motor vehicles (34)
Clothing (40)
Computers and peripherals (27)
Typewriters and office machines (26)
Plastic materials (20)
Telecommunications (29)
Scientific instruments, photographic
supplies, watches and clocks (33)
Pharmaceuticals (18)
Organic chemicals (15)
Domestic electrical equipment (32)
Pumps and centrifuges (25)
Other engineering products (37)
Power generating machinery (22)
Machinery for production and
distribution of electricity (30)
Feeding-stuff for animals (5)
Heating and cooling equipment (24)
Other industrial products (41)
Manufactures of metal (3B)
Oil and gas (14)
Dyestuffs, coloring materials (17)
Fish and fish preparations (3)
Other chemicals (21)
Wood and wood manufactures (7)
Animals, meat and meat preparations (1)
Aluminum (12)
Iron, steel and ferro alloys (11)
Aircraft (35)
Inorganic chemicals (16)
Ships and boats (incl. oil rigs) (36)
Machinery for special industries
or processes (23)
Pulp and paper (8)
Other products based on natural
resources (13)
Skins and'leather manufactures (6)
Dairy products and eggs (2)
Cereals and cereal preparations (4)
Fertilizers (19)
Iron ore (10)
Textiles (9)
In comparison:
All commodities: 14.49
Growth rate
26.54
24.B7
23.77
23.18
22.40
21.15
21.14
21.07
19.08
1B.B4
1B.B3
18.43
18.41
1B.33
18.33
17.92
17.72
17.06
16.92
16.45
16.44
15.B6
15.82
14.98
14.90
14.71
14.65
14.05
14.04
13.67
13.66
13.52
13.32
11.19
11.06
10.95
10.76
10.32
10.27
9.92
9.82
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TABLE 3. GROWTH OF OECD IMPORTS 1973-1983.
(Value, yearly average, percentage)
Rank R&D
inten-
sity
Commodity
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
Computers and peripherals (27)
Oil and gas (14)
Semiconductors (28)
Aircraft (35)
Organic chemicals (15)
Aluminum (12)
Telecommunications (29)
Other chemicals (21)
Scientific instruments, photographic
supplies, watches and clocks (33)
Other industrial products (41)
Plastic materials (20)
Furniture (39)
Fertilizers (19)
Clothing (40)
Road motor vehicles (34)
Pharmaceuticals (18)
Machinery for production and
distribution of electricity (30)
Inorganic chemicals (16)
Power generating machinery (22)
Consumer electronics (31)
Fish and fish preparations (3)
Pumps and centrifuges (25)
Domestic electrical equipment (32)
Pulp and paper (8)
Manufactures of metal (38)
Dairy products and eggs (2)
Dyestuffs, coloring materials (17)
Other engineering products (37)
Other products based on natural
resources (13)
Heating and cooling equipment (24)
Feeding-stuff for animals (5)
Machinery for special industries
or processes (23)
Iron, steel and ferro alloys (11)
Skins and leather manufactures (6)
Cereals and'cereal preparations (4)
Textiles (9)
Iron ore (10)
Wood and wood manufactures (7)
Animals, meat and meat preparations (1)
Ships and boats (incl. oil rigs) (36)
Typewriters and office machines (26)
H
H
H
H
H
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
H
H
H
H
H
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
In comparison:
All commodities: 11.43
Growth rate
21.30
19.72
15.64
15.36
14.78
14.57
14.31
13.88
13.14
13.04
12.94
12.63
12.55
12.44
12.32
12.10
11.91
11.80
11.52
11.36
11.31
11.06
10.86
10.16
9.65
9.47
9.17
9.06
8.18
8.09
8.08
7.39
6.35
5.96
5.32
5.16
4.64
4.33
4.17
3.85
0.38
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Booming oil-prices during the seventies caused high growth in
OECD trade with oil and gas and other energy-intensive products
between 1973 and 1983. But electronics, and to some degree
chemicals, continued to be strong growth sectors in OECD trade.
It should be noted, though, that the rate of growth in consumer
electronics declined markedly both in absolute terms and compared
with other commodities. The same is true for non-electronic
office machines, cars and electrical household equipment. What
happened, probably, is that many of these commodities, especially
those linked to the diffusion of "the American way of life",
during the seventies approached the mature phase.
However, the Schumpeterian suggestion, that R&D-intensive
products linked to relatively recent innovations grow much faster
then other products, holds good in both periods:
--------------------------------------------------
TABLE 4. TEST OF DIFFERENCES IN GROWTH RATES BETWEEN R&D-
INTENSIVE PRODUCTS AND OTHER PRODUCTS
1961-1973 1973-1983
R&D REST R&D REST
Number 13 28 10 31
Growth 19.1 15.0 14.0 9.4
F-test(1,39) 13,27 11.03
( * ) ( * )
* Denotes significance of F-test at the 1% level----------------------------------------------------
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In summary, this section shows that OECD trade during the sixties
and seventies underwent radical structural changes. Generally,
commodities from R&D-intensive industries, especially electronics
and chemicals, increased their share of OECD trade at the expense
of raw materials, semi-finished products and mature manufactured
products. As noted in the introduction to this chapter, this
process should be expected to affect countries quite differently
depending on their specialization patterns. In the following, we
are going to discuss the relation between these changes and the
export performance of different OECD countries during this
period.5
4.3 STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND EXPORT PERFORMANCE
Export performance is normally measured through changes in market
shares. A country's share of the world market may change for
three different reasons:
First, the market shares for individual commodities on the world
market may change. This is often referred to as changes caused by
competitiveness, but this implies a more narrow view on
competitiveness than the one developed in this study (see chapter
3) •
Second, the total market share may change even if market shares
5 A similar analysis could in principle have been carried
out for imports (the growth in a country's market share on its
domestic market), but data are not easily available.
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for individual commodities remain constant, because structural
changes in international trade affect countries differently,
depending on their specialization patterns. Such changes in the
total market share of a country are often referred to as changes
caused by structural change or commodity composition.
Third, changes in the export structure of a country may increase
or decrease a country's market share on the world market
depending on how well these changes correspond to the changes in
world trade. This may be referred to as changes in the market
share caused by a country's ability to adapt its export structure
to changes in the composition of world trade.
In the following, we will calculate the importance of these three
effects on the data presented in the preceding section. The
method is a version of the so called "constant market shares
analysis" (CMS), which, however, differs from the version
commonly used, that of Leamer and Stern(1970), in several
respects6• Contrary to Leamer and Stern, we are concerned with
the change in the market share for exports, not export growth,
and, since the purpose is to investigate the consequences of
long-run changes in the commodity composition of OECD trade, we
do distinguish between "commodity composition" and "country
composition" effects. Furthermore, we allow for a separate
"adapta~ility" effect, an effect which Leamer and stern include
6 For a more comprehensive discussion of different versions
of the CMS method, the reader is referred to Fagerberg and
Sollie(1987).
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in the other effects in a rather arbitrary way. The following
symbols will be used:
X. = Country A's export of commodity i
1.
M. = The market's import of commodity i
1.
a. = Country A's market share for commodity i
1.
b. = Commodity i's share of the market
1.
m = Country A's market share for all commodities
So that:
(1)
M.
(2) bi - -±~M:
i 1.
~i Xi
(3) m - ±~-M~-
By substituting (1) (2) in (3)
m -
Let superscript (0,1) denote two points in time:
( 5 ) 0 - ~ ° b?m aii 1.
(6 ) 1 - ~ 1 b1m aii i
By subtraction of (5) from (6) (A denotes difference)
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1 1 0 0
D.m - ~ ai bi - ~ ai bi
i 0 i 0 o 0D.m - ~ (ai + D.ai) (bi + D.b. ) - ~ a.h.
i
i, i ~ ~
0 0 D.aiD.bi)D.m - ~ (D.aibi + D.h.a. +
i
~ ~
( 7 )
(I ) ( I I) (III)
The first effect (I) is the changes in market shares for
individual products weighted by the commodity composition of the
market in the initial year (market share effect), while the
second (II) is the changes in the commodity composition of the
market weighted by the country's market shares in the initial
year (commodity composition effect). The third effect (III) is
the product of the changes in the market shares for individual
products and the changes in the commodity composition of the
market. This effect shows the degree of correlation between the
changes in market shares and the changes in the composition of
the market. We will therefore label it adaptability effect7•
The interpretation of the latter effect may be understood quite
intuitively but we will nevertheless give the following proof:,
7 The original version of the eMS method, developed by
Tyszynski (1951), contained only two effects, the commodity
composition effect and a residual which he attributed to
"competitiveness". Baldwin(1958) and Spiegelglas(1959) did
independently point out that if Laspeyres indices are used
througbout the calculation, a third "interaction effect"
necessarily appears, but they did not attribute any economic
significance to it. In his review of the method, Richardson(1971)
pointed out the economic significance of this effect, and
suggested that it should be viewed as "a second measure of
competitiveness". However, this suggestion seems largely to have
been ignored.
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Lemma: The adaptability effect measures the correlation
(covariance(cov» between the changes in the market shares for
individual products and the commodity composition of the market
(number of commodities: i = 1, ••,n).
Proof:
( 8 )
1
- - - L
n i
L t,.a.
1 i ~COY L [t,.ai ( - - - - - - ) 1 t,.bi (since L t,.b - 0)- - - - - in i n i
L t,.a
1 1 i i t,.bi 1COY - - - - L t,.ait,.bi - - - - L [(------)n n i ni
L t,.a.
1 1 i ~ t,.bi)COy - - - - L t,.ait,.bi - - - - (------)(Ln i n n i
( 9 ) n COy - L t,.ait,.bi
i
The calculations were carried out for 18 OECD countries in the
periods 1961-1973 and 1973-1983, using 1961 (for 1961-1973) and
1973 (for 1973-1983) as base years. The data and the commodity
breakdown are the same as those used in the previous section
(OECD Trade Series C), but we chose to exclude oil and gas from
the calculations, because otherwise the calculations for the post
1973 period would have been totally dominated by the growth in
oil prices. The results are given in tables 5 and 6.
Generally, structural changes in OECD trade had quite important
consequences for the export performance of the OECD countries.
The commodity composition effect was especially important for
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some of the most industrialized countries of the sample8, for
which it contributed positively, and for some of the least
industrialized countries of the sample, for which it contributed
negatively. It also contributed negatively for some
industrialized countries with a relatively mature industrial
structure dominated by production of raw materials and semi-
finished goods.
However, even if the commodity composition effect was important,
and in some cases decisive, for most countries the market share
effect mattered most. The general picture was that Japan, joined
by some of the least industrialized countries of the sample, won
market shares within individual commodity groups at the expense
of some of the more industrialized ones. The adaptability effect
was generally of less importance than the other effects. But it
was nonetheless quite important in some cases, especially for
Japan and some of the least industrialized countries of the
sample, for which it contributed positively. In general, for the
least industrialized countries of the sample, negative commodity
composition effects tended to be outweighed by positive market
share and adaptability effects. After 1973, the commodity
composition and adaptability effects became somewhat less
important compared with the market share effect, but the general
picture was the same in both periods.
8 It was, surprisingly perhaps, less positive for USA than
for many other industrialized countries. However, the explanation
is fairly simple. USA is specialized in both R&D-intensive (high
growth) products and agricultural (low growth) products.
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TABLE 5. DECOMPOSITION OF CHANGES IN MARKET SHARES 1961-1973
Country Commodity Market Adaptation Total
composition shares
USA 3.51 -18.58' -1. 06 -16.13
JAPAN 22.11 61.11 33.99 117.21
GERMANY 27.31 6.49 -11.58 22.22
FRANCE 8.45 35.92 -8.16 36.21
UK 19.79 -17.60 -18.32 -16.13
ITALY 19.24 16.23 -7.94 27.54
CANADA -16.20 -7.32 16.38 -7.14
AUSTRIA 4.84 -6.16 -3.90 -5.21
BELGIUM 1.22 29.42 -0.60 30.08
DENMARK 5.75 -15.72 -3.25 -13.21
NETHERLANDS -1.16 39.51 -5.85 32.51
NORWAY -6.79 14.03 -0.18 7.06
SWEDEN 7.70 -1.03 -3.11 3.56
SWITZERLAND 19.23 -4.64 -12.29 2.29
FINLAND -11.76 -16.23 4.38 -23.60
IRELAND -2.42 1.45 -2.39 -3.36
PORTUGAL -11.33 68.09 3.30 53.46
SPAIN -19.06 52.68 8.93 42.54
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TABLE 6. DECOMPOSITION OF CHANGES IN MARKET SHARES 1973-1983
Country Commodity Market Adaptation Total
composition shares
USA 4.18 -8.49 0.86 -3.46
JAPAN 9.68 42.25 8.63 60.55
GERMANY 5.36 -11.82 -1.62 -8.09
FRANCE -0.28 -8.34 -1.16 -9.78
UK 4.12 -9.90 -0.93 -6.72
ITALY 6.90 15.49 -6.81 15.57
CANADA 1.16 3.77 -1.66 3.26
AUSTRIA -4.79 19.54 -1.51 13.24
BELGIUM -2.17 -15.89 -0.66 -18.72
DENMARK -8.53 4.01 -4.79 -9.31
NETHERLANDS -2.95 -2.22 0.96 -4.21
NORWAY -3.43 -25.56 1.73 -27.25
SWEDEN -1.50 -13.49 -2.44 -17.43
SWITZERLAND 7.14 2.76 -5.16 4.74
FINLAND -8.10 2.54 -1. 24 6.79
IRELAND -9.08 39.64 16.38 46.94
PORTUGAL -6.16 8.50 1.41 3.74
SPAIN -1.88 25.83 0.92 24.87
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As noted, the calculations were carried out using export data for
individualc~untries and import data for the OECD area as a
whole. Since data on exports and imports as, for instance,
country A's exports of commodity i to country B and country B's
imports of commodity i from country A, generally differ, the
resulting calculations will not be totally consistent. To test
the results for the way data were handled, we repeated the
calculations on a data base constructed from import data only.
The results were not qualitatively different from the ones
presented here, and are therefore not reported.
4.4 ON THE EXPLANATION OF EXPORT PERFORMANCE
In the preceding chapter we tested a technology-gap model of
aggregate export performance. In this section we will examine to
what extent the different aspects of export performance discussed
in this chapter can be shown to be related to technological,
economic and institutional factors that differ between countries.
As pointed out in chapter 1 (and verified in section 2 of this
chapter), demand generally grows faster for new products and
technologies originating in R&D-intensive industries and firms.
Following this, we should expect structural changes in
international trade to be more favourable for countries with a
high level of innovative activity and R&D than for other
countries.
As discussed in chapter 1, Vernon(1966), building on earlier work
by Linder(1961), has developed this argument further by relating
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innovation to various economic aspects, such as the level of
income in th~country and the size of the market. A high level of
income in a country, it is argued, implies a sophisticated demand
structure, which in turn is assumed to feed back on the structure
of production, giving the country a comparative advantage in
"new", sophisticated goods. Furthermore, Vernon argues that since
many such goods are produced under conditions of economics of
scale, countries with access to large domestic markets should
also be more likely to develop a comparative advantage in such
goods than other countries. Thus, following these arguments,
structural changes in international trade should be expected to
affect countries with high levels of income and access to large
domestic markets favourably.
However, even if structural changes in world trade in general
favour countries on a high economic and technological level of
development, it does not follow that these countries also are
best placed when it comes to competing for market shares within
individual commodity groups or adapting the export structure to
the changing composition of demand. On the contrary, as pointed
out in the preceding chapters, it is often suggested
(Posner(1961), Gerschenkron(1962) and others) that countries on a
comparatively low level ~f economic and technological development
are for various reasons better placed in this respect (the "late-
comer" ~ypothesis). Following this argument, "late comers" have
the opportunity of building up new competitive export sectors,
and increasing market shares within individual commodity groups,
by imitating technologies developed elsewhere and by exploiting
138
cost advantages. If correct, we should expect a negative relation
between the level of economic and technological development and
the adaptability and market share effects. Furthermore, as
pointed out by several writers (Cornwall(1976),
Abramovitz(1979», the creation of new production capacity and
new skills require resources. Following this, we should expect a
positive relation between the adaptation and market share effects
and the mobilization of resources for growth and structural
change, as investments in production capacity, growth in national
technological activities etc.
In the following, we are going to test the hypotheses outlined
above. What we will do is to regress th~ effects calculated in
the previous section on proxy variables related to hypotheses
under test, using ordinary least squa res , To increase the
efficiency of the test, we pool the data for the two periods, but
to allow for changes from one period to the next, we include a
pre73-dummy. If not significant on a 20% level at a two-tailed
test, the equation was re-estimated without time-dummy. Given the
short time series, it is difficult to test for the possibility of
serial correlation in the residuals of the cross-sectional units.
However, to test for the significance of the inclusion of Japan
in the sample, we re-estimated the same models with a dummy for
Japan included.
The problem of how to find reliable indicators for the
explanatory factors discussed above is already discussed at some
length in the previous chapters. For the level of technological
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development, we used the two indicators discussed earlier: Civil
R&D as a percentage of gross national product(RD) and External
patents per capita adjusted for differences in the openness of
the economy (PATENTING). For the level of income in the country
we used GOP per capita in constant 1980 us dollars (PROD), for
size the number of inhabitants (POP). For growth in national
technological activity we had to rely on growth in external
patenting only (PAT), because annual R&D statistics were not
available for a sufficient number of countries and time spans. As
earlier, we chose to use gross investments as a share of GOP
(INV) as a proxy for growth in productive capacity. The results
follows in tables 7 and 8 below. Data and sources are listed in
the appendix to this chapter.
In general, all hypotheses under test receive some support from
the data. In particular, the data give strong support to the
Schumpeterian hypothesis of a positive relation between the
commodity composition effect and the level of nationai
technological activity measured through R&D or patent statistics.
But also the Vernon-Linder view is supported, especially the
assumption of a positive relation between the commodity
composition effect and the size of the country. Thus the
countries most favourably affected by the structural changes in
OECD trade in the periods under consideration were large
countries with a high level of national technological activity.
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TABLE. 7 EXPLAINING ASPECTS OF EXPORT PERFORMANCE
The commodity composition effect(COM)
The SchumEeterian view:
COM = -14.30 + 9.93RD + 6.99TIME
(-3.53) (3.95 ) (2.32 )
* * **
COM = -39.32 + 5.731nPATENTING
(-3.64) (3.89 )
* *
R2=0.35(0.31)
SER=8.84
N=36
R2=0.32(0.30)
SER=8.91
N=34
The Vernon-Linder view:
COM = -21.94 + 1.04PROD + 4.011nPOP +7.32TIME R2=0.34(0.27)
(-3.40) (2.02) (3.26) (2.24) SER=9.06
* ** * ** N=36
The market share effect(MAR)
The "catch-uE" hYEothesis:
MAR = 20.99 - 9.94RD R2=0.08(0.04)
(2.30 ) (-1.51) SER=23.64
** *** N=36
MAR 49.66 - 5.911nPATENTING R2=0.08(0.05)
(1.87) (-1.63) SER=21.90
** *** N=34
MAR = 44.52 - 4.39PROD R2=0.35(0.33)
(4.93 ) (-4.28) SER=19.68
* * N=36
The "efforts" hYEothesis:
MAR = -40.92 + 2.11INV R2=0.11(0.09)
(-1.69) (2.07) SER=23.01
** ** N=36
141
...... ...... .........
R2=0.16(0.11)
SER=21.16
N=34
MAR = 15.11 + 2.38PAT - 16.85TIME
(2.11) (2.31) (-1.36)
The adaptability effect(ADA)
The "catch-up" hypothesis:
ADA = 2.86 - 2.47RD
(0.82 ) (-0.99)
ADA = 2.85 - 3.20lnPATENTING
(2.16 ) (-2.22)...... ......
R2=0.03(0.00)
SER=8.98
N=36
R2=0.13(0.11)
SER=8.72
N=34
......... ......
R2=0.08(0.06)
SER=8.73
N=36
ADA = 6.27 - 0.79PROD
(1.57) (-1.75)
The "efforts" hypothesis:
ADA = -23.25 + 0.98INV R2=0.17(0.lS)
(-2.67) (2.67) SER=8.28
* ... N=36
ADA 8.01 + 1.63PAT - 16.90TIME R2=0.40(0.36)
(3.21) (4.54 ) (-3.91) SER=7.36... * ... N=34
* = Significance at the 1% level at a two-tailed test
......= Significance at the 5% level at a two-tailed test
*** = Significance at the 10% level at a two-tailed test
............= Significance at the 20% level at a two-tailed test
SER = Standard error of regression
The numbers in brackets under the estimates are t-statistics.
The numbers in brackets after R2 are R2 adjusted for degrees of
freedom.
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TABLE. 8 EXPLAINING ASPECTS OF EXPORT PERFORMANCE
(with Japan dummy)
The commodity composition effect(COM)
The Schumpeterian view:
COM = -13.57 + 9.02RD + 6.77TIME + 9.30JAP
(-3.37) (3.53 ) (2.28) <1.42 )
* * ** ****
COM = -38.78 + 5.551nPATENTING + 12.99JAP
(-3.77) (3.95 ) (2.10)
* * **
The Vernon-Linder view:
R2=0.39(0.33)
SER=8.70
N=36
R2=0.41(0.37)
SER=8.47
N=34
COM = -21.41 + 1.13PROD + 3.311nPOP +7.51TIME + 10.59JAP
(-3.38) (2.24) (2.56) (2.34) (1.52)
* ** ** **
The market share effect(MAR)
The "catch-up" hypothesis:
MAR = 24.39 - 15.09RD + 55.36JAP
(3.09) (-2.60) (3.64 )
* * *
MAR = 51.68 - 6.591nPATENTING + 49.49JAP
(2.29) (-2.13) (3.64)
** ** *
MAR = 39.61 - 4.05PROD + 38.90JAP
(4.78) (-4.36) (3.00)
* * *
The "efforts" hypothesis:
MAR = -12.62 + 0.82INV + 38.32JAP
(-0.46) (0.69) (1.98)
***
****
R2=0.39(0.31)
SER=8.88
N=36
R2=0.33(0.29)
SER=20.26
N=36
R2=0.35(0.31)
SER=18.62
N=34
R2=0.49(0.46)
SER=17.72
N=36
R2=0.21(0.16)
SER=22.09
N=36
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MAR 3.40 - 0.49PAT + 1.63TIME + 42.89JAP
(0.40) (0.38) (0.11) (2.22)
**
R2=0.28(0.21>
SER=19.93
N=34
The adaptability effect(ADA)
The "catch-up" hypothesis:
ADA = 4.45 - 4.88RD + 25.94JAP R2=0.45(0.42)
(1.67) (-2.49) (5.05 ) SER=6.85
**** ** * N=36
ADA = 23.79 - 3.53lnPATENTING + 24.00JAP R2=0.52(0.49)
(2.97 ) (-3.22) (4.98) SER=6.61
* * * N=34
ADA = 3.52 - 0.61PROD + 21.80JAP R2=0.40(0.36)
(1.04) (-1.61) (4.14 ) SER=7.19
**** * N=36
The "efforts" hypothesis:
ADA = -8.43 + 0.30INV + 20.07JAP R2=0.36(0.32)
(-0.92) (0.76) (3.10) SER=7.40
* N=36
ADA = 4.62 + 1.08PAT - 11.56TIME + 12.37JAP R2=0.46(0.40)
(1.51) (2.35 ) (-2.25) (1.79) SER=7.11
**** ** ** *** N=34
* = Significance at the 1% level at a two-tailed test
** = Significance at the 5% level at a two-tailed test
*** = Significance at the 10% level at a two-tailed test
**** = Significance at the 20% level at a two-tailed test
SER = S~andard error of regression
The numbers in brackets under the estimates are t-statistics.
The numbers in brackets after R2 are R2 adjusted for degrees of
freedom.
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The test also supports the hypotheses of a positive relation
between the market share and adaptation effects on the one hand,
and the scope for imitation, measured in terms of technological
activity or income per capita, on the other hand. Interestingly,
in most cases the results tend to be more significant when Japan
is excluded from the sample. Thus, there is certainly no support
for the suspicion that the "catch-up" effect might be due to the
inclusion of Japan in the sample. It may be noted, also, that in
the case of growth of market shares, income per capita tends to
yield more significant results than technological activities as a
proxy for "the scope for imitation". One intuitive interpretation
of this result is that the income-per-capita indicator is more
powerful because it in addition to a large scope for imitation
also reflects absolute cost-advantages (a low level of income per
capita indicate a low level of wages per produced unit).
It is one case, however, where the introduction of a Japan dummy
had a large influence on the result: the hypotheses of a positive
relation between the market share and adaptability effects and
"efforts" (investment and patent growth). When Japan was
included, these variables were found to be significant, when
Japan was excluded, they were, with one exception (the
adaptab~lity effect and patent growth), not significant. Similar,
though not identical, results have been reached in earlier
studies (Cornwall(1976, 1977), Fagerberg(1987». However, these
results do not necessarily imply that these hypotheses should be
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rejected. What these results show is that these "efforts" do
contribute to the explanation of the differences in export
performance between Japan and the other countries of our sample,
but not to the explanation of the <much smaller) differences in
export performance between the remaining countries of our sample.
The results of chapter 2 lead us to believe that the significanse
of the relation between export performance and "efforts" would
have been reinforced if other fast-growing countries - as the
Asian NIC's -had been included in the sample. Given the
availability of data, this was not possible.
4.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter has extended the analysis of export performance in
the preceding chapter by taking into account the relation between
the process of innovation-diffusion and structural changes in
international trade. Between 1961 and 1983, the structure of OECD
trade changed quite radically. The main source of these changes
was found to be the creation and subsequent diffusion of new
products and technologies originated in R&D-intensive industries,
especially the electronics and chemical industries. These changes
were shown to favour large countries with a high level of
national technological activity, measured through R&D or patent
statistics, and disfavour small countries with a less well
developed indigenous technological base.
However, the growing international trade in this period did at
the same time allow countries on a low level of economic and
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technological development to catch up and increase market shares
through imitation, exploitation of cost advantages and changes in
export structure (adaptation). On balance the latter type of
effects outweighed the former.
Thus, Post-War growth seems to a game with two winners: the
large, technologically advanced countries on the one hand, and
the semi-industrialized (low-cost) countries on the other.
However, there are countries that do not belong to either group,
among them many small, developed countries, characterized by high
levels of income (and wage-costs), but relatively low levels of
national technological activity. In the next chapter, we will
consider the trade performance of some of these countries in this
period in more detail.
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APPENDIX
Sources
Trade statistics:
OECD Trade Series C and national sources(Finland and Japan(1961»
Real GDP per capita (1980 market prices in US $):
IMF International Financial Statistics
External patent applications:
OECD/STIIU DATA BANK and World International Property
Organization(WIPO):Industrial Property Statistics
The R&D data are estimates based on the following sources:
OECD Science and Technology Indicators, Basic statistical Series
(vol B(1982) and Recent Results(1984», UNESCO Statistical
Yearbook and various UNESCO surveys on resources devoted to R&D.
Military R&D expenditures were, following the OECD, assumed to be
negligible in all countries except the US, France, Germany,
Sweden and UK. The R&D data for these countries were adjusted
downward according to OECD estimates. The estimates were taken
from OECD(1983), Directorate for Science, Technology and
Industry: The problems of estimating defence and civil GERD in
selected OECD member countries (DSTI/SPR!83-2). For other count-
ries, civil and total R&D as a percentage of GDP were assumed to
be identical.
Data on population and export shares in GOP were taken from:
OECD Historical Statistics 1960-1983, OECD National
Accounts(various editions), IMF Supplement on Output Statistics,
UN Monthly Bulletin of Statistics(various editions) and
Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China 1984.
Growth in relative unit labour costs:
IMF Financial Statistics
Growth in relative export unit values:
UN International Trade Statistics Yearbook
Methods
Growth rates are calculated as geometric averages for the periods
1960-1973 and 1970-1983, or the nearest period for which data
exist. Levels and shares are calculated as arithmetic averages
for the periods 1960-1973 and 1974-1983, or the nearest period
for whi~h data exist.
Table A 1
CLAsSIFICATION OF PRODUCTS
101 PRODUCTS BASED ON
NATURAL RESOURCES
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SITe. REV. 1 SITe. REV.2
1 Animals, meat, and
meat preparations
2 Dairy products and
eggs
3 Fish and fish prepara-
tions
4 Cereals and cereal prepara-:
tions
5 Feeding-stuff for animals
-- Skins and leather manu-
factures
7 Wood and wood manu-
factures
8 Pulp and paper
9 Textiles
10 Iron ore
11 Iron, steel and ferro
alloys
12 Al mninum
13 other products based on
natural resources
102 OIL AND GAS
00, 01, 091.3, 411.3: 00, 01, 091.3,
411.3
02 02
03, 411.1 03, 411.1
04 04
08 08
21, 61 21, 61
24, 63 24, 63
25, 64 25, 64
26, 65 26, 65
281 281
67 67
684
05, 06, 07, 091.4,
099, 11, 12, 22,
23, 27, 282, 283,
284, 285, 286, 29,
32, 35, 42, 43, 62,:
66, 681, 682, 683, :
685, 686, 687, 688,:
689
684
05, 06, 07, 091.4,
098, 11, 12, 22,
23, 27, 282, 286,
287(-:32), 288,
289, 29, 32, 35,
42, 43, 62, 66,
681, 682, 683,
685, 686, 687,
688, 689, 699.9
33(-:5.2), 3414 Oil and gas
103 CHEMICAlS
~ Organic chemicals
16 Inorganic chemicals
17 Dyestuffs, coloring
materials
18 Pharmaceuticals
19 Fertilizers
20 Plastic materials
21 other chemicals
33, 34
104 ENGINEERING, ELECTRONICS
AND TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT
512
513, 514
53
54
56
581.1:2
515, 52, 55, 57,
581.3:9, 59
51
522, 523, 287.32
53
54
56
582, 583, 893.91:2
335.2, 524, 55,
57, 584, 585, 59,
894.63, 899.39,
951.66
22 Power generating machinery: 711
23 Machinery for special 712, 715, 717, 718,:
industries or processes 719.3:5:8
711, 712, 713,
714, 718
72, 73(-:7.32)
744, 745.1
Heating and cooling
equipnent
Pumps and centrifuges
Typewriters and office
machines
Computers and peripherals
Semiconductors
Telecommunications
Machinery for production
and distribution
of electricity
Consumer electronics
Domestic electrical
equipnent
Scientific instruments,
photographic supplies,
watches and clocks ~
Road rrotorvehicles
Aircraft
Ships and boats
(incl. oil rigs)
other engineering
products
TRADITIONAL INDUSTRIAL
PRODUerS
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719.1
719.2
714.1:9
714.2:3
729.3
724.9
722, 723, 729.9
724.1:2, 891.1
725
726, 729.5:7, 861,
862, 864
732
734
735
741(-:31)
742, 743
751.1:81:88,
759.11:15
751.2, 752, 759.9
776
764(-:99)
771, 772, 716,
773, 778.8(-:5),
737.32, 741.31
761, 762, 763,
764.99
775
751.82, 759.19,
774, 778.85,
87, 88(-:3)
78(-:5(-:1:39»
792(-:83)
793
719.6:7:9, 729.1:2:: 745.2, 749, 778
4:6,731,733 (-:8),785.2:31,
786,791
Manufactures of
metal
Furniture
Clothing
Industrial pvoducts
SUM OF ALL PRODuers
69, 719.4, 812.1:3
82
84
812.2:4, 83, 85,
863, 891.2:4:8:9,
892, 893, 894, 895
896, 897, 899, 9
69(-:9.9), 812.1
82
655.3, 658.98, 84(-
:8.21)
792.83,
812.2:4, 83,
848.21, 851, 883,
892, 893(-:91:92),
894(-:63),895, 896,
897, 898, 899.1:3
(-:9):4:6:7:8:9, 9
Sum of all products
es
The abbreviations should be read as the following examples show:
.1:3 should be read as 891.1+891.3.
'.3(-:.9)should be read as 899.3 - 899.39.
Commodity no. 14 (oil and gas) was not included in the calculations.
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Table A2 Data used in regressions(Chapter 4)
Patents R&D Investment GOP p.cap. Patents Population
(level,adj) (growth)
10291.80 1.71 18.12 9.93 3.47 198.71
4373.65 1.82 17.94 12.23 -5.38 222.59
1569.83 1.61 32.61 4.92 18.22 99.92
2117.26 2.11 31.36 8.32 0.40 114.925292.36 1.63 24.89 8.05 3.47 59.293182.67 2.21 21.14 11.10 -7.50 61.333127.67 1.54 22.68 7.21 4.07· 49.551725.23 1.57 21.98 10.40 -5.58 53.282842.43 1.64 18.34 7.21 0.98 54.931323.77 1.76 18.40 8.86 -6.58 55.901086.82 0.78 21.28 4.40 3.86 52.67
676.67 0.91 19.68 6.11 -3.66 56.131075.52 1.15 21.91 7.94 4.62 20.41
716.69 1.15 22.46 10.84 -4.70 23.55
1598.29 0.48 26.71 5.71 3.92 7.32
1082.27 1.02 25.44 8.59 -5.60 7.51
912.69 1.20 21.64 6.78 1.40 9.58
430.63 1.37 20.46 9.79 -6.98 9.83
1630.79 0.73 23.78 8.89 4.14 4.84
1269.69 1.01 19.94 11.22 -4.64 5.10
2101.80 1.91 25.00 7.76 0.82 12.60
1202.29 1.95 20.22 10.36 -6.44 13.94
653.86 0.91 28.38 8.59 3.01 3.79
575.65 1.32 30.06 12.36 -6.64 4.06
4997.68 1.03 23.40 10.32 3.26 7.87
3104.83 1.78 20.04 13.03 -5.86 8.28
11868.32 2.35 27.96 13.00 3.43 6.06
7287.42 2.34 23.06 15.35 -8.02 6.34
810.43 0.56 26.45 6.48 9.27 4.61
1184.37 1.09 26.28 9.33 4.08 4.75
204.55 0.62 20.47 3.58 9.44 2.90
163.88 0.80 26.34 4.84 -4.26 3.31
na 0.29 23.97 1.39 na 9.10
na 0.31 27.70 2.18 na 9.80347.01 0.20 21.16 3.44 6.18 32.85
253.96 0.37 20.76 4.98 -5.22 36.78
For the order of countries, see table 5. (The first observation
is USA in the first period, the second USA in the second period,
the third Japan in the first ,period etc.)
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CHAPTER 5
INTRA-REGIONAL TRADE AS AN ENGINE OF TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION:
THE SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF SMALL COUNTRIES!
5.1. INTRODUCTION
It is often suggested that access to a large, advanced and
homogeneous domestic market is an important factor facilitating
both innovation and diffusion of technology2 and that small
countries, as a result of this, face significant competitive
disadvantages in new, advanced products and technologies. Consi-
der, for instance, the data on export specialization3 in
1 It should perhaps be stressed that the discussion in this
paper confines itself to the relation between country size and
innovation-diffusion, and that other aspects of "country size"
will not be discussed. For instance, there is no treatment here
of whether small countries gain more (or less) from trade than
others , to what extent trade makes small countries more
"vulnerable" than others or questions related to trade-policy.
For a recent discussion of some of these issues within a game-
theoretic approach, which, incidentally, also considers Nordic
economic cooperation, see Dixit (1987). For an overview of the
research on relations between technology and small-country
disadvantages in trade, see Walsh(1987).
2 In the version discussed here (see section 2 of this
chapter), this view may be attributed to Vernon(1966). Other
proponents of the view that small countries face considerable
disadvantages in advanced products ( or manufacturing products in
general) are Keesing (1968) and Kaldor (1979).
3 The export specialization index for a commodity i on the
world-market (or "revealed comparative advantage" (Balassa, 1965»
is the ratio between the country's market share on the world market
for that commodity and its market share for all commodities on
the world market. If this ratio is above one, the country in
question is said to be export specialized in that commodity.
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high, medium and low technology products4 in table 1 below. The
table contains data for 20 OECD countries divided into three
groups: large developed countries, small developed countries and
semi-industrialized countries. Even though the specialization
patterns differ both between and within the three groups of
countries, with Switzerland (among the small developed countries)
and Ireland (among the semi-industrialized countries) as extreme
within-group-deviants,5 there is nevertheless clear support for
the proposition that the large developed countries tend to be far
more specialized in high technology products than the small
developed ones. Indeed, with one exception(Switzerland), all
small developed countries are specialized in low technology
products.6
4 The division of products into high, medium and low
technology products is based on R&D-intensities as reported by
other sources. For a discussion of sources and methods, see
section 2 of the preceding chapter, for a list of products ranked
according to technology group, see appendix 1 to this chapter.
Admittedly, a division of this kind must necessarily be rather
rough, and can always be contested. It is brought here for
illustratory purpose mainly.
5 Switzerland has for historical reasons, which we will not
attempt to explore here, developed a specialization pattern which
differs from most other countries, with a strong emphasis on
chemicals, instruments and mechanical engineering. The
specialization patte~n of Ireland was until recently not very
different from the majority of semi-industrialized countries. For
instance, in 1973, export specialization in high technology
products was 0.62. In recent years, however, this has changed
dramatically because foreign multinationals for various reasons
have found it profitable to locate assembly plants for computers
and other electronic products in Ireland.
6 Note, however, that Sweden is export specialized in both
medium-technology and low-technology products.
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TABLE 1. EXPORT-SPECIALIZATION OF DECO-COUNTRIES, 1983
Technology-intensity
High Medium Low
Large, developed:
USA 1.55 0.81 0.90
Japan 1.16 1.55 0.52
Germany 1.01 1.32 0.75
France 0.95 0.99 1.03
UK 1.08 0.75 1.15
Italy 0.71 0.95 1.17
Small, developed:
Austria 0.82 0.88 1.17
Belgium 0.62 0.79 1.33
Canada 0.47 0.97 1.26
Denmark 0.55 0.77 1.37
Finland 0.38 0.77 1.45
Netherlands 0.76 0.63 1.38
Norway 0.32 0.43 1.73
Sweden 0.80 1.06 1.05
Switzerland 1.53 1.14 0.66
Semi-industrialized:
Greece 0.19 0.22 1.94
Ireland 1.30 0.61 1.16
Portugal 0.50 0.54 1.57
Spain 0.44 0.88 1.34
Turkey 0.13 0.20 1.98
Means:
Large developed 1.08 1.06 0.92
Small developed 0.69 0.83 1.27
of which Nordic 0.51 0.76 1.40
Semi-industrialized 0.51 0.49 1.60
Source: DECO-Trade Series C
For the classification of products, see appendix 1 to thii
ter.---------------------------------------------------------_.
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This chapter focuses on the possibilities for small countries
to take part in the international process of innovation and
diffusion by means of a case-study of the Nordic countries in the
period 1961-1983. In terms of empirical methodology, this repre-
sents a change compared to the previous chapters. While chapters
2-3 (and to some extent chapter 4 as well) used regression analy-
sis to test highly aggregated formal models on data for a large
number of countries, the analysis in this chapter is based on
interpretation of relatively disaggregated, descriptive
statistics for a small number of countries (Denmark, Finland,
Iceland, Norway, Sweden and the Nordic countries as a group). The
case-study methodology adopted in this and the following chapter,
while less well suited for general conclusions on the working of
the international economy, has the advantage that it allows us to
study in detail how sector and country specific conditions for
innovation-diffusion interact and evolve through time. For each
country, a large number of descriptive tables was computed,7 but
to keep the discussion manageable, we focus mainly on the Nordic
countries as a group.8
The following section extends the perspective developed in the
preceding chapters by considering in more detail the opportuniti-
es and problems, encountered by small countries in the internatio-
nal process of innovation and diffusion. In particular, an at-
7 For a presentation of data, sources and commodity
breakdown, see section 2 and appendix in chapter 4.
8 The full set of tables on which the analysis of this
chapter is based includes more than 100 pages. A smaller set,
showing some main figures for each Nordic country, is included in
the appendix to this chapter.
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tempt is made to explore to what extent intra-regional trade
between a group of small countries can help small countries to
overcome the disadvantages of small domestic markets. The remai-
ning part of the chapter analyses the development of the Nordic
countries' trade patterns, with special emphasis on their mutual
trade, from that perspective.
5.2. A SCHUMPETER-LINDER-VERNON APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL DIFFU-
SION OF TECHNOLOGY
According to the Schumpeterian perspective outlined in chapter 1,
innovations tend to cluster in special industries, located in
special countries (geographical centre), from where they diffuse
to other countries (geographical periphery) through trade and
other means of knowledge transfer. To what degree countries in
the periphery manage to take part in the international process of
diffusion (or transfer of technology) by establishing domestic
production, reducing import dependency and increasing exports,
will be of crucial importance for the development of market
shares (domestically and abroad) and, hence, economic growth.
What, then, are the conditions for countries with different sets
of characteristics to exploit the possibilities offered by the
international process of diffusion to establish new production
and, hence, exports? As pointed out by Mansfield(1982, p.29),
there has been relatively little research in this area. In fact,
most diffusion studies have focused on process innovations or
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diffusion among users (not producers) of new products.9 Probably,
the most systematic attempts to cope with this issue are still
those made by the so called "neotechnological" trade theorists in
the 1960's (see chapter 1).
The seminal contribution by Linder(1961), though not focusing
exclusively on diffusion aspects, provides a useful point of
departure. According to Linder, a necessary condition for firms
to engage in production of new products is that they receive
signals from their traditional markets, in most cases the do-
mestic market, that this is a profitable way to go. Following
this, producers should be expected to start production by selling
to the domestic market, and later - if successful there - exploit
the accumulated experiences from the domestic market to engage in
exports. As a consequence, learning10 through domestic "user-
producer" interaction (Lundvall(1988» - enters as a crucial
factor for the outcome of innovation and diffusion processes (and
9 For recent overviews of diffusion theory and applied
studies, see Davies(1979) and Stoneman(1983).
10 On the importance of learning by "doing", "using",
"interacting" etc see Arrow (1962), Rosenberg(1982) and Lundvall
(1988)•
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specialization patterns in international trade11). Thus, follo-
wing this view, the quality, composition and - in the case of
economies of scale - size of the domestic market should be added
to the list of important factors that influence a country's
ability to enter new production areas.
Diffusion conditions do not only depend on factors related to the
recipient country, but also on technological factors.
Vernon(1966) was, as pointed out in chapter 1, among the first to
present a systematic theory which reflected both(the "product
life cycle" theory). Following Linder he assumed that most inno-
vat ions would be carried out in the United states (due to the
large domestic market for advanced products). Diffusion or trans-
fer of production should, according to this view, be expected to
take place relatively automatically as the product or technology
in question moves through the three phases of the product life
cycle (introduction, growth and maturity), starting with diffu-
sion to other developed countries, and continuing with diffusion
11 One implication of Linder's view is that since demand
affects the composition of both exports and imports, countries
with similar demand structures should be expected to trade more
extensively with each other. If the structure of demand reflects
the level of income, this implies that countries on approximately
the same level of income should be more inclined to trade with
each other than countries on different levels of income. This
hypothesis, which is sometimes referred to as the Linder view,
has undergone extensive empirical testing, of which the majority
are supportive (for a recent test on a large data set including
100 countries, see Kleiman and Kop, 1984). Though empirically
~upported, we hold this to be a too narrow interpretation of
Linder's view. In essence, Linder's argument is an evolutionary
one, that specialization patterns evolve through learning
processes related to (historically given) structures which (though
related to the level of income) also differ among countries on
comparable levels off income. For an earlier attempt to analyse
export specialization in producer goods from this (latter)
perspective, see Andersen et al.(1981a,b).
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to less-developed, low-cost countries. If Vernon's view is cor-
rect, small developed countries should be expected to have a
comparative disadvantage both in the introductory phase (because
of small domestic markets for new products) and in the late phase
(because of the increasing importance of economies of scale and
low (wage) costs). To the extent that they succeed in increasing
domestic production and exports through imitation, these gains
should be expected to be of a transitory nature.
However, the product cycle theory, though relevant in many in-
stances, is built on quite strong assumptions. To put it in the
words of Van Duijn (1983), the product life cycle may be "ex-
tended" because new innovations (or technological competition)
take place. In such cases, the competitive position of the inno-
vator often remains strong relative to imitators, and diffusion
(or transfer of production) may be delayed or blocked entirely,
depending on the character of the technologies, industries and
markets involved. One case refers to industries characterized by
rapid technological shifts and increasingly complex technologies,
delivering to customers allover the world, as, for instance, the
aircraft industry and the computer industry (Rosenberg(1982),
Porter(1986), Dalum et al.(1988». These industries are often
characterized by increasing dynamic and static economies of scale
and, consequently, increasing disadvantages for small firms or
(what often means the same thing) firms from countries with small
domestic markets(Walsh,1987). However, when large technological
shifts occur, new possibilities of entry will emerge, provided
that the entrants react early enough ("early movers"). Another
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case refers to industries that produce "taylor-made"-products for
user-specific needs or differentiated products in small series
for customers throughout the world, as, for instance, the scien-
tific instruments industry(Dalum et aI, 1988). Here small-country
disadvantages are less pronounced, but to the extent that lear-
ning curves are steep (dynamic economies of scale), significant
"early mover" advantages should be expected.
Thus, even though small country disadvantages in new, advanced
products and technologies exist, they are not uniformly distribu-
ted, either across industries or through time, and this opens
possibilities that the small countries may exploit. As pointed
out by walsh (1987), small country disadvantages may in many
cases be overcome through the adaptation of adequate strategies,
as, for instance, by specializing in areas ("niches")12 where
economies of scale are relatively unimportant or where competent
domestic users exist, by supporting the growth of national MNE's
or by cooperation (including trade) between a group small coun-
tries. In general, these strategies are complements rather than
alternatives, even though a conflict may arise between a global
internationalization strategy based on the growth of national
MNE's and a regional integration strategy based on close coopera-
tion between a group of small neighbouring countries. The latter
should be expected to be easiest in cases where similarities in
tastes, cultures, income levels, institutions and markets exist,
12 Walsh (1987) treats "specialization" and "finding niches
in the markets" as separate strategies, but since the latter
necessarily is a subgroup of the former, we have - following Lemola
and Lovio (1987) - chosen to group them together.
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and the level of protectionism is low. As small open economies,
with many common features and free trade agreements, this view
should be applicable to intra-Nordic trade.
5.3. THE NORDIC COUNTRIES' PATTERNS OF PRODUCTION AND TRADE
AROUND 1960
In the 1950s and 1960s the united States was the uncontested
centre of the capitalist world; technologically and economically.
GDP per man-hour in the United States was in 1960 about twice as
high as in Western Europe (Maddison(1982». New products and
technologies originated as a rule in the United States, from
which they diffused at different speeds to Western Europe, Japan
and other countries through trade and other means of knowledge
transfer.
While the United States was a highly productive centre in the
OECD area, so was Sweden in the Nordic area, even though the
differences between the Nordic countries were less pronounced. In
1960, GDP per man-hour in Sweden was about 50% higher than in
Finland and Iceland. Compared to Sweden, Finland and Iceland 1n
the 1950s were industrially poorly developed, in the same way as
most countries in Western Europe were industrially poorly develo-
ped in comparison with the United States.
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TABLE 2 THE COMMODITY COMPOSITION OF NORDIC TRADE 1961-1983,value.
Nordic exports to the OECD (excl. Nordic countries)
Products based on natural
resources (101)2
Oil and gas (102)
Chemical products (103)
Machinery and transport
equipment (l04)
Traditional
industrial products (105)
1961
78.6
0.0
2.5
14.7
4.2
19731
60.0
0.6
3.5
28.7
7.1
(60.4)
(3.5 )
(28.9)
(7 .1)
42.7
23.1
5.2
22.8
6.1
(55.5)
(6 .8)
(29.6)
( 7 • 9 )
(lOO)100 100 (100) 100
Nordic imports from the OECD (excl. Nordic countries)
Products based on natural
resources (101)
Oil and gas (102)
Chemical products (103)
Machinery and transport
equipment (104)
Traditional
industrial products (105)
Intra-Nordic trade
Products based on natural
resources (101)
Oil and gas (102)
Chemical products (103)
Machinery and transport
equipment (l04)
Traditional
industrial products (105)
1961
38.4
7.0
8.7
38.2
7.7
19731
31.4
5.9
10.0
44.2
8.6
(33.3)
(l0.6)
(47.0)
(9.1)
24.4
10.8
11.7
41.6
11.5
(27.4)
(l3.1)
(46.6)
(12.9)
(100)100
1961
44.9
1.8
8.1
36.0
9.3
100
19731
40.0
3.0
7.8
33.0
16.3
(lOO)
(41.2)
(8.0)
(34.0)
(16.8)
100
19831
34.0
15.4
8.9
26.5
15.2
(40.2)
(l0.5 )
(31.3)
(l8.0)
(100)100 100 (lOO) 100
1) The numbers in brackets are excl. oil and gas.
2) The numbering of products refers to the appendix in chapter 4
Sources: OECD Trade Series C
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The low stage of industrial development of the Nordic countries
compared to the United States, and to some extent also to other
OECD countries, was clearly reflected in the specialization
patterns of the Nordic countries on the DECO market. In 1961,
three fourths of the Nordic countries' total exports to other
DECO countries were made up of products based on natural re-
sources, cf. table 2. The percentages were highest for the less
developed countries. In the case of Iceland, 99.4% of its
export to the other DECO countries13 consisted of natural-
resource based products (mainly fish and fishery products),
while the share for Finland was 97.6% (forest products and
pulp/paper). Also Norway and Denmark were highly specialized in
natural-resource based products; for Norway the share was 83.9%
(mainly metals, forest products and pulp/paper, and fish), and
for Denmark 79.2% (agricultural products). Sweden too had a
large share of natural-resource based products in 1961, 66.0%
(metals, forest product and pulp/paper). However, Sweden also
had a substantial export of more advanced products such as
machinery and transport equipment (25.4% of the export to the
other OECD countries in 1961).
The imports to the Nordic countries in the beginning of the
1960s were far more differentiated than the exports, reflecting
the fact that the composition of demand was much more differen-
tiated than the structure of production. Intra-Nordic trade
also had a far larger share of industrial products than the
13 With "other OECD countries" we mean OECD less the Nordic
countries. This notion will be used throughout this chapter.
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exports to the other OECD countries. At the outset this was
especially important for Sweden and Denmark, which at that time
were industrially the most advanced of the Nordic countries.
For instance 50.0% of Sweden's and 35.6% of Denmark's exports
to the Nordic countries in 1961 consisted of machinery and
transport equipment, and the Nordic market absorbed in both
cases approximately one third of total Swedish and Danish
exports of these products. For some "new" products the share of
the Nordic market of total exports was even larger. For instan-
ce, in 1961, the Nordic countries absorbed 44.4% of Swedish
exports of pharmaceuticals, and 53.7% of Danish exports of
consumer electronics.
5.4. DIFFUSION AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE 1961-1973: THE ROLE OF
INTRA-NORDIC TRADE
Between 1961 and 1973, an extensive change in the traditional
natural-resource based specialization pattern took place. The
share of natural-resource based products in the Nordic countri-
es' exports to the other OECD countries decreased from 78.6% to
60.0%, while the share of machinery and transport equipment
doubled, from 14.7% to 28.7% Except Iceland, all Nordic
countries took part in this development, but the changes were
especially marked for Denmark and Norway. The structure of the
Nordic countries' imports and mutual trade, which at the outset
were less natural-resource based, changed too, but less marked-
ly than in the case of exports.
164
As discussed earlier on, diffusion (transfer of production) may
be facilitated if the level and growth of demand for the pro-
duct in the markets familiar to the producer are high. The
Nordic market had a favourable effect in this respect because
the demand structure was relatively advanced, i.e. Nordic
consumers had already adapted their consumption patterns to a
large number of new products which initially had been introdu-
ced in the United States, and because demand grew at a steady
rate. However, for successful diffusion to take place, local
producers must be able to compete favourably with competitors
from the innovating country and other "early imitators". This
means that there must exist local competitive advantages either
in the form of customs or other trade restrictions, or in the
form of norms on the demand side that the local producers are
better placed to adapt to, or in the form of cost components
(such as transport costs) that are lower for local producers.
The Nordic market had several favourable features. First, all
the Nordic countries were members of EFTA, which means that
they to an increasing degree practiced free trade between
themselves and towards other EFTA countries, but exercised some
protection towards producers from the United states and the
EEC. Second, common norms and mutually intelligible languages
made it easy for Nordic producers to develop product variants
which were considered attractive in the Nordic market. And
thirdly, the geographical location of the Nordic countries (far
away from the United states and the large European countries)
provided an incentive to start local production in cases where
transport costs were high.
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To investigate the impact of intra-Nordic trade on the process
of transfer'~f production from the more advanced DECO countries
- primarily the United states - to the Nordic countries in
this period, we shall consider more closely the development
within ten selected product groups. These products have been
chosen because they belong to the one third which increased
most in DECO trade between 1961 and 1973 (see chapter 4), and
because they (with one exception, electrical household applian-
ces14) have a high research intensity. What we should expect,
given the assumption of a positive relation between diffusion
and intra-Nordic trade, is the following:
1) The Nordic market should be important for Nordic producers,
i.e. a large share of total Nordic exports should go to other
Nordic countries, especially at an early stage of the diffusion
process.
2) Nordic producers should cover a small share of the Nordic
market at the beginning of the diffusion process, but this
share should soon start to increase.
3) Nordic market shares in the other DECO countries should
initially be at a low level, but should after a while start to
increase.
14 The group of electrical household appliances was chosen
because it includes many typical "American Way of Life" products
that diffused from the United states to the Nordic countries in
this period.
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As is evident from tables 3-5, pharmaceuticals, plastics,
telecommunications equipment, consumer electronics, electrical
household appliances and motor vehicles follow a pattern quite
close to the one predicted. For these products, the Nordic
market was initially relatively important for Nordic producers,
even though the Nordic producers had a relatively small share
of the Nordic market. The Nordic producers' share of Nordic
imports increased rapidly, however, and more so than the avera-
ge for all products. For some products, the market shares in
the DECO market decreased at an early stage, and then picked up
again, while in other instances they increased from a low level
as expected. A possible explanation of the former type of
development is that it took Nordic producers some time to
adapt to new technologies, and that during this period they
lost market shares abroad.
Also for "scientific instruments" we find that the Nordic
market purchased a relatively large share of total Nordic
exports at the beginning of the 1960s, but the Nordic produ-
cers' share of the Nordic countries' import remained low.
Internationally, however, their market share increased. A
possible explanation of this may be the level of aggregation;
this group contains both scientific instruments, photographic
equipment and-watches. If Nordic exports are concentrated in
one of these groups (scientific instruments, probably), this
may explain the low market share in the Nordic market.
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However, office machinery, computers and semi-conductors do not
conform to the pattern suggested by the "extended home market"
hypothesis. For semi-conductors the market shares both domesti-
cally and abroad remained close to zero. For computers, the
market shares in the Nordic market as well as the OEeD market
declined steadily from the early/mid 1960s onwards. The latter
type of development reflects that Nordic producers gradually
lost ground as mechanical and electromechanical solutions were
replaced by electronic ones.15
Apart from Iceland, all Nordic countries took part in the
rapidly increasing intra-Nordic trade in advanced products. In
most instances, all Nordic countries increased their market
shares in the Nordic market in all products. Typical areas
where all countries increased their market shares were tele-
communications equipment, consumer electronics and electrical
household appliances. Within telecommunications equipment,
Sweden acquired a leading position in the Nordic market with a
market share of 27.1% in 1973. Other products where Sweden
obtained a strong position were electrical household appliances
(17.1%), motor vehicles (15.4%), plastics (14.5%) and consumer
electronics (11.8%). Also Norway achieved a strong position
within some of the new commodity groups, especially electrical
household appliances (12.4%) and consumer electronics (7.6%).
Denmark obtained a strong position among the Nordic countries
within pharmaceuticals(10.3%) followed by Sweden (9.4%).
15 The development(including export performance) of the
Nordic electronic industries in this period is analysed in more
detail in Dalum et al. (1988).
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However, it was not only in the process of technology transfer
from the United States and other developed countries to the
Nordic countries that the Nordic market played an important
role. Equally important, perhaps, was the role of the Nordic
market as a medium for a reduction of the technological and
economic differences within the Nordic area, between Sweden on
the one hand and the other Nordic countries on the other. This
proved to be especially important for Finland, which by the
early 1960s was at a much lower stage of industrial development
than Norway and Denmark were. Through deliveries to the Nordic
market, initially of relatively simple industrial products,
such as clothing, but gradually also of more advanced products,
a fundamental restructuring of Finnish production and foreign
trade took place. Between 1961 and 1973, Finland's market share
of clothing in the Nordic market rose from 0.5% to 16.1% • But
also for the other Nordic countries, increased intra-Nordic
trade in relatively traditional industrial products provided a
stimulus to industrial development(for instance, within the
furniture industry, to mention just one example).
~
5.5. POST 1973: NEW EXTERNAL CONDITIONS - NEW PROBLEMS
In the 1970s, the conditions that made the structural changes
of the preceding'decade in Nordic-OECD trade relationships and
intra-Nordic trade possible, had changed in a number of re-
.spects. First, the technological differences both within the
Nordic countries and between these countries and the most
developed countries of the OECD area, were strongly reduced. A
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few main figures may serve as an illustration. Within the
Nordic area: In 1960 GOP per man-hour in Sweden was 50% higher
than in Finland - in 1970 25% higher. Between the Nordic coun-
tries and the United States: In 1960 GOP per man-hour in the
united States was 64% higher than in Sweden - in 1970 only 27%
higher. Furthermore, during this period, the structural dif-
ferences between Nordic exports and OECD trade were much redu-
ced, even though natural-resource based products continued to
play a more important role in Nordic exports than in OECD
trade.
Second, the structure of OECD imports was changed. The strong
price increases on some raw materials, primarily oil, gas and
some energy-intensive products, increased these products' share
of OECD trade in value terms. Except for Norway, which at that
time had just begun to produce oil on its continental shelf,
this had a negative influence on the Nordic countries' market
shares, terms of trade and external balances. Furthermore, as
shown in chapter 4, some of the important "growth sectors" in
OECD trade of the previous decade had now entered the phase
where growth decreases relative to the other products and price
competition increases, especially from producers in the "newly
industrialized countries" (the NICs). This was of special
importance for the Nordic countries because, to a considerable
extent, it was precisely in these sectors that the Nordic
countries had increased production most markedly and gained
market shares in the 1960s.
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Third, the institutional structure of intra-Nordic trade and
Nordic economic co-operation was changed. Denmark entered the
EEC in 1972, while the other Nordic countries remained in EFTA.
However, great caution should be shown when estimating the
economic impact of this, since the other Nordic countries soon
negotiated free trade agreements with the EEC.
Nevertheless, it is a striking fact that after 1973, the trend
towards increased intra-Nordic trade was broken. The Nordic
countries' share of Nordic imports fell from 23.2% to 21.3%
between 1973 and 1983, most markedly in machinery, transport
equipment, and traditional industrial products (table 6).
Within chemicals there was only a slight decrease, and no
change for natural-resource based products, while the Nordic
countries(e.g. Norway) - not surprisingly - increased their
market share on the Nordic market for oil and gas. Thus, the
recorded decrease in intra-Nordic trade as a share of total
Nordic imports after 1973 was not caused by the simultaneous
increase in oil and gas prices. Indeed, if oil and gas had been
excluded from the calculations, the decrease would have been
even larger.
If we study this development in more detail, we find that the
decrease in intra-Nordic trade is concentrated in a few groups.
First, it concerns consumer electronics where Nordic producers'
share of the Nordic market share was dramatically reduced, from
27.5% in 1973 to 10.0% in 1983. Other groups where Nordic
producers lost from 5 to 10% of the Nordic market between 1973
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and 1983, are fertilizers, heating and cooling equipment, pumps
and separators, telecommunications equipment, metal products
and clothing.
Among the Nordic countries, Sweden, Denmark and Iceland were
the main losers of market shares in the Nordic market throug-
hout this period. For Sweden the decline was especially evident
for machinery, in particular heating and cooling equipment,
pumps and separators, telecommunications equipment, consumer
electronics and motor vehicles, and for furniture. Denmark's
loss in market shares was especially evident for ships, power
machinery and engines, pumps and separators. For Iceland the
decline took place for traditional raw-material based export
products such as meat, fish and feeding stuff for animals.
Norway's total share of the Nordic market held up well because
of oil, but otherwise Norway lost market shares for a large
number of industrial products, most markedly for fertilizers,
consumer electronics, electrical household appliances and metal
products. In contrast to the other countries, Finland continued
to increase its market shares on the Nordic market for a large
number of products, but for a mature group like clothing,
Finland also lost market share <from 16.1% in 1973 to 10.6% in
1983).
Also in the OECD market the trend from the 1960s and the first
part of the 1970s was broken. Unto 1973 <table 7), the Nordic
countries lost market shares for natural-resource based pro-
ducts in the OECD market. The market shares for oil and gas,
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chemical products and traditional industrial products changed
little between 1961 and 1973, whereas the market shares for
machinery and transport equipment increased. After 1973 this
process was reversed: the market share for natural-resource
based products remained stable, the market shares for chemical
products and oil and gas increased, whereas the market shares
for machinery and transport equipment and traditional industri-
al products decreased drastically.
In chemicals, what is most striking is the strong increase in
the Nordic countries's market shares in the DECO market for
pharmaceuticals and plastics. In pharmaceuticals, it was espe-
cially Sweden and Denmark that increased market shares, for
plastics it was Norway that showed the strongest increase. For
machinery and transport equipment, where the Nordic countries
as a whole lost market shares in the DECO market between 1973
and 1983, the decline was especially marked for ships, tele-
communications equipment, electrical household appliances,
pumps and separators, and consumer electronics. Apart from
Iceland (which had nothing to lose) and Finland (for one commo-
dity: pumps and separators), all Nordic countries lost market
shares in the DECO market for these groups. The Nordic countri-
es also lost market shares for traditional industrial products,
especially clothing.
Even though the Nordic countries' total market share held up
better in the DECO market than in the Nordic market between
1973 and 1983, there are strong similarities between the deve-
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lopments in the two markets. In both instances the Nordic
countries' market shares fell markedly for machinery and tradi-
tional industrial products. To get an idea of what happened, it
may be of some value to ask who actually won the market shares
that the Nordic countries lost. To answer this, consider table
8 below, which covers the OECD market as a whole, with Nordic
imports included. The answer is fairly unambiguous. In products
where the Nordic countries lost market shares, the other OECD
countries as a group lost market shares as well during this
period, whereas countries outside of the OECD area (NIC coun-
tries, developing countries) gained.16 Furthermore, it may be
shown that in relative terms (growth-rates), Nordic losses
were generally larger than those of the group of other OECD
countries.17 Thus, the Nordic countries appear to have been
especially vulnerable to the increasing competition from non-
OECD countries (and to some extent Japan as well) in the
seventies and early eighties.
The tendency towards decreasing market shares for machinery was
not limited to the Nordic and OECD markets, but characterized
the Nordic countries' exports to the growing markets in NIC
16 It may be noted that in contrast to the other OECD
countries as a group, Japan gained market shares in the five
machinery groups covered in table 8. In absolute terms, the
gains were largest for consumer electronics (where Japan's
market share of the OECD market exceeded 50% in 1983) and
telecommunications equipment. However, for metal products,
furniture and clothing, Japan too lost market shares.
17 This holds, whether Japan is included in the group of
other OECD-countries or not (though much less pronounced in the
latter case), for 6 of the 8 products covered by table 7 (the
exceptions are electrical household appliances and ships).
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countries and developing countries as well. The Nordic countri-
es' share of OECD's export to "the rest of the world" of machi-
nery and transport equipment declined between 1973 and 1983
from 4.4% to 3.5%. Even though the markets shares for the other
main products increased or remained stable, the Nordic countri-
es' total share of OECD exports to these markets decreased,
from 3.6% in 1973 to 3.3% in 1983. Thus, with one partial
exception - Finland18 - the Nordic countries did not succeed in
their attempts to find new markets for their manufacturing
exports.
5.6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
As pointed out in the first section of this chapter, the view
that small developed countries face considerable comparative
disadvantages in advanced products and technologies commands
considerable support both on theoretical and empirical grounds.
However, the perspective adopted in this study (section 2 of
this chapter) suggests that these disadvantages, though
existing, should be expected to differ considerably between
industries and through time, and that this opens up possibili-
ties for specialization that small countries may exploit.
Following Walsh (1987) and others it was argued that the per-
formance of small ,developed countries in advanced products and
technologies also depends on how these possibilities are ex-
ploited (or the type of strategies adopted).
18 Finland is in a special position because Finland's trade
with the socialist countries has been regulated through
agreements designed to ensure balanced trade.
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The empirical evidence considered in this chapter is consistent
with the view that small country disadvantages differ substan-
tially between industries and through time. There are industri-
es, such as the computer and semiconductor industries, where
static and dynamic economies of scale seem to have prevented
the Nordic countries from establishing production on a suffici-
ently large scale to meet the requirements of international
competition. But the evidence seems to suggest that this is the
exception rather than the rule. During the period considered by
this study, the Nordic countries manage~ to reduce dependency
and increase market shares within a whole range of manufac-
turing industries, some of which may be characterized as tech-
nologically demanding, such as telecommunications, scientific
instruments, motor vehicles, pharmaceuticals and plastics.
However, there is also a group of products, of which typewri-
ters and consumer electronics are the most prominent examples,
where an initial tendency towards reduced dependency and in-
creased market shares was reversed later on. It was shown that
the losses of market shares in these cases were matched by
increased market shares by newly industrializing countries
outside the OEeD area (and to some extent Japan as well). Thus
the performance of the Nordic countries within these groups
conforms to the pattern described by Vernon.
With regards to strategies as "revealed" through the data
examined in this chapter, the evidence indicates that up to the
mid seventies, the performance of the Nordic countries in new,
advanced products and technologies conforms to the "extended
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home market hypothesis" outlined in section two of this chap-
ter. In general, Nordic firms seem to have used the Nordic
market as an extended home market for the most advanced parts
of their production and then, on the basis of accumulated
experience from the Nordic market, engaged in exports to the
rest of the OECD area. This points to the important role that
intra-regional trade may play for small countries that want to
catch up in technology and increase their manufacturing base.
However, a similar pattern cannot be detected in the data from
the post-1973 period, even though micro evidence suggests that
Nordic cooperation and trade continued to have a favourable
impact on the performance of Nordic firms in some specific
high technology segments. One successful example of this from
the last decade is the cooperation between the Nordic countries
on a system for mobile telecommunication (the NMT system),
which resulted in rapidly growing market shares for Nordic
firms in this area both in the Nordic and the OECD markets.19
However, in general, the Nordic governments seem to have been
unable or unwilling to increase their cooperation along these
lines, and the result has been a gradual disintegration instead
of a further strengthening of Nordic economic cooperation.
19 Among the companies that took advantage of these
opportunities w~re Ericsson and NOKIA. This is a good example
of how dependent many companies, even quite large and
internationalized ones (as Ericsson and NOKIA), are on their
"home markets" for successful product innovation. Another
example from the same companies relates to the development of
digital public switches (where Ericsson and NOKIA are among the
few companies competing world wide) which in both cases were
developed in joint ventures with, and with support from, the
national governments/PTTs. See Dalum et al.(1988) for a more
detailed account.
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APPENDIX
1. CLASSIFICATION OF PRODUCTS ACCORDING TO TECHNOLOGY INTENSITY
SITC, Rev. 1
201. HIGH TECHNOLOGY PRODUCTS
16 Inorganic chemicals
18 Pharmaceuticals
20 Plastic materials
22 Power generating machinery
27 Computers and peripherals
28 Semiconductors
29 Telecommunications equipment
30 Machinery for production and distribution
of electricity
33 Scientific instruments, photographic
supplies, watches and clocks
35 Aircraft
202 MEDIUM TECHNOLOGY PRODUCTS
15 organic chemicals
17 Dystuffs, colouring materials
19 Fertilizers
21 Other chemicals
23 Machinery for special industries or processes
24 Heating and cooling equipment
25 Pumps and centriffuges
261) Typewriters and office machines
311) Consumer electronics
32 Domestic el~ctrical equipment
341) Road motor vehicles
36 Ships and boats (incl. oil rigs)
37 Other engineering products
38 Manufactures of metal
513, 514
54
518.1, 581.2
711
714.2, 714.3
729.3
724.9
722, 723,
729,9
726, 729.5,
729.7, 861,
862, 864
734
512
53
56
Rest 5
712, 715, 717,
718, 719.3,
719.5, 719.8
719.1
719.2
714.1, 714.9
724.1, 724.2,
891.1
725
732
735
Rest 7 (excl.
719.4)
69, 719.4,
812.1, 812.3
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203 LOW TECHNOLOGY PRODUCTS
1 Animals, meat and meat preparations
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 Iron ore
11 Iron, steel and ferro-alloys
12 Aluminium
13 Other products based on natural resources
Dairy products and eggs
Fish and fish preparations
Cereals and cereal preparations
Feeding-stuff for animals
Skins and leather manufactures
Wood and wood manufactures
Pulp and paper
Textiles
00, 01, 091.3,
411. 3
02
03, 411.1
04
08
21, 61
24, 63
25, 64
26, 65
281
67
684
14 oil and gas
39 Furniture
40 clothing
41 Industrial products, n.e.s.
Rest 0-4
(excl. 33,
34), 62, 66
33, 34
82
84
891.1
Note: 1) No. 26, 31 and 34 are high tech products 1961-69. In
1973-83 they are put in the medium tech group.
182
2. SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES ON EACH NORDIC COUNTRY
TABLE Al. DENMARK'S EXPORTS TO THE NORDIC COUNTRIES
NUMBER 1961 1965 1969 1973 1979 1983
NATRES 101 42.92 39.67 39.00 36.71 34.07 32.50
OIL-GAS 102 .54 3.87 4.18 7.06 10.02 9.85
CHEMICAL 103 6.65 7.07 8.20 7.99 8.74 9.14
MACHINERY 104 35.63 31.61 27.63 28.53 25.49 24.83
OTHERIND 105 14.26 17.78 21.00 19.71 21.68 23.67
SUM 106 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
TABLE A2. DENMARK'S EXPORTS TO OECD-THE NORDIC COUNTRIES
NUMBER 1961 1965 1969 1973 1979 1983
NATRES 101 79.15 74.31 62.60 60.77 60.51 56.26
OIL-GAS 102 .04 .15 .18 .37 1.73 3.65
CHEMICAL 103 2.72 3.21 6.89 4.48 6.04 6.61
MACHINERY 104 12.83 15.38 21.78 23.78 22.18 21.89
OTHERIND 105 5.26 6.95 8.55 10.60 9.54 11.58
SUM 106 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
TABLE A3. DENMARK'S EXPORT-SHARE IN THE NORDIC COUNTRIES' TOTAL IMPORT
NUMBER 1961 1965 1969 1973 1979 1983
NATRES 101 3.29 4.04 5.15 5.12 4.80 5.02
OIL-GAS 102 .19 2.02 2.48 3.75 2.26 2.33
CHEMICAL 103 2.84 3.63 4.52 4.62 4.02 4.01
MACHINERY 104 3.76 4.09 4.32 3.99 3.71 3.43
OTHERIND 105 6.32 9.06 10.02 9.48 8.15 8.83
SUM 106 3.35 4.28 5.11 5.00 4.31 4.36
TABLE A4. DENMARK'S EXPORT-SHARE IN THE OECD-NORDIC COUNTRIES' TOTAL
IMPORT
NUMBER 1961 1965 1969 1973 1979 1983
NATRES 101 1.69 1.68 1.25 1.34 1.40 1.54OIL-GAS 102 .01 .02 .02 .03 .07 .13CHEMICAL 103 .68 .72 1.09 .69 .67 .73MACHINERY 104 .95 .99 .84 .89 .73 .66OTHERIND 105 .98 1.01 .88 1.06 .77 .91SUM 106 1.30 1.27 .99 1.00 .82 .84
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TABLE AS. FINLAND'S EXPORTS TO THE NORDIC COUNTRIES
NUMBER 1961 1965 1969 1973 1979 1983
NATRES 101 87.53 70.94 53.11 41.86 36.36 34.98OIL-GAS 102 .14 .08 .55 .33 7.17 12.65CHEMICAL 103 1.70 3.01 3.46 4.18 5.45 5.42MACHINERY 104 7.30 16.98 23.04 27.59 26.28 27.00OTHERIND 105 3.34 9.00 19.84 26.04 24.74 19.96SUM 106 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
TABLE A6. FINLAND'S EXPORTS TO OECD-THE NORDIC COUNTRIES
NUMBER 1961 1965 1969 1973 1979 1983
NATRES 101 97.59 94.82 89.29 84.31 78.05 73.25OIL-GAS 102 .01 .01 .55 .15 .83 5.69CHEMICAL 103 .56 1.58 1.90 2.30 4.30 4.03MACHINERY 104 1.16 2.27 5.03 7.64 10.67 10.89OTHERIND 105 .68 1.32 3.23 5.60 6.15 6.14SUM 106 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
TABLE A7. FINLAND'S EXPORT-SHARE IN THE NORDIC COUNTRIES' TOTAL IMPORT
NUMBER 1961 1965 1969 1973 1979 1983
NATRES 101 2.87 2.62 3.65 3.63 4.66 4.37OIL-GAS 102 .02 .01 .17 .11 1.47 2.42CHEMICAL 103 .31 .56 .99 1.50 2.28 1.92MACHINERY 104 .33 .80 1.87 2.40 3.48 3.01OTHERIND 105 .63 1.66 4.92 7.79 8.44 6.02SUM 106 1.43 1.55 2.66 3.11 3.91 3.53
TABLE A8. FINLAND'S EXPORT-SHARE IN THE OECD-NORDIC COUNTRIES' TOTALIMPORT
NUMBER 1961 1965 1969 1973 1979 1983
NATRES 101 1.49 1.23 1.11 1.01 1.10 1.10OIL-GAS 102 .04 .01 .02 .11CHEMICAL 103 .10 .20 .19 .19 .29 .24MACHINERY 104 .06 .08 .12 .16 .21 .18OTHERIND 105 .09 .11 .21 .31 .31 .26SUM 106- .92 .73 .61 .55 .51 .46
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TABLE A9. NORWAY'S EXPORTS TO THE NORDIC COUNTRIES
NUMBER 1961 1965 1969 1973 1979 1983
NATRES 101 48.17 46.29 43.68 42.78 40.06 33.97
OIL-GAS 102 7.06 5.86 4.35 4.18 10.63 25.06
CHEMICAL 103 22.79 18.91 16.23 13.31 15.64 13.76
MACHINERY 104 15.59 20.60 25.68 27.48 22.38 19.31
OTHERIND 105 6.39 8.33 10.06 12.25 11.29 7.90
SUM 106 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
TABLE A10. NORWAY'S EXPORTS TO OECD-THE NORDIC COUNTRIES
NUMBER 1961 1965 1969 1973 1979 1983
NATRES 101 83.94 80.62 74.05 63.52 34.06 21.83
OIL-GAS 102 .05 .31 .21 2.34 50.65 64.90
CHEMICAL 103 4.18 5.11 4.70 4.58 3.83 3.80
MACHINERY 104 8.67 10.69 18.22 25.95 9.15 8.00
OTHERIND 105 3.17 3.26 2.81 3.61 2.32 1.47
SUM 106 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
TABLE All NORWAY'S EXPORT-SHARE IN THE NORDIC COUNTRIES' TOTAL IMPORT
NUMBER 1961 1965 1969 1973 1979 1983
NATRES 101 2.92 3.57 4.29 4.93 4.54 4.97
OIL-GAS 102 2.00 2.31 1.92 1.83 1.93 5.61
CHEMICAL 103 7.67 7.33 6.64 6.35 5.78 5.72
MACHINERY 104 1.30 2.02 2.98 3.18 2.62 2.53
OTHERIND 105 2.24 3.21 3.56 4.87 3.41 2.79
SUM 106 2.64 3.24 3.80 4.13 3.47 4.13
TABLE A12. NORWAY'S EXPORT-SHARE IN THE OECD-NORDIC COUNTRIES' TOTAL
IMPORT
NUMBER 1961 1965 1969 1973 1979 1983
NATRES 101 .97 1.02 1.09 .96 .80 .84
OIL-GAS 102 ~ .02 .02 .14 1.97 3.37
CHEMICAL 103 .57 .64 .54 .48 .44 .60
MACHINERY 104 .35 .38 .52 .66 .31 .34
OTHERIND 105 .32 .26 .21 .25 .19 .16
SUM 106 .70 .71 .73 .69 .84 1.19
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TABLE A13. SWEDEN'S EXPORTS TO THE NORDIC COUNTRIES
NUMBER 1961 1965 1969 1973 1979 1983
NATRES 101 35.45 34.21 38.26 36.09 33.40 31.03
OIL-GAS 102 1.13 1.42 2.59 1.60 6.81 11.13
CHEMICAL 103 4.21 5.34 6.80 6.82 8.02 8.22
MACHINERY 104 50.02 48.80 38.46 40.94 36.98 34.89
OTHERIND 105 9.18 10.23 13.88 14.55 14.78 14.73
SUM 106 100.00 100.0·0 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
TABLE A14. SWEDEN'S EXPORTS TO OECD-THE NORDIC COUNTRIES
NUMBER 1961 1965 1969 1973 1979 1983
NATRES 101 65.96 62.25 56.59 49.56 44.52 40.12
OIL-GAS 102 .06 .07 .32 .20 1.71 5.60
CHEMICAL 103 2.76 2.96 3.33 2.97 5.26 6.24
MACHINERY 104 25.41 27.98 32.79 40.06 40.22 41.23
OTHERIND 105 5.81 6.74 6.97 7.21 8.28 6.82
SUM 106 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
TABLE A15. SWEDEN'S EXPORT-SHARE IN THE NORDIC COUNTRIES' TOTAL IMPORT
NUMBER 1961 1965 1969 1973 1979 1983
NATRES 101 6.27 7.47 9.66 10.93 10.30 10.66
OIL-GAS 102 .93 1.58 2.93 1.84 3.37 5.85
CHEMICAL 103 4.14 5.86 7.16 8.55 8.06 8.03
MACHINERY 104 12.18 13.52 11.49 12.44 11.78 10.72
OTHERIND 105 9.39 11.16 12.65 15.20 12.14 12.23
SUM 106 7.71 9.16 9.77 10.85 9.41 9.71
TABLE A16. SWEDEN'S EXPORT-SHARE IN THE OECD-NORDIC COUNTRIES' TOTAL
IMPORT
NUMBER 1961 1965 1969 1973 1979 1983
NATRES 101 - 2.01 2.05 1.94 1.93 1.74 1.79
OIL-GAS 102 .01 .01 .06 .03 .11 .34
CHEMICAL 103 .99 .96 .90 .81 .99 1.13
MACHINERY 104 2.68 2.62 2.17 2.64 2.23 2.04
OTHERIND 105 1.54 1.43 1.23 1.28 1.14 .88
SUM 106 1.85 1.85 1.69 1.77 1.40 1.38
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TABLE A17. ICELAND'S EXPORTS TO THE NORDIC COUNTRIES
NUMBER 1961 1965 1969 1973 1979 1983
NATRES 101 99.60 97.97 95.16 95.86 90.81 82.98
OIL-GAS 102 0 0 0 0 0 0
CHEMICAL 103 .29 1.15 .90 .42 .13 .01
MACHINERY 104 0 .11 .01 .10 3.37 4.12
OTHERIND 105 .11 .77 3.93 3.62 5.69 12.89
SUM 106 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
TABLE A 18. ICELAND'S EXPORTS TO OECD-THE NORDIC COUNTRIES
NUMBER 1961 1965 1969 1973 1979 198
NATRES 101 99.35 99.20 98.51 98.75 97.66 97.06
OIL-GAS 102 0 0 0 0 0 0
CHEMICAL 103 .56 .06 0 0 .03 .05
MACHINERY 104 .36 .49 .15 .31 .09
OTHERIND 105 .08 .38 .99 1.10 2.00 2.80
SUM 106 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
TABLE A19. ICELAND'S EXPORT-SHARE IN THE NORDIC COUNTRIES' TOTAL IMPORT
NUMBER 1961 1965 1969 1973 1979 1983
NATRES 101 .35 .52 .31 .38 .27 .14
OIL-GAS 102 0 0 0 0 0 0
CHEMICAL 103 .01 .03 .01 .01
MACHINERY 104 0 .01 .01
OTHERIND 105 .02 .05 .05 .04 .05
SUM 106 .15 .22 .13 .14 .09 .05
TABLE A20. ICELAND'S EXPORT-SHARE IN THE OECD-NORDIC COUNTRIES' TOTAL
IMPORT
NUMBER 1961 1965 1969 1973 1979 1983
NATRES 101~ .09 .13 .08 .13 .16 .17
OIL-GAS 102 0 0 0 0 0 0
CHEMICAL 103 .01 0 0
MACHINERY 104
OTHERIND 105 .01 .01 .01
SUM 106 .06 .07 .04 .06 .06 .05
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CHAPTER 6
DIFFUSION OF TECHNOLOGY, SHIFTS IN COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AND
INTRA-INDUSTRY TRADE
6.1 INTRODUCTION
In recent years, several authors have developed models which
explain the existence of intra-industry trade. However, the ques-
tion of what determines the development of intra-industry trade
through time has largely been ignored. This is true not only for
theoretical models, but also for most applied work in the field.1
The aims of this chapter are to show the following: First, that
existing theories of intra-industry trade are not sufficent to
explain the development of intra-industry trade through time.
Second, that Schumpeterian views on innovation, diffusion and
structural change have important implications for the development
of intra-industry trade. Third, that the development of intra-
industry trade between the Nordic countries and the OECD/Non-OECD
countries between 1961 and 1983 to a large extent conforms to the
Schumpeterian perspective.
1 Petterson(1984)'S study
intra-industry trade between
exception.
of the development of
1871 and 1980 is a
Swedish
notable
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The next sections present a brief discussion of existing theories
of intra-industry trade, their relation to empirical evidence and
how intra-industry trade fits into the theoretical perspective of
this study. The remaining part of the chapter analyses the
development of intra-industry trade between the Nordic countries
and the OECD/Non-OECD countries, respectively, from that
perspective.
6.2 EXISTING THEORIES OF INTRA INDUSTRY TRADE
Both classical and neoclassical trade theory suggest that
countries may increase their welfare by specializing in
production and exports of certain goods according to
structural characteristics that differ between countries, leaving
the other goods to be imported (inter-industry trade). A wide
range of empirical studies, on the other hand, show that
developed countries to a large extent export and import the same
goods (intra-industry trade).2 Moreover, this tendency seems to
have gained strength during the post-war period.
According to Finger(1975) and others, intra-industry trade is
primarily a statistical phenomenon, caused by factors such as
borders (economic and geographical borders differ), the inclusion
of semi-finished-goods (or parts) and finished goods in the same
commodity classes, and that trade statistics are not organized
according to the principle of factor intensity. However, even if
2 For an overview of empirical studies of intra industry
trade, as well as theoretical contributions, see Tharakan(1983).
189
such factors may explain some intra-industry trade, it is most
unlikely that the majority of international trade transactions
can be explained in this way, as pointed out by Norman(1983).
Thus, it has for some time been a quite widespread opinion among
students of international trade that intra-industry trade
represents a real challenge to traditional trade theory.
In a number of recent works, Lancaster(1980), Dixit and
Norman(1980), Krugman (1981) and others have responded to this
challenge by developing models which extend the theory of
imperfect competition to international trade. The models suggest
that in the case of differentiated products and economies of
scale, countries may increase their welfare by specializing in
different versions of the same good. Two qualifications are
normally added to this: First, since the demand for
differentiated products increases with the level of income,
intra-industry trade should be expected to be more frequent
between rich countries than between rich and poor countries.
Second, since the scope for inter-industry trade depends on
differences in factor endowments, intra-industry trade should be
expected to be more important between countries with similar
factor endowments, than between countries with different factor
endowments.
Models of this type certainly go a long way in giving c
theoretical explanation of the existence of intra-industry trade,
which for a long time seemed to be incompatible with economic
theory. But these models have one central characteristic ir
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common with the factor-proportion theory: The static framework.
Thus, they should not necessarily be expected to explain the
development of intra-industry trade through time. However, since
the level of intra-industry trade is assumed to increase with the
level of income in the trading countries, one possible assumption
from this could be that the level of intra-industry trade between
developed countries should be expected to increase when the level
of income increases. By the same token, the level of intra-
industry trade between developed and developing countries could
be expected to increase when the gap in income levels decreases.
A brief look at the existing evidence does not seem to contradict
these hypotheses (Petterson(1984), eulem and Lundberg(1986».
Graph 1 gives a brief picture of the development of the Nordic
countries' intra-industry trade with the OEeD countries(mostly
developed) and the Non-OEeD countries(mostly less developed). The
index used is the familiar Grubel-Lloyd index, adjusted for
differences in trade imbalances through time, which measures
intra-industry trade as a proportion of total trade. Further
information regarding data and methods may be found in the fourth
section of this chapter.
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The graph shows that the level of intra-industry trade between
the Nordic countries and the OECD countries grew steadily from
the early 1960s to the late 1970s, but then declined. Contrary to
this, the level of intra-industry trade between the Nordic
countries and the Non-OECD countries has grown much faster during
recent years than in the preceding periods. These developments
cannot be easily explained by the approaches and hypotheses
referred to above. Admittedly, economic growth slowed down both
in the Nordic countries and in the OECD area as a whole after
1979, but GNP per capita did not decline, neither in the Nordic
countries, nor in the OECD countries. Furthermore, it is true
that the differences in the levels of income between the Nordic
countries and the Non-OECD countries declined after 1979. But so
it did in the preceding periods, also, when the level of intra
industry trade grew much slower. Thus, to explain the development
of intra-industry trade, the approaches discussed so far do not
seem to suffice.
6.3 A SCHUMPETERIAN PERSPECTIVE ON INTRA INDUSTRY TRADE
In the following we are going to extend the perspective of the
preceding chapters to include intra-industry trade. What we want
to show is that the international process of innovation-diffusion
pas important implications for how intra-industry trade should be
expected to develop. The consequences of this process for intra-
industry trade may be shown to depend both on technological
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factors and the type of country under study. Several cases may be
distinguished.
In cases where the assumptions of the product-cycle theory apply
(the Vernon case), the diffusion process begins with diffusion
from the centre (innovator) to other developed countries(early
imitators) and continues with diffusion from the centre and
other developed countries to less developed countries (late
imitators). For the typical early imitator(developed) this
implies that initially its import dependency, measured as net
imports as a percentage of total trade with the product, will be
reduced. But as late imitators(less developed) enter the scene,
import dependency will s1::arto increase again. As a consequence,
for the typical developed country(early imitator), intra-industry
trade in the product category will first increase and then
decrease, because intra-industry trade per definition increases
when net imports as a percentage of total trade decreases.3
If, on the other hand, the product life cycle is "extended"
through new innovations (technological competition), the
competitive position of the innovator is likely to continue to be
strong relative to imitators(the Van Duijn -case). In such cases,
the most likely outcome is that the innovator remains export-
specialized and -the other countries import-dependent for a
considerable period of time. This implies that intra-industry
trade in such products will remain on a low level.
3 This is easily seen from the indices of intra-industry
trade discussed in the fourth section of this chapter.
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In summary, the discussion in this and the preceding sections
leaves us with the following classification scheme for when
inter- or intra-industry trade should be expected to take place.
First, the traditional Hecksher-Ohlin case, mostly limited to
products based on natural resources, according to which trade
should be expected to be inter-industry trade. Second, the
Chamberlin case of differentiated products produced under
economies of scale in which trade tends to be of the intra-
industry trade type. Third, the Vernon case, where intra-industry
trade first increases and then decreases. And fourth, the Van
Duijn case, limited to products characterized by a high rate of
innovation, where trade should be expected to be of an inter-
industry trade character.
It may be noted that also Grubel and Lloyd (1975) discuss the
consequences of diffusion for intra-industry trade (ch.7), but
they blur the concepts somewhat by distinguishing between
"technology gap trade", which they associate with process
innovation, and "product cycle trade", which they associate with
product differentiation, only. Their conclusion is that intra-
industry trade connected to diffusion of product innovations and
shifts in comparative advantage is of "no particular analytical
or empirical importance". In the following we are going to show
that this conclusion does not hold when confronted with empirical
evidence from the Nordic countries between 1961 and 1983.
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6.4 DATA AND METHODS
As noted in the introduction, it has been suggested that intra-
industry trade is a purely statistical phenomenon, caused by a.o.
the type of commodity classification and the level of aggregation
used in the analysis. It is not surprising, therefore, that the
choice of commodity classification and level of aggregation has
been one of the main fields of interest in applied studies of
intra-industry trade. However, for practical reasons, in most
cases this has boiled down to a discussion of what aggregation
level of the international trade classification (SITC) to use.4
The empirical analyses that follow make use of the data base on
international trade statistics described in more detail in
chapter 4. As noted, this implied a quite radical regrouping of
data on the 1-4 digit level of the SITC into 5 sectors, Products
based on natural resources, oil and gas, Chemicals, Machinery and
Traditional industrial products. Each sector (except oil and gas)
was further divided into a number of specified products and a
residual category (see Table 1 and Appendix in chapter 6). As a
guiding principle, products were classified according to
industry, where an industry was defined by either use of a
specific raw material, a specific technology, market- or
4 Petterson (1984) uses the BTN/CCCN classification, which
~e holds as superior to the SITC classification because it groups
products according to factor of production, not purpose. Our own
experience suggests that these two classifications are very
similar in many respects, and that trade data classified
according to the BTN/CCCN in most cases quite easily may be
reclassified according to SITC.
196
product- characteristics or combinations of these factors.5
Measures of international specialization (or comparative
advantage) and intra-industry trade are closely related, since a
high degree of specialization implies a low degree of intra-
industry trade and vice versa. Let exports and imports be denoted
by X and M, respectively. The degree of international
specialization of a country (S) in a certain product group (i)
may then be written as
Xi-Mi
(1) si = ( -----)100
Xi+Mi
S varies from +100 (completely export specialized) to -100
(completely import specialized). Intra-industry trade is at its
maximum when exports equal imports, i.e. when S = O. Thus, S may
also be regarded as a measure of intra-industry trade. However,
in studies of intra-industry trade it has become customary,
following Grubel and Lloyd (1975), to use a modified version of S
to measure intra-industry trade (I):
'Xi-Mil= ( 1 - -----
Xi+Mi
)100
5 In general, products based on natural resources (and oil-
gas) were classified according to raw material, chemicals
according. to technology and product characteristics, and other
manufacturing products according to technology, product and
market characteristics.
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I varies from 100 (only intra-industry trade) to 0 (only inter-
industry trade). On the product level it makes no difference
whether I or S is used, but I has the advantage that it may be
used to construct an overall measure of intra-industry trade (G)
by adding up the lis, using the shares of each product in total
trade as weights.
lX__i -_M__il
(3) G = I [(1 - ] 100
i X + M
There are different views in the literature of whether or not the
intra-industry trade measures should be adjusted for trade
imbalances. Grubel and Lloyd proposed to adjust G by dividing it
with a measure of the overall trade imbalance (defined in such a
way that the adjusted and unadjusted GiS are identical when
overall trade is balanced). Let the adjusted measure be G*:
(4) G* lX-M I= G / ( 1 - -----
X+M
Aquino(1978) criticized these measures on the ground that both G
and G* are biased measures of intra-industry trade, though in
different directions, and proposed a new measure that adjusts for
overall trade imbalances both at the product level and on
aggregated levels. Greenaway and Milner(1981), on the other hand,
hold that such adjustments may create more problems than they
solve, because, in general, the "correct" (equilibrium) balance
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of trade is not easily defined, especially not in bilateral
trade6 or at the product or sector level. Empirical studies seem
to indicate that the results(in terms of ranks) are not very
sensitive to the type of measure used(Tharakan(1986».
Graph 2 resembles graph 1, but in addition to the balance of
trade adjusted index of intra-industry trade G* (solid lines), it
includes the non-adjusted index G as well (with symbols). The
graph confirms Aquino's prediction that the adjusted index
consistently shows higher values of intra-industry trade than the
non-adjusted one. However, the trend is roughly the same, with a
possible exception for the trade between the Nordic countries and
the Non-OECD countries between 1979 and 1983, when the adjusted
index grew much faster than the non-adjusted one. Why?
In 1973 and 1979 the trade between the Nordic countries and the
Non-OECD countries was balanced, but in 1983 the Nordic countries
ran a great surplus in their trade with the Non-OECD countries.
This change in the balance of trade was mainly caused by
increased trade surpluses, and reduced levels of intra-industry
trade, within a few natural-resource-based products, especially
animals and meat, cereals and wood and wooden manufactures. Since
this phenomenon does not reflect a long-term shift in comparative
advantage or balance of trade between these two groups of
countries, it is the adjusted index which in this case most
correctly mirrors the underlying trend.
6 According to Andersson and Tolonen(1985), the Aquino-
index tends to be upward biased in cases where bilateral trade is
very unbalanced.
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However, the main lesson to be learned from this is not that the
adjusted index of intra-industry trade in general is better than
the non-adjusted one, but that detailed knowledge of what happens
within different sectors and products is indispensable for a
correct interpretation of the development of intra-industry trade
at the aggregate level.
6.5 THE CASE OF THE NORDIC COUNTRIES
The Nordic countries' trade with the OECD area
As a first step it may prove worthwhile to take a look at what
happens at the sector level. This is done in Table 1 which
reports weighted, unadjusted indices of intra-industry trade (G)
between the Nordic countries and the OECD countries for selected
years 1961-1983 at the sector level.7
7 The results for the oil and gas sector are excluded from
table 1, partly because they are not in the focus of interest
here, and partly because data are unreliable. However, the reader
may find the results for this sector from table 3 and 6.
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TABLE 1. INTRA INDUSTRY TRADE, NORDIC COUNTRIES VS.THE OECD AREA
1961 1965 1969 1973 1979 1983
ALL 33.68 38.98 47.29 54.14 62.57 59.50
NATUR.RES. 28.91 33.61 39.68 41. 32 45.05 45.86
CHEMICALS 35.36 39.17 47~06 46.04 55.90 65.02
MACHINERY 43.84 48.09 59.08 70.94 70.85 71. 53
TRADITIONAL 50.02 54.95 57.05 71.43 64.30 60.48
--------------------------------------------------------------
Between 1961 and 1983, intra-industry trade between the Nordic
and the OECD countries grew in all four sectors, but the pace of
growth differed substantially between sectors. Growth was very
strong in chemicals, considerable in machinery and products based
on natural resources, and rather slow in traditional industrial
products. Before 1973, the picture mirrors the one for the period
as a whole, with the exception that growth of intra-industry
trade was stronger in machinery than in the other sectors. After
1973, the development of intra-industry trade between the Nordic
and the OECD countries changed both direction and pace. within
chemicals, growth of intra-industry trade accelerated during this
period, while it levelled off in machinery and natural-resource-
based products and declined markedly in traditional industrial
products.
These developments have important bearings on attempts to explain
intra-industry trade. First, even if the sector classification
202
does not distinguish between consumer products and other
products, growth of intra-industry trade seems to have been much
stronger in sectors characterized by a high share of investment
goods, semifinished goods or raw materials, than in sectors
characterized by a high share of consumer goods. Second, after
1973, intra-industry trade in traditional industrial products
(mostly consumer goods) declined markedly. Obviously, this does
not conform to what should expected from a Lancaster-type
perspective, where consumer demand diversity and economies of
scale cause intra-industry trade in consumer goods. The marked
differences in the development of intra-industry trade between
sectors may be interpreted in support of a perspective which
allows for sector- and product-specific explanations.
Table 2 and 3 report specialization indices (S) and intra-
industry trade indices (I) for the Nordic countries' trade with
the OECD area between 1961 and 1983 for the 41 products covered
by the investigation.
In the early 1960s, the Nordic countries were export- specialized
in a few products only (table 2). These products stemmed from
traditional sectors such as agriculture, fishing, the forest
industry (furniture included) and ores and metals. The Nordic
countries were _import-specialized in all other products except
two machinery products where trade was approximately balanced. As
a consequence of this pattern of specialization, intra-industry
trade was at a rather low level.
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As shown in chapter 5, the Nordic countries' structure of
production and trade underwent radical changes between the early
1960s and the early 1980s. What happened was that the Nordic
countries managed to catch up in a number of sectors, partly by
diversifying from natural resources to products using these
natural resources, and partly by importing technology from the
more advanced countries of -the OECD area. Examples of
diversification on the basis of initial competitive advantage in
natural resources may be found in a.o. the forest industry (from
wood to furniture), the metal industry (from ores (and
hydroelectric energy) to steel, aluminum and metal products), and
in the chemical industry (from hydroelectric energy and other
natural resources to a.o fertilizers and plastics). In many
cases, the process of diversification on the basis of initial
competitive advantage and import of technology went hand in hand,
as, for instance, in the case of plastics. The impact of this
process of diversification on intra-industry trade depends on
whether export-specialization increases or import-specialization
decreases, but since the latter has been more frequent than the
former, the overall consequence has been increased levels of
measured intra-industry trade.
The process of structural change was not limited to
diversification on the basis of initial competitive advantage. On
the contrary, the Nordic countries caught up and reduced import
dependency in a whole range of chemical and machinery products,
some of them typical research- and development-intensive products
as, for instance, pharmaceuticals and telecommunications. In most
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cases, import dependency as measured by the specialization rate
declined and intra-industry trade increased throughout the
period. Even if some of these products, such as vehicles, are
sold mostly to consumers, the majority of them are capital goods,
which indicates that the sources of intra-industry trade
specialization have to be found between capital-goods users and
capital-goods producers, rather than in consumer-demand
diversity.
However, there is also a group of products, mostly directed for
private consumption, which does not conform to this picture. What
these products have in common is that the import dependency
decreased in the 1960s, reached a minimum in 1973, and increased
thereafter. As a consequence, the level of intra-industry trade
follows a "hat-shaped" curve with a peak in 1973. Typical
examples are consumer electronics, domestic electrical equipment,
manufactures of metals and clothing, products which, all other
differences notwithstanding, have in common that they in the
1970s were approaching the "mature" phase. Other products that at
least partly conform to this pattern are telecommunications and
pumps. As shown in the preceding chapter, the Nordic countries
lost market shares on the OECD market after 1973 for these
products and these losses were matched by increased market shares
for Non-OECD countries on the same market. Thus, the evidence
seem to suggest that these products are typical Vernon cases.
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TABIE 2. SPECIALIZATION-INDICES« NORDIC OXJNI'RIES vs. '!HE OECD MARKEl'
NUMBER 1961 1965 1969 1973 1979 1983
ANIMAIS 1 96.71 96.82 96.17 95.35 95.84 95.99
I:l.2URY 2 95.64 94.85 90.71 86.26 83.29 79.80
FISH 3 82.38 85.75 82.20 78.51 83.82 87.79
CERFAIS 4 -34.99 -38.38 -3.15 -41.03 -22.19 -2.14
FEEDING 5 -11.95 3.92 20.11 17.19 -15.50 -31.11
IEA'lHER 6 29.75 46.38 -46.14 46.69 53.59 60.46
IDOIl1ANU 7 90.72 84.83 80.44 79.79 81.02 78.01
RJLPPAPER 8 93.48 91.92 89.58 88.67 85.43 83.76
TEXTIIES 9 -85.63 -80.90 -75.35 -66.73 -59.75 -51.30
IRONORE 10 99.74 83.63 90.97 82.33 98.51 99.95
STEEL 11 -38.24 -25.49 -12.84 -17.19 3.75 4.73
AilJMINUM 12 30.06 39.98 59.81 56.68 50.35 54.52
0lHERNAT 13 -49.60 -47.14 -40.56 -34.60 -36.17 -30.19
OIIGAS 14 -99.13 -96.79 -90.39 -83.99 -.94 39.13
ORGANIC 15 -53.12 -45.13 -21.45 -45.93 -31.59 -19.30
INORGANIC 16 -68.13 -57.85 -50.75 -41.23 -45.83 -24.25
DYES'lUFF 17 -76.76 -73.39 -56.33 -55.33 -41.56 -54.52
FHARMAC 18 -55.29 -59.35 -53.68 -48.06 -26.29 -11.88
F'ERI'ILIZ 19 -72.75 -72.13 -63.86 -43.33 -55.62 -22.30
PIASTIC 20 -71.09 -72.22 -74.95 -69.90 -55.49 -46.53
0IHERaIE 21 -62.04 -55.36 -55.68 -52.94 -49.65 -49.29
FaVERMAC 22 -56.61 -52.88 -46.29 -35.86 -29.36 -21.34
SPECINW 23 -49.59 -38.69 -25.77 -18.83 -14.56 -17.20
HFA'!aX)L 24 7.43 9.89 15.96 14.80 8.81 13.34
RJMPS 25 -23.49 -23.84 -17.95 -17.40 -22.68 -26.34
TYPEWRITER 26 -49.87 -52.05 -38.32 -30.79 -32.77 -34.24
cn.mJl'ER 27 5.27 -4.05 -16.72 -37.36 -42.72 -45.93
SEMIroND 28 -95.11 -94.45 -93.66 -95.25 -88.75 -84.98
'.I'EI.ECX:M 29 -50.79 -53.80 -32.36 .72 -3.83 -3.41
EI.J:roD 30 -68.43 -59.70 -57.99 -54.24 -53.77 -46.20
CONSEIEC 31 -79.14 -58.67 -66.28 -26.44 -39.15 -40.35
~ 32 -63.66 -43.04 -8.25 -2.05 -13.43 -9.15
INSTRUMENTS 33 -69.44 -67.86 -59.43 -48.46 -41.10 -35.83
VEHICIES 34 -75.29 -72.37 -53.84 -31.55 -24.26 -14.17
AIRCRAFT 35 -68.00 -87.33 -92.72 -95.23 -80.64 -81.68
SHIPS 36 -44.73 -36.27 7.65 -9.58 10.04 20.96
OIHERENG 37 -54.88 -54.21 -49.85 -44.67 -38.07 -42.14
MANMEl'AL 38 -37.49 -28.51 -21.12 -13.49 -21.28 -28.72
FURNI'IURE 39 69.38 64.97 51.12 59.84 44.55 55.20
CWIHING 40 -65.06 -63.81 -56.04 -33.06 -52.84 -50.98
NEC 41 -51.38 -47.51 -52.28 -31.48 -36.39 -38.41
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TABlE 3. INI'RA-INIXJSTRY TRADE-INDICES , NORDIC c:x:xJNl'RIFS vs. '!HE OECD MARKEl'
NUMBER 1961 1965 1969 1973 1979 1983
ANIMAlS 1 3.29 3.18 3.83 4.65 4.16 4.01
DAIRY 2 4.36 5.15 9.29 13.74 16.71 20.20
FISH 3 17.62 14.25 17.80 21.49 16.18 12.21
CEREAlS 4 65.01 61.62 96.85 58.97 77.81 97.86
FEEDING 5 88.05 96.08 79.89 82.81 84.50 68.89
IEA'IHER 6 70.25 53.62 53.86 53.31 46.41 39.54
YroINANU 7 9.28 15.17 19.56 20.21 18.98 21.99
ruLPPAPER 8 6.52 8.08 10.42 11.33 14.57 16.24
TEXl'IIES 9 14.37 19.10 24.65 33.27 40.25 48.70
IRONORE 10 .26 16.37 9.03 17.67 1.49 .05
SI'EEL 11 61.76 74.51 87.16 82.81 96.25 95.27
AI1JMINUM 12 69.94 60.02 40.19 43.32 49.65 45.48
0llIERNAT 13 50.40 52.86 59.44 65.40 63.83 69.81
OIIGAS 14 .87 3.21 9.61 16.01 99.06 60.87
ORGANIC 15 46.88 54.87 78.55 54.07 68.41 80.70
INORGANIC 16 31.87 42.15 49.25 58.77 54.17 75.75
DYES'IUFF 17 23.24 26.61 43.67 44.67 58.44 45.48
HIARMAC 18 44.71 40.65 46.32 51.94 73.71 88.12
FERI'ILIZ 19 27.25 27.87 36.14 56.67 44.38 77.70
PIASTIC 20 28.91 27.78 25.05 30.10 44.51 53.47
0IHERam 21 37.96 44.64 44.32 47.06 50.35 50.71
rovERMAC 22 43.39 47.12 53.71 64.14 70.64 78.66
SPECINIXJ 23 50.41 61.31 74.23 81.17 85.44 82.80
HEA'roX>L 24 92.57 90.11 84.04 85.20 91.19 86.66
RJMPS 25 76.51 76.16 82.05 82.60 77.32 73.66
TYPEWRITER 26 50.13 47.95 61.68 69.21 67.23 65.76
a:MruTER 27 94.73 95.95 83.28 62.64 57.28 54.07
SEMICDND 28 4.89 5.55 6.34 4.75 11.25 15.02
TEIECX:M 29 49.21 46.20 67.64 99.28 96.17 96.59
ELPROD 30 31.57 40.30 42.01 45.76 46.23 53.80
CONSEIEC 31 20.86 41.33 33.72 73.56 60.85 59.65
~ 32 36.34 56.96 91.75 97.95 86.57 90.85
INSTRUMENTS 33 30.56 32.14 40.57 51.54 58.90 64.17
VEHICIES 34 24.71 27.63 46.16 68.45 75.74 85.83
AIRCRAFT 35 32.00 12.67 7.28 4.77 19.36 18.32
SHIPS 36 55.27 63.73 92.35 90.42 89.96 79.04
OIHERENG 37 45.12 45.79 50.15 55.33 61.93 57.86
MANMEl'AL 38 62.51 71.49 78.88 86.51 78.72 71.28
FURNI'IURE 39 30.62 35.03 48.88 40.16 55.45 44.80
CIDIHING 40 34.94 36.19 43.96 66.94 47.16 49.02
NEe 41 48.62 52.49 47.72 68.52 63.61 61.59
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Finally, there are two very research- and development-intensive
and closely related products where the Nordic countries do not
seem to succeed: semiconductors and computers. Both products are
characterized by a high rate of innovation and sUbstantial static
and dynamic economies of scale. Thus, it may be taken as examples
of a Van Duijn-like type of diffusion pattern. In semiconductors,
import dependency remains very high and intra-industry trade Very
low, while in computers import dependency increases and intra-
industry trade decreases throughout the period. As noted in
chapter 5 this reflects that Nordic producers did not manage to
keep competitive when micro-electronic technology sUbstituted a
whole range of traditional electronic, electromechanical and
mechanical technologies in the late 1960s.
The Nordic countries' trade with the Non-OECD area
Table 4 reports weighted, non-adjusted indices of intra-industry
trade between the Nordic countries and the Non-OECD area for
selected years 1965-19838• The Non-OECD area consists of all Non-
8 The results for 1961 did not conform well to the results
for 1965 and 1969. We have no good explanation for this, but
since we cannot exclude the possibility that this is caused by
bad statistics, we decided not to present the results for 1961.
Finland was not a member of the OECD in 1961 and we therefore had
to supplement the OECD data by other sources. For the trade
between Finland and the OECD area, OECD's import from Finland
were used together with national sources and published data from
the UN. For Finland's trade with the Non-OECD area and the
socialist countries, we had to rely on national sources and
published data from the UN only, and since the commodity and
country breakdown of these data did not conform to the one used
here, we had to make a number of assumptions, which, eventually,
may prove to be wrong. But even so, this is probably not enough
to explain the discrepancies between the recorded levels of
intra-industry trade in 1961 and 1965.
208
OECD countries except the Soviet union and the socialist
countries in Europe. Thus, this group of countries may
alternatively be labeled "developing countries".
TABLE 4. INTRA INDUSTRY TRADE. NORDIC COUNTRIES VS. THE NON OECD
AREA
1965 1969 1973 1979 1983
ALL 12.12 13.61 17.70 19.30 25.91
NATUR.RES 16.32 20.69 27.03 31.69 35.00
CHEMICALS 25.99 22.22 24.32 18.24 19.63
MACHINERY 2.21 5.78 11.52 10.35 17.96
OTHER 28.09 28.91 26.53 42.66 43.62
When compared to the trade between the Nordic countries and the
Non-OECD countries, a number of interesting differences emerge.
First, the levels of intra-industry trade between the Nordic
countries and the Non-OECD countries were much lower in all
sectors than between the Nordic countries and the OECD countries,
as should be expected from the type of models discussed in the
second section of this chapter. Second, while the overall level
of intra-industry trade between the Nordic countries and the OECD
area declined - after 1979, it increased very fast between the
Nordic countries and the Non-OECD area. Third, while chemicals
were the sector where intra-industry trade grew fastest in the
Nordic countries' trade with the OECD area, intra-industry trade
actually declined in this sector in the trade between the Nordic
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countries and the Non-OEeD countries. And fourth, while intra-
industry trade in machinery stagnated between the Nordic
countries and the OEeD area after the early 1970s, intra-
industry trade in this sector increased very fast between the
Nordic countries and the Non-OEeD countries after 1979. Thus,
with a possible exception for products based on natural
resources, the tendencies differ very much from those discussed
in the previous section, both on the aggregate and the sector
level.
To understand what happened, it is necessary to turn to the
development of the Nordic countries' pattern of specialization in
relation to the Non-OEeD countries (table 5). But in doing this,
one has to bear in mind that the Nordic countries' trade with the
Non-OEeD countries is much less developed and less regular than
with the OEeD countries, and that stochastic year-to-year
variations should be expected to be more frequent. This is also
the case, as can be seen form a brief inspection of table 5,
especially within products based on natural resources.
Even so, it is possible to detect a broad tendency within
products based on natural resources in the direction of decreased
import dependency, a tendency which is reflected in increased
levels of measured intra-industry trade. Throughout the 1960s,
the Nordic countries were import-specialized in 6 out of 13
products based on natural resources, in 1979 they remained so in
4, and in 1983 in 3 products,
three products, the measured
only. Furthermore, even in these
level of import specialization
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declined markedly and intra-industry trade increased, throughout
the period. It should be noticed, however, that this tendency was
counteracted by a tendency towards increasing export
specialization and decreasing intra-industry trade in a number of
products.
The general trend in chemicals was not very different from the
trend in products based on natural resources, but the point of
departure was different in the sense that the Nordic countries in
the 1960s were export-specialized in 6 out of 7 chemical
products. This pattern of specialization was stable throughout
the period, but the level of export-specialization increased ,
especially in dyestuffs, fertilizers and other chemical products.
As a consequence, intra-industry trade decreased.
211
TABlE 5. SPECIALIZATION rnoICES « NORDIC CXXJNIRIES vs. '!HE NON-OECD MARKEl'
NUMBER I965 I969 I973 I979 I983
ANIMAlS 1 57.18 66.86 40.05 38.79 71.75
DAIRY 2 99.98 98.91 94.30 99.28 98.93
FISH 3 80.13 81.26 73.86 25.35 13.81
CERFAIS 4 -62.82 -18.76 15.00 26.55 67.23
FEEDING 5 -97.61 -98.44 -86.34 -82.22 -70.89
lEA'IHER 6 -73.43 -76.25 -93.89 -74.75 14.15
~rMANU 7 -28.29 -21.26 ':'28.49 50.79 70.17
ruLPPAPER 8 99.89 99.89 91.75 92.96 94.83
TEXI'IIES 9 -67.28 -56.25 -51.19 -44.35 -46.84
IRONORE 10 -100.00 -98.27 -100.00 94.73 99.40
STEEL 11 74.43 60.57 55.84 62.33 65.94
AIIJMINUM 12 62.74 25.75 55.97 78.52 51.46
OIHERNAT 13 -87.46 -83.72 -75.60 -68.51 -57.36
OIIGAS 14 -99.75 -99.77 -99.85 -96.62 -91.89
ORGANIC 15 55.20 85.29 65.19 67.39 61.13
mORGANIC 16 -81.06 -80.57 -70.45 -76.04 -74.82
DYES'IUFF 17 47.46 80.56 81.29 87.64 89.14
FHARMAC 18 86.07 74.96 86.12 87.95 83.87
FERrILIZ 19 71.80 48.61 73.02 82.99 93.48
PlASTIC 20 95.62 91.11 97.17 93.65 91.26
a:mEROIE 21 64.01 72.63 79.08 90.24 87.20
ro-mRMAC 22 96.56 94.69 94.91 95.07 98.30
SPECINW 23 99.45 99.15 98.03 96."/9 95.66
HEATOX>L 24 99.89 99.77 99.08 99.47 99.42
:roMPS 25 98.70 98.88 93.68 95.21 94.18
'l'YPE.WRITER 26 98.23 97.90 77.32 94.17 54.83
<nmJI'ER 27 81.02 96.97 85.39 64.73 41.39
SEMICDND 28 65.85 86.87 -70.38 -72.04 -73.43
'l'EI.E<XM 29 99.66 99.82 98.02 94.73 94.04
ELPROD 30 98.02 97.22 90.80 92.64 87.05
CDNSEIEC 31 91.26 71.40 -14.23 -49.98 -55.47
~ 32 99.61 98.28 84.70 77.43 56.14
mSTRUMENTS 33 86.81 80.93 74.69 59.70 65.41
VEHIClES 34 96.95 98.12 97.21 95.42 92.12
AJ:RaWiT 35 99.65 93.70 84.34 21.36 91.19
SHIPS 36 99.22 89.94 82.92 86.73 68.44
OIHERENG 37 95.04 90.75 84.81 86.28 83.60
MANMErAL 38 93.09 89.75 76.33 73.71 69.46
FURNI'IURE 39 79.11 42.57 57.88 50.90 50.90
CI.DIHING 40 -96.46 -97.15 -97.82 -93.62 -93.10
NEC 41 ' 11.85 -15.16 -28.74 -8.09 -11.50
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TABlE 6. INTRA- INJ:US'IRY TRADE lNDICES , NORDIC axJNTRIFS vs. NON-QECD MARKEl'
NUMBER 1965 1969 1973 1979 1983
ANIMAIS 1 42.82 33.14 59.95 61.21 28.25
DlURY 2 .02 1.09 5.70 .72 1.07
FISH 3 19.87 18.74 26.14 74.65 86.19
CERFAIS 4 37.18 81.24 85.00 73.45 32.77
FEEDING 5 2.39 1.56 13.66 17.78 29.11
IEA'lHER 6 26.57 23.75 6.11 25.25 85.85
~mANU 7 71.71 78.74 71.51 49.21 29.83
RJLPPAPER 8 .11 .11 8.25 7.04 5.17
TIDcr'IIES 9 32.72 43.75 48.81 55.65 53.16
IRONORE 10 0 1.73 0 5.27 .60
STEEL 11 25.57 39.43 44.16 37.67 34.06
AIlJMINUM 12 37.26 74.25 44.03 21.48 48.54
OIHERNAT 13 12.54 16.28 24.40 31.49 42.64
OIIGAS 14 .25 .23 .15 3.38 8.11
ORGANIC 15 44.80 14.71 34.81 32.61 38.87
INORGANIC 16 18.94 19.43 29.55 23.96 25.18
DYES'IUFF 17 52.54 19.44 18.71 12.36 10.86
fHARMAC 18 13.93 25.04 13.88 12.05 16.13
FERl'ILIZ 19 28.20 51.39 26.98 17.01 6.52
PIASTIC 20 4.38 8.89 2.83 6.35 8.74
0IHERaIE 21 35.99 27.37 20.92 9.76 12.80
IaVERMAC 22 3.44 5.31 5.09 4.93 1.70
SPECINJ:U 23 .55 .85 1.97 3.21 4.34
HFATOX>L 24 .11 .23 .92 .53 .58
RJMPS 25 1.30 1.12 6.32 4.79 5.82
'IYPEWRITER 26 1.77 2.10 22.68 5.83 45.17
~ 27 18.98 3.03 14.61 35.27 58.61
SEMIroND 28 34.15 13.13 29.62 27.96 26.57
TEIEa::M 29 .34 .18 1.98 5.27 5.96
ELPROD 30 1.98 2.78 9.20 7.36 12.95
CDNSEIEC 31 8.74 28.60 85.77 50.02 44.53
~ 32 .39 1.72 15.30 22.57 43.86
rnS'I'RUMENlS 33 13.19 19.07 25.31 40.30 34.59
VEHICIES 34 3.05 1.88 2.79 4.58 7.88
AIRCRAFT 35 .35 6.30 15.66 78.64 8.81
SHIPS 36 .78 10.06 17.08 13.27 31.56
OIHERENG 37 4.96 9.25 15.19 13.72 16.40
MANMEI'AL 38 6.91 10.25 23.67 26.29 30.54
RJRNI'IURE 39 20.89 57.43 42.12 49.10 49.10
CI.DIHrnG 40 3.54 2.85 2.18 6.38 6.90
NEC 41 88.15 84.84 71.26 91.91 88.50
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In the 1960s, the Nordic countries' degree of export
specialization in machinery was close to one hundred(complete
export-specialization), and intra-industry trade close to zero.
For the majority of machinery products, this pattern of
specialization remained stable throughout the period, but there
were notable exceptions: Typewriters, computers and peripherals,
consumer electronics, domestic electrical equipment, instruments
and ships.9 For these six products, the Nordic countries' degree
of export specialization declined from the 1960s onwards, even if
the Nordic countries remained export-specialized in all but one
(consumer electronics). As a consequence, intra-industry trade in
these six products, and in machinery as a whole, increased
throughout the 1970s and early 1980s. A similar explanation may
be found for the growth of intra-industry trade in traditional
industrial products during the same period: Intra-industry trade
increased, because the Nordic countries' export specialization in
metal products decreased.
Summing up: The case of the Nordic countries
In the early-mid 1960s, the Nordic countries were in a typical
"middle" position in the international division of labour. In
9 Also semiconductors were an exception, but since the
level of trade between the Nordic countries and the Non-OEeD area
was almost negligible in this category, we will not draw any
conclusions from this.
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relation to the OECD countries, the Nordic countries' pattern of
specialization was rather "peripheral" : A high degree of export
specialization in a number of products based on natural
resources, and a high degree of import specialization in most
other products, especially the technologically more advanced
ones. But in relation to the Non-OECD countries, the Nordic
countries' pattern of specialization was more "developed"
Import-specialized in a number of products based on natural
resources and clothing, export-specialized in all other products,
especially the technologically more advanced ones.
As shown in chapter 5, what happened during the 1960s was that
the Nordic countries in relation to the rest of the OECD "traded
up the development ladder". Gradually, the Nordic countries
became more competitive and increased production capacity within
a whole range of industries, partly by diversifying from natural
resources to industries using natural resources, partly by
imitation and technology import. As a consequence, import
dependency was reduced and intra-industry trade increased in a
number of products, most markedly within the machinery sector.
In relation to the Non-OECD countries, the Nordic countries'
pattern of specialization remained relatively unchanged during
the 1960s. But by the early 1970s it became clear that many
developing countries were trading up the development ladder, too.
Gradually, they became more competitive and increased production
capacity within a range of maturing products, i.e. products where
technology is well known and transferable and cost
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competitiveness is decisive. As a consequence, the export
specialization of the Nordic countries in their trade with the
Non-OECD countries decreased throughout the 1970s and early
1980s in a number of maturing products, resulting in increasing
intra-industry trade.
Thus, what happened during the 1970s was a gradual shift in
comparative advantage in favour of less developed, low-cost
countries, as they managed to cope with the technology necessary
for exploiting their potential cost advantages. As a consequence,
high-cost Nordic producers gradually lost ground in a number of
maturing products, not only in Third World markets, but in the
OECD market as well. In their trade with the OECD-countries, the
Nordic countries became gradually more import specialized in such
products throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, and as a
consequence intra-industry trade decreased. It is worthwhile
noticing, that the same factor which caused intra-industry trade
between the Nordic countries and the OECD countries to decrease,
caused the intra-industry trade between the Nordic countries and
the Non-OECD countries to increase.
However, there is one sector where the Nordic countries seem to
develop a new comparative advantage: Chemicals. In the trade with
the OECD countries, where the Nordic countries initially were
import-specialized, the increasing competitiveness of Nordic
producers in this sector caused import specialization tc
decrease and intra-industry to increase throughout the period.
But in their trade with the Non-OECD countries, the increasec
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competitiveness of the Nordic countries within this sector caused
intra-industry trade to decrease, because in this case increasing
competitiveness caused export specialization to increase.
6.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Recently, several writers have.developed models which show that
intra-industry trade is what should be expected in a world where
imperfect competition and economies of scale prevail. However,
these models are all essentially static. Very little research has
been done, both theoretical and applied, on the dynamics of
intra-industry trade.
The approach of this study differs from the one referred to above
by focusing on trade as a medium for diffusion of technology,
sector- and product-specific conditions for diffusion, and shifts
in comparative advantages across countries. However, it should
be stressed that the approach of this chapter complements rather
than contradicts other types of explanation of intra-industry
trade. In sectors or products where the structure of comparative
advantage across countries does not change much over time, it is
quite probable that the most important source of intra-industry
trade is to be found in the link between economies of scale and
the market structure. But where sector- or product-specific
conditions of diffusion cause the structure of comparative
advantage across countries to change radically, as they often do,
this is a source of intra-industry trade of its own. The
empirical evidence considered by this chapter suggests that the
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latter type of diffusion pattern has had strong influence 0
measured levels of intra-industry trade for the countries an
time spans under consideration.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLOSION
The basic questions addressed by this study have been why some
countries grow faster than others, what determines trade perfor-
mance (competitiveness/specialization) and how trade and growth
interact.
These questions are by no means new. On the contrary, they
belong to the core of international economics. It is fair to
say, however, that the theory of international economics for
some time has been in a state of flux. Beginning with Ricardo,
and continuing with Ohlin, Samuelson and others, the theory of
international trade has gradually developed into an applied ver-
sion of general equilibrium theory. The same holds for growth
theory (Solow and others). In both cases, much effort has been
devoted to establishing the properties of optimal equilibrium
solutions and discussing the implications for economic policy.
However, these conclusions rest on very restrictive assumptions
on technology and economic behaviour. Unless these assumptions-
including that of general equilibrium - are shown to hold, at
least in an approximate sense, there is no reason to expect that
the actual international economy should share the properties
predicted by the theory. Nevertheless, this is what many resear-
chers, until recently at least, seem to have been expecting.
However, as shown in chapter 1, applied research has in many
cases revealed that the actual international economy does not
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possess the properties that the neoclassical theories "predict".
These findings have launched a still ongoing search for new ways
to explain international economic phenomena.
As pointed out in chapter 1, many of these attempts came to adopt
Schumpeterian perspectives on the working of the economy. This is
certainly no coincidence. In contrast to the neoclassicals,
Schumpeter strongly emphasized that the actual economy would
never be in a state of equilibrium, and that the study of actual
economic developments has to be based on an understanding of
disequilibrium dynamics. According to Schumpeter, economic deve-
lopment should be analysed as the interplay of two conflicting
forces: innovations which create disequilibria, and diffusion or
imitation which tends to reduce them. Since this is a continuous
process, the economy will never settle down on a (moving) equili-
brium. Indeed, Schumpeter points out, even "to speak of "moving
equilibria" may prove misleading, in the face of the fact that
what really happens is destruction of equilibria in the received'
meaning of the term" (Schumpeter, 1928, p.369). Thus, without
explicitly denouncing equilibrium theory as such, he laid the
foundations for a qualitatively different approach to the study
of economic development, including international economics, than
that of general equilibrium theory.
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Take, for instance, the question of "why growth rates differ"
between countries (chapter 2 of this study). The neoclassical
theory of growth predicts that economic growth is a linear func-
tion of the growth in the factors of production (capital and
labour) and exogenous technical progress ("manna from heaven").!
However, when this model is applied to the actual differences in
growth between countries on different levels of economic apd
technological development, a large part of the differences in
growth continues to be unaccounted for. In applied work, there-
fore, the above factors are often supplemented by "the scope for
imitation", measured as the distance between the productivity
level of the country in question and world productivity frontier,
or other factors related to disequilibria that exist within and
between countries. But in the long run these disequilibrium fac-
tors are assumed to vanish and all countries converge towards
the world productivity frontier. Thus, even when disequilibrium
assumptions are introduced into the equilibrium framework, impor-
tant phenomena such as changes of technological leadership and
the existence of laggards continue to be unexplained. The main
reason for this, the presents study argues, is the assumption
that when differences in the scope for imitation are adjusted
for, all countries should be expected to gain equally from tech-
nological progress.
! According to the neoclassical theory of growth, when
time grows towards indefinitely, the capital-term will vanish
and economic growth become a function of growth in labour
supply and exogenous technical progress alone. However, in
applied studies, the growth of capital (or the saving rate)
is always included, e.g. it is implicitly assumed the economy
is not in a state of long run equilibrium.
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In contrast to the neoclassical view, where growth in knowledge
is treated as "manna from heaven", Schumpeterian (or neo-Schum-
peterian) analyses treat growth of knowledge as the outcome of
technological activities, e.g. innovative efforts of firms, re-
search and development efforts in the public sector and inter-
action processes (learning) between firms and their environments.
According to this view knowledge is both specific, in the sense
that in most cases advances in knowledge cannot be automatically
transferred from one environment (firm, sector, industry or
country) to another, and cumulative, in the sense that advances
in knowledge in one area tend to lead to further advances within
the same or related areas. This implies that imitation in many
cases is difficult and costly to undertake, especially in the
early phases of the life cycle. Thus, even though diffusion to
other countries will take place, this takes time, and in the
meantime the economic benefits accrue solely to the innovating
country. It follows, other factors left apart, that if the natio-
nal technological activities of one country continue to grow
faster than that of another country, the former, more "dynamic"
country should be expected to have a higher rate of technical
progress and, hence, growth than the latter. If the more dynamic
country is a leader country, this will help it to keep its lead,
if it is a follower country, this will help it to catch up and,
eventually, surpass the (former) leader (change of leadership).
The findings ~f this study (chapter 2) support the view that
differences in the growth of national technological activities,
together with differences in the scope for imitation and efforts
related to the economic exploitation of innovation and diffu-
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sion, contribute significantly to differences in growth perfor-
mance between countries.
However, the model of economic growth set out in chapter 2
abstracts from trade, which is, of course, a major shortcoming,
since trade is often assumed to play a crucial role in the dis-
tribution of the economic benefits that come out of the inter-
national process of innovation and diffusion. To take trade into
account, however, we have to be more specific on how domestic and
international markets work. Here the traditional neoclassical
models with their sole emphasis on price competition are of
little help since, as every manager knows, the outcomes of compe-
titive processes depend as much on technology as on price. To
Schumpeter this was so obvious that he, too optimistically it
seems, took it for granted that economists would take this into
account in their future analyses:
"Economists are at long last emerging from the stage in
which price competition was all they saw. As soon as quality
competition and sales effort are admitted into the sacred
precincts of theory, the price variable is ousted from its
dominant position. However, it is still competition within a
rigid pattern of invariant conditions, methods of production
and forms of industrial organization in particular, that
practically monopolizes attention. But in capitalist reality
as distinguished from its textbook picture, it is not that
kind of competition which counts, but the competition from
the new commodity, the new technology, the new source of
supply, the new type of organization (the largest-scale unit
of control for instance) - competition which commands a
decisive cost or quality advantage and which strikes not at
the margins of the profits and the outputs of the existing
firms, but'at their foundations and their very lives. This
kind of competition is as much more effective than the other
as a bombardment in comparison with forcing a door, and so
much more important that it becomes a matter of comparative
indifference whether competition in the ordinary sense
functions more or less promptly; the powerful lever that in
the long run expands output and brings down prices is in any
case made of other stuff." (Schumpeter, 1947, pp. 84-85).
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Following this view, chapter 3 developed an open economy model
where the growth in a country's market share, domestically as
well as abroad, was assumed to depend on the ability to compete
in technology, the ability to compete in price and the ability to
compete in delivery (capacity). By definition, the growth in a
country's market shares (domestically and abroad), the growth in
terms of trade and the growth in world demand add up to "the
balance-of-payments equilibrium growth rate"2, to which the
actual growth rate was assumed to adjust. In addition, demand was
assumed to feed back on competitiveness by affecting the ability
to deliver and stimulating investments in productive capacity.
Prices and, hence, terms of trade were assumed to depend (mark-up
pricing) on unit wage costs (assumed to be exogenously determi-
ned). Thus, the model combines the Schumpeterian emphasis on
innovation (technological competition) with Keynesian (or post-
Keynesian) features such as mark-up pricing and an accelerator-
based investment function. However, since differences in invest-
ments across countries also depend on differences in institutio-
nal and economic structures, these were also taken into account
when testing the model.
The findings of chapter 3 suggest that in the long run the growth
of market shares is determined mainly by technological factors,
e.g. the scope for imitation, the growth in national technologi-
cal activity (or technological competitiveness) and efforts
related to the economic exploitation of innovation and diffusion
2 This is the growth rate which secures that the current
account, if initially balanced, continues to be in balance.
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(investments), while differences in the growth of unit labour
costs were found to be of minor importance. These results are
consistent with the finding by Thirlwall (1979), that growth in
the long run can be explained without reference to relative
prices or costs, by the relation between income elasticities for
exports and imports. The explanation proposed here is simply that
the estimated differences in income elasticities of demand for
exports and imports reflect different degrees of technological
competitiveness.3 The findings of chapter 3 were also shown to be
consistent with the observations by Kaldor(1979) and others that
market shares for exports and unit labour costs often move toget-
her instead of in opposite directions as many other models sug-
gest. The explanation in this case is, as suggested by Schumpe-
ter, that differences in technological competitiveness more than
outweigh differences in price or cost competitiveness.
The model presented in chapter 3, though relatively elaborated
compared to the model presented in chapter 2 and most other
approaches to the subject, has one major shortcoming when related
to the Schumpeterian perspective adopted in this study: the one-
sector framework. According to the perspective outlined in chap-
3 If one country, say, Japan, continuously increases its
level of technological competitiveness relative to other coun-
tries and gains market shares domestically as well as abroad,
this should, given the models and methods normally applied in
estimating in~ome elasticities of demand for total exports and
imports, be reflected in a relatively high income elasticity for
exports and a relatively low income elasticity for imports.
However, these estimates may also reflect the level of technolo-
gical activity, since countries that produce new advanced goods,
for which demand is above average, in most cases also have a high
level of technological activity and vice versa. This case is
discussed in more detail below.
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ter 1, world demand should be expected to grow faster for new,
advanced products, originating from R&D-intensive industries and
firms, than for more mature products. Since the character of the
goods that a country produces is closely related to its level of
national technological activity, it follows that the growth of-
world demand will affect countries differently depending on their
levels of technological activity. For instance, a country t~at
has a higher level of technological activity or a higher share of
new, advanced products in production than the average, will
normally face an above average growth in the demand for its
exports. Similarly, a country that has a lower level of tech-
nological activity or a higher share of mature goods in produc-
tion than the average, will normally face a below-average growth
in the demand for its products. Thus the level of technological
activity and the composition of production and trade enter as
important factors determining the competitiveness of a country.
In principle, this could be taken into account by developing a
multi-sector version of the model presented in chapter 3, but in
this study (chapter 4) we have adopted a simpler approach.
Chapter 4 presents evidence on the relation between the inter-
national process of innovation-diffusion, the changing composi-
tion of world trade and the export performance of countries with
different sets of characteristics. Between 1961 and 1983 the
composition o'f world trade changed quite radically. The main
source of these changes was found to be the creation and sub-
sequent diffusion of new products and technologies originating in
R&D-intensive industries, especially the electronics and chemical
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industries. In general, these changes were shown to be most
favourable for countries with a high level of technological
activity and a relatively large domestic market. According to
chapter 4 the group of countries most favourably affected in-
cludes the United States, Japan, Germany (BRD), the United King-
dom, Italy and Switzerland.4 However, in some cases (the United
States and the United Kingdom in particular), favourable demand
effects were outweighed by declining market shares within in-
dividual commodity groups and a lack of ability to adjust the
production structure in pace with the changing structure of world
demand. Even if one should be extremely cautious in interpreting
results obtained from pooled regressions on data for individual
countries, it is worth noticing that the analysis of chapter 3
suggests that this may be part of the price paid by these coun-
tries for their participation in the Cold War.3
As noted, with one exception (Switzerland), the countries most
favourably affected by the structural changes in the composition
of world demand in the period covered by this study were all
relatively large countries. This raises the important issue of
4 These countries are mentioned because the commodity
composition effects were positive in both periods. Other count-
ries that share some of the same characteristics are France
and Sweden, but for these two countries a positive commodity
composition effect in the first period turned to a negative
effect in the second period (though close to zero).
3 Comp ared to other countries, the United States and
the United Kingdom have devoted a much higher share of nat-
ional resources to military expenditures, and a much lower
share of national resources to investments. According to the
calculations (table 4, chapter 3) this explains most of the
losses in market shares by these countries throughout this
period.
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whether there exist significant small country disadvantages
(economies of scale) in new, advanced products and technologies.
The data on revealed comparative advantage (export specializa-
tion) reported in chapter 5 seem to support this view. On avera-
ge, large developed countries have a much higher degree of speci-
alization in high-technology products than the small developed
ones. Indeed, with the exception of Switzerland, all small devel-
oped countries turned out to he specialized in low-technology
products.4 However, though they exist, small-country disadvanta-
ges differ substantially between and within different "high-tech"
industries. As suggested by Walsh (1987) these disadvantages may
in many cases be overcome through the adoption of relevant stra-
tegies, such as supporting domestic user-producer interaction in
areas where domestic competence is strong or through cooperation
(including trade) between small countries. The findings of chap-
ter 5 showed that intra-regional trade between a group of small
countries (the Nordic ones) may function as an important stimulus
to the growth of new, relatively advanced lines of production
based on diffusion of technology from abroad and indigenous
development efforts. However, as the Nordic countries approached
the frontier countries in terms of income per capita, they become
more vulnerable to increased price-competition from the newly
industrialized countries (see below) in a number of areas, and,
at the same time, less inclined to develop their mutual trade and
cooperation further. One possible interpretation of the latter,
which - however - will not be discussed here, is that these
4 Note, however, that Sweden is export specialized in
both medium-technology and low-technology products.
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countries have substituted a regional-integration strategy for a
global-internationalization strategy, with a stronger emphasis on
supporting "national" MNE's (Walsh, 1987).5
While favouring countries with a high level of national tech-
nological activity and sophisticated production structure, the
growing international trade in the Post-War period did at the
same time allow countries on a lower level of economic develop-
ment to catch up and increase market shares through imitation and
exploitation of cost advantages. In fact, in the early Post-War
period, when the United States enjoyed a large technological
lead, most European countries (and, of course, Japan) followed
this route. In later years a number of other countries from
different parts of the world (the NICls) have embarked on the
same route and, as this study shows6, with some success in terms
of market shares for exports on the world market. However, the
increasing price competition (and the strong emphasis on low wage
costs) that characterizes the drive towards maturity, makes this
a questionable strategy to follow in the long run. The results of
this study suggest that to catch up in terms of income per capi-
ta, the NIC's have to combine imitation and exploitation of cost
advantages with a strengthening of their indigenous technological
base and a transformation of their production structure. This,
it may be noted, is exactly what Japan did a few decades ago, and
5 This seems more likely in the Swedish and Finnish cases,
where national MNE's such as Ericsson and Nokia have received
relatively large support (see Dalum et al.,1988), than in the
Norwegian and Danish cases.
6 See tables 5 and 6, chapter 4 and table 8, chapter 5.
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what the Asian NIC's attempt to do today. The Republic of Korea,
for instance, is now reported to have a share of R&D expenditures
in GDP comparable to that of many developed countries.
The continuous transformation of industrial structures and trade
patterns that follows in the wake of the international process of
innovation and diffusion has important implications for the
development of export specialization and, hence, intra-industry
trade. According to the traditional neoclassical theory of inter-
national trade, the growing intra-industry trade that has been
observed in the Post-War period is difficult to account for
because it contradicts the assumption of increasing specializa-
tion on the basis of differences in factor endowments.7 However,
the growth of intra-industry trade is difficult to explain only
as long as the world economy is assumed to approach a state of
general equilibrium. As soon as it is recognized that innovation
causes the products and technologies of the centre countries (as
well as other countries) to change, and that these innovations
thereafter (at different degrees and paces) diffuse to the inter-
national economic environment, a continuous change in specializa-
tion patterns is what should be expected. As shown in chapter 6
7 As pointed out in chapter 6, there have been many attempu
to make the e~istence of intra-industry trade consistent with
neoclassical theory, for instance by introducing assumptions of
imperfect competition. However, while useful, these explanations
do not explain the growth of intra-industry trade. Alternatively,
it is sometimes suggested that increasing intra-industry trade
reflects the increasing importance of intra-MNE trade. While
possible for large, developed countries such as,for instance, the
united states, this is probably not an important factor for the
group of small, developed countries covered in chapter 6.
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this process is likely to lead to a large amount of intra-in-
dustry trade.
The starting point for this study was the observation that many
cases of applied research have provided evidence that has proven
difficult to reconcile with the neoclassical theories of growth
and trade. This is, as noted, no proof that it cannot be done,
and there are, indeed, many attempts to do so. However, this is
not what concerns us here. The purpose of this study has been a
different one, to apply the basic Schumpeterian model of innova-
tion-diffusion to the problem of how technology, growth and trade
interact, and to confront this with empirical evidence from the
Post-War period. In general, the Schumpeterian perspective out-
lined here was found to be consistent with the empirical evidence
considered by the study. However, a few qualifications seem to be
in order.
Firstly, the basic Schurnpeterian hypothesis of a causation run-
ning from innovation to growth has been assumed to be true. No
attempt has been made to test for the direction of causation, or,
more generally, to test alternative models. Thus, what is presen-
ted here is one story, hopefully a convincing one, which is shown
to be consistent with the data. Others may construct other stor-
ies, convincing or not, which may fit the data equally well or
even better, but this task is left to them. Secondly, the focus
of this study has been on the consequences of innovation pro-
cesses for growth and trade, and on how growth and trade inter-
act. No attempt has been made to explain innovation processes.
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Thirdly, and related to the previous point, the level of the
analysis has been that of the world economy, not that of indivi-
dual countries. In general, data from individual countries are
used to analyse the working of the world economy, not the other
way around. What we can hope for is that this throws some light
on why the performance of groups of countries with certain common
characteristics differs. To analyse the performance of individual
countries, a more elaborated framework, which takes differences
in institutional setting and economic structure more explicitly
into account, would be required.
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